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Chair: Mark Allan Clague 
Long considered one of the western world’s cultural treasures, the symphony 
orchestra’s artistic significance belies an institutional history replete with unsolved 
paradoxes. Since at least 1900, the classical performing arts have struggled to reconcile 
artistic creation with economic and cultural sustainability. This tension is rooted in a 
variety of management models that employ distinct ownership structures, revenue 
streams, and artistic ideologies. Along with various other factors, these models have 
played a decisive though often ignored role in determining artistic practices and audience 
reception, especially in America. My dissertation argues that the organizational structure 
employed by orchestras since the late-nineteenth century is fundamental to understanding 
the challenges they face today. Drawing from the domains of historical musicology and 
organizational theory, this project uses the analytic lens of structure—including 
governance arrangements, financial systems, social hierarchies, institutional logics, and 
artistic initiatives—to explain the orchestra’s turbulent yet resilient history.   
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Chapter 1 develops a framework to demonstrate how structure has influenced 
orchestral culture and performance practice. Several early operating models are 
introduced and compared to the corporate structure adopted by twentieth-century 
American orchestras. Chapter 2 explores the New York Philharmonic’s evolution from a 
musician-owned-and-managed cooperative to a board-governed nonprofit, a transition 
shaped by the ideals—and wallets—of a new philanthropic elite. Chapter 3 scrutinizes 
the Louisville Orchestra New Music Project (1948–58), which supported over one 
hundred world premieres and inspired a shift in how orchestras foster the creation of 
contemporary music. Chapter 4 examines the development of a global youth orchestra 
movement, El Sistema, whose recent transplantation to the U.S. highlights a conflict 
between traditional definitions of artistic excellence, commercial viability, and social 
change. The dissertation concludes by synthesizing these strains of evidence and positing 
some solutions for the orchestra’s contemporary challenges, connecting past and present 
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Chapter One  
Untangling the Symphony Orchestra: An Organizational Perspective 
Introduction: A History of Decline, or Business as Usual? 
 In the spring of 1987, Ernest Fleischmann was invited to deliver a commencement 
address to graduates of the Cleveland Institute of Music (CIM). As executive director of 
the Los Angeles Philharmonic since 1969, Fleischmann was well known both for his 
visionary leadership and hard-nosed business acumen. Yet while the trustees of CIM 
were surely aware of Fleischmann’s reputation for being uncompromising and 
opinionated, they could not have anticipated the controversy his address would spark. 
After being introduced by the director of the conservatory, Fleischmann began his 
speech: “It’s [been] more than twenty years since Pierre Boulez started a revolution in the 
opera world with his stern but subtle call to action. Today I want you to know that it’s 
high time to set fire to the symphony orchestra.”1 
 Fleischmann’s address, subsequently published as “The Orchestra is Dead, Long 
Live the Community of Musicians,” has become the stuff of legend, but the crux of his 
argument—that orchestra concerts had become dull, predictable, and overly expensive, 
and musicians increasingly bitter and disinterested—rang true for many industry insiders. 
And while this was not the first time that the artistic, economic, and organizational 
challenges facing orchestras had been discussed, the intensity of the ensuing debate 
                                                 
1
 Ernest Fleischmann, “The Orchestra is Dead, Long Live the Community of Musicians,” transcript of 
commencement address to the Cleveland Institute of Music, 16 May 1987 (available for download at 
http://www.acso.org/). 
  2 
suggests the industry had approached a boiling point. Fleischmann’s most vocal critic 
was Samuel Lipman, co-founder of the literary and culture magazine New Criterion and a 
staunch supporter of the orchestral status quo. He, along with Fleischmann and Cleveland 
Orchestra executive director Tom Morris, was invited to take part in a public symposium 
dedicated to the future of the symphony orchestra in 1989. Although their opinions 
differed as to what the future might look like, they ultimately agreed on one point: “the 
symphony orchestra is very much alive, … but [this] does not mean that its present 
condition is either healthy or happy.”2 
 Discussions concerning diagnosis of the orchestra’s “condition” and possible 
remedies has continued, unabated, for much of the last century, spanning time and place 
and defying uniform explanation. Despite a lack of consensus, the various solutions put 
forward are worth unpacking further. Fleischmann’s proposal involved a larger and more 
flexible “community of musicians,” not unlike the El Sistema movement that was 
simultaneously flourishing in Venezuela and would later be adapted in the U.S. and other 
countries.
3
 Morris insisted that “new and enlightened leadership” was the only way to 
successfully navigate the difficult times that lay ahead. Allegations regarding 
management’s inability to navigate the tension between artistic sophistication and fiscal 
solvency would soon develop into a popular rallying cry for musicians, who grew 
increasingly frustrated with the precarious state of orchestral institutions in general.                       
                                                 
2
 Quoting Samuel Lipman, in “Pure Gold: The Fleischmann–Lipman–Morris Debate of 1987–89,” 
Harmony: Forum of the Symphony Orchestra Institute 2 (April 1996), 60. 
3
 This topic is addressed in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. Pierre Boulez anticipates Fleischmann’s 
suggestion in a 1970 essay, stating “I believe that our aim should be polymorphous groupings: within the 
larger group formed by the orchestra we should make it possible to tackle all the different repertories…. 
This would restore to the orchestra—which would in fact be a cooperative of performers—its sociological 
function, because it would include all the different sectors and in addition provide a certain mobility, an 
ability to move about” (Pierre Boulez, “Orchestras, Concert Halls, Repertory, Audiences,” Orientations: 
Collected Writings, ed. by Jean-Jacques Nattiez (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 467). 
  3 
For senior arts consultant Thomas Wolf, however, such concerns skirted a more 
fundamental issue. In 1992, Wolf was hired by the American Symphony Orchestra 
League (since 2007 known as the League of American Orchestras, or simply the League) 
to research the origins of the orchestra’s economic struggles. His findings were troubling. 
Wolf projected that, by 2002, the aggregate debt of American orchestras would grow to 
$64 million; to escape certain financial collapse, the field must enact a “serious paradigm 
shift” by increasing productivity, cutting artistic costs, and bucking “Baumol’s Curse”—a 
reference to the analysis of Princeton economist William Baumol, who along with 
William Bowen exposed the structural paradox of live orchestral performance.
4
 Published 
in 1966, their research provides a stark explanation of why orchestras and other 
performing arts organizations struggle to earn enough revenue to cover expenses.
5
 The 
authors claim that, unlike most manufacturing and service industries, arts organizations 
suffer from inherently stagnant productivity. No matter the technological advances, the 
number of musicians and time it takes to perform a Beethoven symphony has remained 
more or less unchanged since the nineteenth century. This productivity gap, they argue, is 
the crux of an irreversible structural deficiency that has no obvious remedy.
6
 
 We will return to Baumol’s Curse later in this chapter, but as it turns out, Wolf 
was wrong. In lieu of the anticipated $64 million deficit, the League reported an industry-
wide surplus of $85 million in 2002, suggesting that the problem was solved and a new 
paradigm had been achieved. Yet this was of course not the case. The number of 
                                                 
4
 Douglas J. Dempster, “The Wolf Report and Baumol’s Curse: The Economic Health of American 
Symphony Orchestras in the 1990s and Beyond,” Harmony 15 (October 2002), 1–22. 
5
 William Baumol and William Bowen, Performing Arts—the Economic Dilemma (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1966). 
6
 Several orchestras, including the Berlin and Los Angeles Philharmonic, have recently experimented with 
digital streaming technology as a means of reaching new audiences and erasing the productivity gap 
inherent to live orchestral performance. See chapter 5 for more discussion regarding these developments. 
  4 
orchestral concerts and the salaries of orchestral musicians grew at unprecedented rates, 
thanks to increased levels of giving by individuals, corporations, and foundations. The 
productivity lag highlighted by Baumol and Wolf remained in place, however, as the 
revenue generated from ticket sales covered an increasingly smaller portion of mounting 
artistic and production costs. Thus the orchestra only appeared to have bucked the curse, 
experiencing growth during boom periods in the national economy but ultimately unable 
to match its ever-rising cost structure with gains in ticket sales or audience demand. 
 Fast forward to 2011, and the tension between financial stability and artistic 
excellence on the orchestral stage is as palpable as ever. After the so-called “Great 
Recession” (beginning in 2007) took a firm hold of the global economy, businesses and 
for-profit institutions once accustomed to hefty profits were faced with unprecedented 
financial losses. Not surprisingly, nonprofit performing arts organizations faced an even 
grimmer reality. Nevertheless they continued to exceed expectations, overcoming a 
flawed business model to produce and disseminate art of the highest quality. The 
struggles that orchestras face are particularly acute, due to the large cache of musicians 
and administrative staff needed to produce and present concerts. In 2007–08, for instance, 
the Chicago Symphony Orchestra Association boasted 101 musicians, 140 full-time staff, 
and a budget of over $50 million.
7
 To cover such enormous costs, orchestra boards and 
development directors have had to appeal to wealthy donors, lest ticket sales 
miraculously cover a higher proportion of the total budget. While many arts organizations 
might be producing more art at a higher quality than ever before, their means of bringing 
                                                 
7
 As stated in Mark Clague, “Building the American Symphony Orchestra: The Nineteenth-Century Roots 
of a Twentieth-Century Institution,” in American Orchestras in the Nineteenth Century, edited by John 
Spitzer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming). The number of staff listed here (140) includes 
those dedicated to the upkeep and operation of Orchestra Hall, such as box office staff, janitors, security 
guards, stagehands, and rental managers. 
  5 
that art to the public and defining its cultural value is lacking—a deficiency that 
highlights the gap between popular audiences and classical music.
8
  
 To be sure, the economic dilemma confronting orchestras today has been the 
subject of much attention and research from within the industry, having been addressed 
most recently by economist Robert Flanagan in a comprehensive report to the Andrew W. 
Mellon Foundation, one of the nation’s largest arts funders.9 Flanagan’s analysis 
highlights trends in the economic health of orchestras between 1987 and 2008 in an 
attempt to find a “smoking gun” that explains the perennial shortfalls orchestras face. 
Flanagan’s study provides a rich assessment of the problems facing the orchestra, 
positing that the disproportionate growth of musician salaries and the revenue structure of 
orchestras in general are unsustainable and incongruent with the contemporary funding 
environment. Music critics in American and abroad have joined the fray, writing 
extensively on the plight of classical music while asking some difficult but important 
questions.
10
 Why should public or private funds be directed toward struggling orchestras 
and opera companies when the populations they’ve historically served are, in a word, 
elite? 
 Indeed, this question has confronted major American orchestras since their 
earliest founding—in New York (1842), Boston (1881), and Chicago (1890). The 
economics of live performance proved incapable of covering their costs long ago, and the 
                                                 
8
 A lower percentage of the general population attended symphonic concerts in 2008 than in 1980 (National 
Endowment for the Arts, 2008 Survey of Public Participation in the Arts, Research Report No. 49 
(November 2009). 
9
 Robert J. Flanagan, Report to Andrew W. Mellon Foundation: The Economic Environment of American 
Symphony Orchestras (Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, March 2008)  
<http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/ packages/pdf/Flanagan.pdf>. 
10
 See Norman Lebrecht, Who Killed Classical Music?: Maestros, Managers, and Corporate Politics (New 
York: Birch Lane Press, 1997) and Greg Sandow, “The Arts Need Better Arguments,” The Wall Street 
Journal, 18 February 2009, D7. 
  6 
constant struggle artists and institutions face is of very real consequence to the art they 
produce. In 1951, historian John Mueller quipped that “the American symphony 
orchestra, like the genius in the garret, has almost always led a precarious hand-to-mouth 
existence,”11 and eighteen years later Time Magazine chronicled the ongoing struggles of 
America’s most prestigious ensembles, suggesting that these challenges are not new but 
are instead rooted in the structure of both the institution and its audience.
12
 Today 
orchestras in Philadelphia, Louisville, and Detroit are fighting to balance their already 
depleted budgets through capital campaigns, contact renegotiations, and bankruptcy 
proceedings.
13
 These conflicts have worried orchestral donors and incited broader debates 
concerning the value of the arts on Capitol Hill, where some federal legislators have 
formalized plans to cease financing the National Endowments for the Arts and 
Humanities altogether.
14
 The death knell for orchestras, it seems, has been ringing for 
decades, only growing louder as the financial strains under which they operate become 
more pronounced. Just as Ernest Fleischmann remarked nearly 25 years ago, the future of 
the orchestra—at least in its traditional guise—remains in doubt.  
 Yet no real consensus has been reached when defining the orchestra’s problems 
and offering up possible solutions. Is lackluster funding and public support to blame, or, 
as some would have us believe, is it a mixture of mismanagement and corporate greed 
that has landed the orchestra in hot water? Is Baumol’s Curse at the center of this 
                                                 
11
 John H. Mueller, The American Symphony Orchestra: A Social History of Musical Taste (Bloomington, 
IN.: Indiana University Press, 1951), 328. 
12
 “American Orchestras: The Sound of Trouble,” Time Magazine, 13 June 1969. 
13
 The particular challenges faced by these orchestras are discussed in chapter 5, but see Daniel J. Wakin, 
“Philadelphia Orchestra’s Ticket Sales Add to Woes,” The New York Times, 9 February 2010; Elizabeth 
Kramer, “Louisville Orchestra Woes Repeat Nationwide Refrain,” The Louisville Courier-Journal, 26 
January 2010; Daniel J. Wakin, “A Strike Looms at Leonard Slatkin’s Detroit Symphony,” The New York 
Times, 3 October 2010.  
14
 “Conservative Republicans Propose Eliminating Arts and Culture Funding,” The Huffington Post, 21 
January 2011 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/21/conservative-replublicans_n_812415.html>. 
  7 
longstanding imbroglio, or is it an unmitigated reality that orchestra administrators must 
work around? Surely it is a bit of all of these. In a January 2011 article published in USA 
Today and reprinted widely, president of the League of American Orchestras Jesse Rosen 
opined that “several cities’ orchestras are struggling financially, not from some broad 
national trend but from primarily local forces,” suggesting that industry-wide fears 
concerning economic sustainability were unfounded.
15
 That same month, president and 
CEO of the Kennedy Center Michael Kaiser (dubbed “The Turnaround King” for his 
success in improving struggling performing arts organization) conceded that the problem 
was national in scope, but insisted that orchestras “have not built the fundraising bases 
they need to support themselves. They've relied too much on earned income, and when 
earned income goes away, they're in trouble.”16  
 These statements offer some explanation regarding the industry’s apparent 
decline, but they do not adequately justify the cycle of crisis it regularly confronts. In my 
dissertation, I argue that the organizational structures and strategies employed by 
symphony orchestras since the late–nineteenth century are critical to understanding the 
challenges they face today. As outlined above, the classical performing arts have long 
struggled to reconcile definitions of excellence with traditional measurements of success, 
financial or otherwise. This unresolved tension is rooted in a variety of management 
models that employ distinct ownership structures, revenue streams, and artistic 
ideologies. Along with various other factors, these models have played a decisive though 
                                                 
15
 Quoted in Tim Evans, “Orchestras Struggle to Play On,” USA Today, 16 January 2011. 
16
 Quoted in Kramer, “Louisville Orchestra Woes Repeat Nationwide Refrain.” Kaiser expounds on the 
problems facing orchestras in a February blog post for The Huffington Post, listing an oversupply of 
concerts, declining demand, inflexible fixed costs, the death of the recording industry, and the end of the 
subscription-based ticketing model (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-kaiser/the-orchestra-
conundrum_b_819434.html?ref=fb&src=sp). 
  8 
often ignored role in determining artistic practice. In the chapters that follow, I 
investigate partial histories of the New York Philharmonic, Louisville Orchestra, and El 
Sistema to establish links between organizational structure, commercial viability, and 
artistic output—including prevailing programming trends, compositional styles, 
performance practices, and public reception.  
Scholars have only recently argued that the way in which orchestras are organized 
shapes cultural production, and while most of these contributions have come from outside 
the humanities, musicology is uniquely situated to offer new insights on the topic.
17
 The 
interconnectedness between organizational structure and artistic practice can be traced 
throughout the orchestra’s history, substantiating a repeating narrative of inevitable crisis 
and unlikely survival. The concept of “organizational structure” is intentionally broad and 
will be used here as a lens through which to analyze the orchestra’s institutional history 
and artistic choices. In the chapters that follow, it subsumes several interrelated 
phenomena, including financial structures, social interactions, symbolic systems of 
meaning, modes of cultural production, and business or management models.
18
 These 
different models impact the day-to-day operations of an orchestra and reflect the values 
and divisions of power present in the community they serve. Although the boundaries 
between these categories were in practice quite flexible, the corporate nonprofit model 
became the structure of choice for American orchestras around 1900. Over the course of 
the next hundred years, a process of deliberate professionalization led to the further 
                                                 
17
 See Stephen R. Couch, “Patronage and Organizational Structure in Symphony Orchestras in London and 
New York,” in Performers and Performances: The  Social Organization of Artistic Work, edited by Jack B. 
Kamerman and Rosanne Martorella (New York: Praeger, 1983), 109–22.  
18
 For an example of how cultural production and organizational structure are inextricably linked, see Mark 
Clague, “The Industrial Evolution of the Arts: Chicago’s Auditorium Building (1889- ) as Cultural 
Machine,” The Opera Quarterly 22, no. 3-4 (Summer-Autumn 2006): 477-511. 
  9 
entrenchment of this model and the ritual of orchestral performance in general. This 
process and its consequences serve as the locus of my dissertation, which unites artistic 
and economic trends to uncover new perspectives on high art music in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. 
Below, I construct a framework so that we might better understand the 
organizational structure adopted by most performing arts nonprofits in America. In 
addition to a synthesis of extant scholarship from the fields of musicology, cultural 
history, sociology, economics, and organizational theory, I will investigate some of the 
earlier operating models used for presenting orchestral music, including cooperative, 
entrepreneurial, and autocratic systems that were retired in favor of the now-ubiquitous 
nonprofit model. Connecting this shift with distinct artistic strategies and cultural norms 
that took root in the early twentieth century helps to explain why the orchestra as an 
organization continues to behave the way it does. Indeed, such an interdisciplinary and 
varied approach is necessary to describe as complex an institution as the symphony 
orchestra. My goal here is to bring these viewpoints together to provide a more coherent 
and historically informed understanding of the orchestra since 1900.  
 Although the continued survival of the symphony orchestra may be in doubt, a 
close reading of its history suggests that crisis is as much a part of the orchestra’s 
institutional DNA as are Beethoven and Tchaikovsky. Implementing widespread change 
in the face of continual crisis is a difficult task, indeed. When Pierre Boulez was music 
director of the New York Philharmonic, he broached the topic with characteristic clarity: 
“Try … simply as a matter of organization, to modify the constitution of an orchestra. 
You will see that you will almost certainly encounter deep hostility, from both public and 
  10 
players.”19 The reasons for this hostility are complex and will be addressed later on in this 
and other chapters, but one could argue that the division stems from the distinct and often 
opposing agendas of orchestra managers, musicians, and patrons. Without consensus as 
to what makes an orchestra “successful” (i.e. a larger-than average budget, famous 
conductor, new concert hall, impressive ticket sales, adventurous programming, 
international press coverage, artistic quality, or audience recognition), it is difficult to 
move toward an objective and mutually defined goal for improvement. 
 Nevertheless, members of the broader orchestra community—musicians, 
administrators, funders, audience members, and even musicologists—are engaged in an 
ongoing transformation process, navigating new modes of performance that challenge 
traditional organizational processes and relationships. Over the past two years, the 
League of American Orchestras has organized conferences around themes such as “The 
New Reality” and “Orchestra Revolution.” Yet revolution implies disruptive 
transformation, and neither the League nor other constituents vested in the orchestra’s 
future have proposed a suitable alternative. In a recent editorial for a union publication, 
Christopher Durham (Director of Orchestral Services, American Federation of 
Musicians) argues that promoting drastic change as a solution to crisis is unrealistic and 
destructive.
20
 In his words, “this is a different world, but it is still a world for Bach, 
Beethoven, and Brahms…. We must preserve and promote the performance of great 
music. We must not be led down the path of mediocrity disguised as the future. We must 
                                                 
19
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be managed effectively so that we are able to perform great music and are rewarded for 
our artistry.”   
Propaganda aside, Durham’s statement is an important one: orchestral music 
deserves a place in our society. Yet to create a hospitable environment for great art, the 
organizational scaffolding that serves to rehearse and disseminate it must allow for, or 
even insist upon, effective engagement with potential consumers. Take for an example 
the Really Terrible Orchestra, founded in 1995 by British businessman Peter Stevenson. 
The amateur ensemble has toured successfully and made a healthy profit, despite 
promoting an artistic product that is self-admittedly terrible. One could certainly argue 
that the group is no more than a circus act, exploiting the perverse curiosities of 
uninformed listeners; but if success is measured by financial gain and engagement with 
modern audiences, the Really Terrible Orchestra has been arguably more successful than 
some of the world’s top professional ensembles.21 In the words of the sociologist and 
amateur pianist Howard Becker,  
Changes in art occur through changes in worlds. Innovations last when 
participants make them the basis of a new mode of cooperation, or 
incorporate change into their ongoing cooperative activities…. But their 
success depends on the degree to which their proponents can mobilize the 
support of others. Ideas and visions are important, but their success and 




While Becker refers here to the organization of art, I take his insight as a point of 
departure for my own work, which explores the art of organization and its reverberations 
in and around the concert hall. The orchestra’s environment—its “world”—is constantly 
                                                 
21
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changing, and the time is ripe for these organizations to reengage their communities and 
enact substantive change. I hope that what follows holds value for scholars and 
practitioners alike, and begins to shed some light on the orchestra and its vibrant history.  
Cultural Politics and the Liability of Being Elite 
While the research presented in my dissertation is primarily concerned with an 
institution and repertoire rooted in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe, the U.S. 
has played a critically important role in its history. To be sure, many of the composers 
and compositions discussed are firmly entrenched in other national traditions, but 
America’s historical affinity toward orchestral culture has been well documented.23 This 
fascination with public ensemble performance parallels the more recent trend to write 
about American music history by way of its performers, patrons, and institutions, versus 
composers and their masterworks. Richard Crawford has been perhaps the most vocal 
proponent of this methodology, but others, including Joseph Horowitz and Mark Clague, 
have noted the disparity between “traditional” western music historiography and the 
American musical landscape.
24
 And, although any discourse concerning music and 
nationalism is wrought with tension, the disconnect between the classical canon and an 
American musical identity has directed some attention away from art music when 
discussing this country’s musical contributions.25 This tension, however, is turned on its 
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24
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  13 
head if one considers the symphony orchestra developed its current form and function in 
America first, despite its reliance on a primarily inherited, Euro-centric repertoire.  
Many monograph-length studies devoted to specific symphonic ensembles exist, 
but previous research on the orchestra in general, both in America and abroad, is limited 
and out of date. Work done by John and Kate Mueller (1951, 1973), Henry Swoboda 
(1967), George Seltzer (1975), Howard Taubman (1970), Philip Hart (1973), and Jack 
Kamerman (1983) comprises a significant portion of the research regarding the orchestra 
as a cultural institution.
26
 My interpretation is informed most directly by Mueller and 
Hart, whose research on programming trends, orchestra financing, and audience taste has 
been particularly influential. Both authors recognize an unavoidable issue when 
discussing the twentieth-century orchestra and its role in society: cultural elitism. 
Although the orchestra has at times been described as an institution devoted to the 
“education of the masses,” its artistic viability is rooted in the support of an elite 
subculture. As explained in more detail below, the beginnings of the modern orchestra as 
an institution have more to do with wealthy donors seeking respite from the growing 
middle and working classes than with the education of the general public. Hart ends his 
book with an eloquent defense of elitism, suggesting that great art is by its very nature 
aristocratic, and thus must maintain its ties to elite culture to survive. Despite the 
polemical nature of Hart’s argument, there is little doubt that issues of taste are 
intertwined with class. In his work with management scholar Michael Useem, cultural 
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sociologist Paul DiMaggio confirms that the connection between social classes and arts 
consumption is deeply entrenched, suggesting that attempts to broaden appeal for 
classical music are doomed to fail if the class connotations associated with symphonic 
culture are not erased.
27
   
 The tension between the orchestra’s elitist underpinnings and its desire to reach a 
broader public has been continuously present throughout much of the last century, and 
has only worsened as the ideological and aesthetic distance between symphonic music 
and popular culture widens. Leon Botstein points out that, while today’s elite are just as 
wealthy and philanthropic as past generations, they simply do not care about classical 
music: “The patron class is philistine; instead of Andrew Carnegie, we have Donald 
Trump. Some rich guy with a hedge fund wants to be photographed with Angelina Jolie, 
not support the Cleveland Orchestra.”28 Conductor James Conlon considers this 
phenomenon an “American paradox,” insisting that in the face of tremendous artistic 
growth and vibrancy, audiences have stagnated, or worse, disappeared.
29
 The fact that 
symphonic culture is appreciated to a greater degree in Europe than in the U.S. should 
come as no surprise given the sense of collective ownership European audiences feel 
toward the canonical repertoire and its creators.
30
 Yet while the European public has 
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historically valued the classical arts more explicitly than in America, the development of 
the modern concert ritual and its insulation from common social practice has produced 
challenges for orchestras on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 Although several scholars from within music studies have devoted their work to 
the orchestra and its relationship to these cultural developments, much pertinent research 
comes from outside the musicological community.
31
 The notion of cultural hierarchy, 
explicated by historian Lawrence Levine in his book Highbrow/Lowbrow, has been an 
important marker of American life since the nineteenth century, and played a significant 
role in the development of modernized orchestral culture.
32
 As early as the 1830s, 
American culture fractured into distinct subgroups that in many cases opposed and 
competed with one another—a phenomenon that reflected the rise of the middle class and 
spurred the formation of many art institutions. John Spitzer unpacks these cultural shifts 
in his recent work on nineteenth-century entrepreneur orchestras, which were slowly 
replaced by permanent institutions subsidized by a new class of wealthy elites.
33
 This 
schism between high art and popular culture continues to resonate today. In a 2010 
lecture for the Royal Philharmonic Society, Alex Ross pointed out that, “In America, 
especially, members of the upper and middle classes embraced the symphony orchestra 
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as a faux-European bastion in a world of vulgar commerce…. The orchestra became the 
pride of the upper crust and the chief beneficiary of its largesse.”34 So although some 
scholars have pointed out the limitations of Levine’s overly simplistic highbrow-lowbrow 
paradigm, it is an important construct to bear in mind. Orchestras and other purveyors of 
the classical arts have spent much of the twentieth century grappling with an elitist 
perception as they work to reengage a broader audience—a struggle made all the more 
tenuous by the structural and ideological barriers they face.
35
  
 The conflict outlined above has had very real implications when one considers the 
orchestra’s cultural history and its relationship to the mass public. In Boston, the split 
between high and low led to the formation of two artistic brands within one institution—
the Boston Symphony Orchestra (BSO, since 1881) and the Boston Pops (founded 1885). 
Although these ensembles are jointly managed and governed, they perform distinct styles 
of music and serve arguably different functions: transcendence versus entertainment. In 
her dissertation, Ayden Adler examines the unique relationship between the BSO and the 
Pops, suggesting that the division between the two groups pervades not only repertoire 
choices but aesthetic ideologies and commercial objectives.
36
 Nevertheless, the split 
between the two groups is born out of necessity: the Pops needs the BSO for high-art 
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This dance enacted between orchestra, audience, and economic forces has 
compelled these institutions to navigate the pressures of artistic integrity on the one hand 
and popular acceptance on the other, leading to what J. Peter Burkholder has called a 
“historicist mainstream” in twentieth-century compositional practice.38 The historical 
nature of classical culture is especially palpable in the context of the modern orchestra, 
which Burkholder casts as an antiquated museum dedicated to masterworks from the 
past.
39
 Although his assessment resonates with the conservative realities of contemporary 
orchestral programming, it foregoes the nuances and unprecedented diversity present in 
contemporary musical discourse. Such aesthetic diversity, driven simultaneously by 
various political and cultural movements that unfolded over the course of the last hundred 
years, has been well documented by Glenn Watkins, Richard Taruskin, Jane Fulcher, and 
others. In the penultimate volume of his Oxford History of Western Music, Taruskin 
invokes the term “maximization” to describe the trajectory of the twentieth century, 
contending that many of the stylistic choices made by composers can be heard as an 
exaggerated extension of—as opposed to a sharp break from—high Romanticism.40 In 
the context of interwar France, Fulcher has used the tools of cultural history to explore 
developments in music, art, literature, and politics that cannot be understood fully 
without both synchronic and diachronic perspectives, constructing a truly 
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interdisciplinary lens to unpack the complex and multifarious story surrounding 
twentieth-century music and life.
41
  
 To be sure, the cultural power afforded to western art music can be understood as 
the result of an ongoing ritualization process that has helped orchestral culture overcome 
its own marginality by endowing certain practices with pseudo-sacred status. Some of the 
most distinctive characteristics of orchestral performance—including musician dress and 
concert etiquette—have gradually become part of a set of ritual behaviors, where 
participants “use the language of gesture to affirm, to explore and to celebrate their ideas 
of how the relationships of the cosmos operate, and thus of how they themselves should 
relate to it and to one another.”42 Yet this ritual, enacted in concert halls for more than a 
century, has become foreign and even off-putting for many. The cultural schism 
discussed above generated a variety of etiquette-related hoops through which 
concertgoers continue to jump, despite efforts to reverse these trends by orchestra 
administrators. Applauding at the right time is a signal of sophistication and nuanced 
understanding of musical expression; silence during performances demonstrates how 
seriously listeners internalize the musical experience. According to Christopher Small, 
“there [is] something in the nature of works of the classical concert repertory that makes 
the acts of performing and listening to them under any circumstances go counter to the 
way I believe human relationships should be.”43 As we will see, this curtain between 
ensemble and audience was not constructed arbitrarily, but is instead an integral 
component of the orchestra’s contemporary organizational identity. 
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Early Orchestra Operating Models  
Just as the organizational structure associated with today’s orchestras began to 
take shape around the turn of the twentieth century, so too did the modern-day concert 
ritual. While the antiquated nature of contemporary concert practice suggests an homage 
to some distant and mythical past, its antecedents are in fact far more recent. In the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, concerts were considered social events, 
providing a space for friends and neighbors to meet and discuss current events over food 
and drink. To be clear, early concert performances held more weight than purely social or 
background music, but they were certainly not the serious or even stodgy affairs familiar 
to us today. This ritual, constructed in the latter part of the nineteenth century and 
reinforced by authoritative conductors and obedient audiences ever since, has been 
shaped as much by class politics as it has by the sublime aesthetic imputed onto the music 
of Beethoven and Wagner.
44
 By the 1880s, upper-middle class and wealthy elites had 
begun to stake claim to the classical music tradition, building barriers that for the most 
part dissuaded initiates from taking part in the concert experience.  
 For these barriers to become fully ensconced, however, the power and 
responsibility previously held by musicians had to be acquired by a new philanthropic 
elite. In short, a new operating model was needed: one that empowered non-musicians to 
make organizational decisions while requiring them to shoulder the increasing costs 
associated with ensemble performance. Before this shift, orchestras in America were 
organized as cooperative enterprises, communal associations, or even for-profit firms. 
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Although these earlier models were known to have existed, they have only recently 
received explicit attention by musicologists.
45
 Mark Clague posits six organizational 
models that proliferated nineteenth-century orchestral life, including the club, 
cooperative, entrepreneurial, conservatory, society, and corporate nonprofit models.
46
 
Each of these structures exhibited a unique combination of leadership (volunteer, shared, 
leader, director, board), musician make-up (amateur, student, professional), economic 
base (membership fees, tuition, ticket revenue, donations), and ownership (members, 
leader, corporation). The link between these structures and distinct modes of patronage is 
one worth recognizing. In Mueller’s orchestral history, he cites no fewer than seven 
methods of institutional patronage, including cooperative support, plutocratic support by 
one or more guarantors, private enterprise, endowment income, broad support from small 
donations (known as a “maintenance fund”), and public subsidies.47 Below, I briefly 
explicate the cooperative, entrepreneur, and autocratic models as they were practiced by 
various nineteenth century orchestras, devoting special attention to how and why each 
operating scheme capitulated to the now-dominant nonprofit structure in the first decades 
of the twentieth century. 
As early as 1842, the New York Philharmonic, billed as “America’s first 
orchestra,” began presenting concerts—the same year that the Vienna Philharmonic was 
founded.  Both groups were musician-owned-and-operated, an operating model 
presumably inspired by the Philharmonic Society of London (known since 1913 as the 
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Royal Philharmonic Society, not to be confused with the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, 
est. 1946). Arguably the first orchestra to be organized as a cooperative, the Philharmonic 
Society of London was founded in early 1813 and gave its first concert on March 8 of 
that year. For the first century of its existence, the orchestra produced six to eight 
concerts annually, performing first for a small entourage of local musicians and then for 
an increasingly large circle of patrons.
48
 
London’s first symphony orchestra was a truly collaborative institution, both on 
the stage and off. Until Louis Spohr’s appointment in 1820, the group was conducted 
from within the ensemble, either by the concertmaster or the harpsichordist, and seating 
was rotated on a regular basis. Performing musicians—called “Members”—were elected 
from a larger pool of 150 “Associates,” all of whom were required to display some 
degree of musical proficiency. Non-musicians, known as “Fellows,” were permitted to 
attend rehearsals and concerts, provided they pay an annual subscription fee of three 
guineas. Members and Associates had to pay this subscription fee as well, and while 
performing musicians were paid for their services, “no member or associate [received] 
any emolument from the funds, all money received being appropriated only to the public 
purposes of the Society.”49 In other words, musicians and patrons alike were treated as 
equal collaborators or investors, sharing in any profits or losses recognized by the 
Society. This tenet of shared ownership often meant that musicians went unpaid for 
weeks on end, resulting in a phenomenon known as the “Deputy system,” where 
musicians could choose to forgo a contracted engagement with little or no notice, 
provided they send a suitable substitute. Other orchestras soon adopted this precedent, 
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resulting in sporadic rehearsal attendance and unenviable performance quality until 
musicians were hired and treated as permanent employees—a development that was not 
achieved in London until 1932. 
The birth of the Philharmonic Society of New York (known colloquially as the 
New York Philharmonic) was surely influenced by what was happening in London. 
Violinist Urelli Corelli Hill, considered the founder of the New York ensemble, spent 
several years in England and continental Europe, having presumably encountered 
London’s orchestra during his travels. When the New York Philharmonic presented its 
first concert on 7 December 1842, its leadership structure closely mirrored that of 
London, operating as a self-governed cooperative that split available dividends at the 
conclusion of each season. While the Philharmonic maintained its collaborative structure 
until 1909, strong-willed maestros and wealthy patrons began to assert more and more 
influence on the orchestra’s day-to-day operations. After a long stint with Carl Bergmann 
as conductor and a disastrous year with Leopold Damrosch at the helm (1876–77), 
German émigré and future orchestra builder Theodore Thomas was elected to lead the 
Philharmonic.
50
 Damrosch would go on to found the New York Symphony Society (est. 
1878), while Thomas’ tenure with the Philharmonic resulted in an unprecedented artistic 
renaissance.
51
 Yet it was short lived; by the first decade of the twentieth century, the 
orchestra had become the laughing stock of newer but more accomplished orchestras in 
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both New York and Boston.  In a way, the group’s capitulation to patron intervention was 
inevitable: 
The Philharmonic in its part-time, cooperative form could not maintain its 
eminent position as the leader of orchestral performance in New York. In 
1911, wealthy patrons offered to greatly increase the number of 
Philharmonic concerts, and to pay for Philharmonic deficits, in return for 
control of the organization of the orchestra. The offer was accepted…. The 
cooperative was dead, with organizational power being put in the hands of 




The reorganization hinted at above unfolded slowly and unevenly, and will be subjected 
to a detailed analysis in the second chapter of this dissertation. 
Yet the New York Philharmonic was not alone in its quest to reorganize and 
acquire professional legitimacy through philanthropic donations. Moving from a 
collaborative to a corporate operating model meant a stark shift in power, favoring donors 
over musicians. Not surprisingly, this change paralleled the rise of artist unions and 
incited an ideological conflict between musicians and management that continues today. 
Theodore Thomas (1835–1905) was perhaps the only contemporary figure who partially 
transcended this infighting, gaining the admiration (and fear) of the musicians he 
employed and the administrators he later worked for. With his stalwart demeanor and 
unwavering artistic vision, Thomas played a significant role in saturating much of the 
eastern and Midwestern U.S. with orchestral music. In addition to his tenure in New 
York, Thomas’ legacy runs through Cincinnati, Chicago, and a host of other cities and 
towns, large and small. Although he was born in Germany, he became an adopted 
authority on orchestral music, legitimizing symphonic culture as an important part of the 
American experience. Indeed, for Thomas, “the symphony orchestra was not an end in 
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itself, but the medium for communicating to the audience the uplifting moral message of 
great music.”53 
 In many ways, Thomas’ career can be seen as a microcosm of the orchestra’s 
institutional development. Imported from Europe, he became a well-known violinist in 
and around New York, gaining admittance to the cooperative Philharmonic on 21 January 
1954, at the age of 19.
54
 Shortly thereafter he began a second career as a chamber 
musician, leading a successful concert series with pianist William Mason. His true 
calling, however, was conducting, due not so much to his grasp of the repertoire (he 
focused mostly on Beethoven, and programmed little contemporary music) but instead a 
paternalistic sense of what musicians and audiences needed in the way of a cultural diet. 
His conducting career began with the Brooklyn Philharmonic Society. In his own words, 
In 1862 I concluded to devote my energies to the cultivation of the public 
taste for instrumental music. Our chamber concerts had created a 
spasmodic interest … and our performances had reached a high standard. 
As a concert violinist, I was at that time popular, and played much. But 
what this country needed most of all to make it musical was a good 
orchestra. The [Brooklyn] Philharmonic Society, with a body of about 





Thomas continued to conduct concerts in Brooklyn until 1891, but it did not take long for 
him to branch out and form his own orchestra in 1862. He had a clear model in the 
entrepreneur-conductor Louis Antoine Jullien, with whom he had performed as a violinist 
on his tour of the United States in 1852–53.  The gesticulating French conductor could 
not have been more different than Thomas: emotional and visually dynamic to his 
deliberate and reserved presence on the podium. Their programming philosophies stood 
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in stark contrast as well, with Thomas refusing to mix serious (usually German) 
symphonic music with the lighter, more popular works that Jullien had become known 
for.  As we will see, however, Thomas and Jullien did have one very important thing in 
common: the drive to build the world’s greatest orchestra. 
 As early as 1864, Thomas was leading an ensemble of his own design in a series 
of Symphony Soirees produced in New York. Many of the musicians he hired also 
performed with the Brooklyn Philharmonic, and more than half had emigrated from 
Germany, echoing a trend of influence in not only repertoire but performance practice 
following the Revolution of 1848. By the fall of 1869, Thomas had secured enough 
musical talent and audience interest to embark on a tour with his Theodore Thomas 
Orchestra, a group that would tour throughout the U.S. until 1888, quickly becoming the 
envy of orchestras everywhere and acquiring the moniker “Thomas’s Machine.” Even in 
Chicago and New York, where he would soon be invited to lead the Philharmonic, 
Thomas’ orchestra was unrivaled. Just as Jullien had done twenty years earlier, Thomas 
had become a successful entrepreneur-conductor. By hiring the best musicians available 
and building relationships with audiences and venues across the country, he produced 
concerts that held both artistic and economic value. And unlike the collaborative 
ensembles discussed above, the Thomas Orchestra was a commercial venture, with any 
profits or losses shouldered by Thomas alone.
56
   
 In spite of his orchestra’s ability to stay in the black, Thomas was not always so 
fortunate in his personal and artistic investments. In addition to touring the “Thomas 
Highway” and conducting both the New York and Brooklyn Philharmonics, Thomas was 
recruited to be music director of the Philadelphia Centennial (1876), the Cincinnati 
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College of Music (1878–80), and the American Opera Company (1885–87). Each of 
these short-lived projects nearly bankrupted Thomas, whose artistic pursuits were not 
nearly as profitable as his professional status suggests. In Philadelphia, he underestimated 
the unwieldy performing forces (over two thousand singers and instrumentalists) and 
cacophonous performance venues, taking on huge personal debts that resulted in the sale 
of his invaluable music library. Fortunately, the library was purchased by longtime 
Thomas supporter Franz Zinzer, who promptly returned the contents to its original owner. 
Two years later, Thomas was selected by a group of backers to lead the newly founded 
Cincinnati College of Music. He had enjoyed a long and prosperous relationship with the 
city, where he was instrumental in founding the biannual May Festivals (est. 1873) and 
had helped build a new 3,600-seat concert hall. In his new post, however, Thomas 
struggled to mediate artistic and economic concerns, refusing to compromise his artistic 
integrity to appease the school’s financial backers. By 1880, the conservatory had folded, 
leaving Thomas with diminished confidence and a depleted bank account. 
 After returning from Cincinnati, Thomas maintained a grueling conducting and 
touring schedule until Jeanette Thurber approached him to direct her fledgling American 
Opera Company. Thurber, a wealthy patron of the arts who would later become famous 
for bringing Dvořák to America, had already dedicated several years to the project, which 
was devoted to bringing English-language opera to new audiences in and around New 
York. Thomas accepted her offer without hesitation, believing wholeheartedly in the 
continued cultural education of the American public. Like his ill-fated experiences in 
Philadelphia and Cincinnati, however, Thomas’s involvement lasted less than two years. 
For a third time, he had failed to separate fact from fiction in the context of funding and 
  27 
audience support, concentrating on his own artistic vision at the expense of all other 
considerations. In an 1888 address to his touring orchestra, he lamented that “to retain a 
permanent orchestra there is apparently only one thing we can do, and that is to travel 
during the whole year.”57 Thomas and his musicians, many of whom had families in New 
York, agreed that this was not a viable strategy to pursue. Despite his undisputed position 
atop the orchestra world, Thomas had come no closer to founding the permanent 
orchestra he so desperately wanted. For the first time in over two decades, the orchestra 
did not go on tour, leaving the conductor to contemplate the future of the American 
orchestra and his role in shaping it. 
 Half way across the country, businessman Charles Norman Fay had an answer to 
Thomas’ previously unanswerable questions.  Fay had long admired Thomas, and wanted 
to bring both him and his orchestra to Chicago. In 1890, with $153,000 in local pledges 
guaranteed over three years, Fay founded the Chicago Orchestral Association—the 
nation’s first symphonic organization to be formally incorporated.58 Created 
independently from any one individual, the Orchestral Association set a precedent by 
laying the democratic groundwork necessary to perpetuate symphonic culture beyond the 
leadership or support of a single conductor or donor. With risk spread across a large 
number of guarantors and financial decisions vetted by a board of experienced 
businessmen and their wives, the orchestra quickly built a reputation for artistic 
excellence and organizational stability. Within a year, Thomas had moved to the 
Midwest, marrying Fay’s sister Rose and presenting regular concerts with an orchestra 
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consisting of many of the musicians he had worked with in New York. By 1904, 
composer Richard Strauss remarked that the orchestra “far surpassed my expectations…. 
I can say to you that I am delighted to know an orchestra of artists in whom beauty of 
tone, technical perfection, and discipline are found in the highest degree.”59 
 To be sure, Thomas’ orchestra—known first as the Chicago Orchestra and later 
the Chicago Symphony Orchestra—had grown into one of the city’s finest civic 
institutions, prompting the conductor to reject job offers from both the Boston Symphony 
Orchestra (1892) and New York Philharmonic (for a third time, in1894) to stay in 
Chicago. In 1904, he witnessed the completion of his crowned jewel: Orchestra Hall, a 
concert venue designed by architect Daniel Burnham and built specifically for Thomas 
and the CSO. When he died a month later, the trustees of the Orchestral Association 
renamed the ensemble the Theodore Thomas Orchestra, in honor of its illustrious 
conductor. Yet as a civic institution designed for public benefit and consumption, the 
orchestra’s legacy was intended to reach far beyond Thomas or Fay, revealing new 
organizational objectives that starkly differed from earlier cooperative or entrepreneur 
models. With this in mind, in 1912 the trustees settled on “The Chicago Symphony 
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 If there was one ensemble that matched Chicago’s artistry, and one man that 
equaled Thomas’s steadfast devotion to symphonic music, it was the Boston Symphony 
Orchestra and Major Henry Lee Higginson. Founded in 1881, the BSO may in fact have 
served as a model for Thomas and the CSO. The orchestra was well disciplined, gave 
concerts of serious symphonic music throughout the winter season, and garnered enough 
support to warrant a new hall. Unlike in Chicago, however, the BSO was organized as an 
autocracy, owned and operated not by a corporation but by a single individual.
61
 
Higginson, who had inherited and multiplied his fortune as a banker, acted as a 
benevolent dictator, personally underwriting the orchestra’s annual $20,000 deficit and 
overseeing all artistic and business decisions for more than thirty-five years.
62
 It was clear 
from the very beginning who was in charge, when on 20 March 1881 Higginson breathed 
life into the orchestra by placing an announcement in the local newspapers: 
THE BOSTON SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA:  
IN THE INTEREST OF GOOD MUSIC 
 
Notwithstanding the development of musical taste in Boston, we have 
never yet possessed a full and permanent orchestra, offering the best music 
at low prices, such as may be found in all the large European cities, or 
even in the smaller musical centres of Germany. The essential condition of 
such orchestras is their stability, whereas ours are necessarily shifting and 
uncertain, because we are dependent upon musicians whose work and time 
are largely pledged elsewhere. 
 
To obviate this difficulty the following plan is offered. It is an effort made 
simply in the interest of good music, and though individual inasmuch as it 
is independent of societies or clubs, it is in no way antagonistic to any 
previously existing musical organization. Indeed, the first step as well as 
the natural impulse in announcing a new musical project, is to thank those 
who had have brought us where we now stand. Whatever may be done in 
the future, to the Handel and Haydn Society and to the Harvard Musical 
Association, we all owe the greater part of our home education in music of 
                                                 
61
 The BSO incorporated on 7 May 1918, the same month that Higginson resigned his post as president. 
62
 As stated in Joseph Horowitz, “Henry Higginson: High Culture, High Finance, and Useful Citizenship,” 
in Moral Fire (unpublished manuscript, by permission of author). 
  30 
a high character. Can we forget either how admirably their work has been 
supplemented by the taste and critical judgment of Mr. John S. Dwight, or 
by the artists who have identified themselves with the same cause in 
Boston? These have been our teachers. We build on foundations they have 
laid. Such details of this scheme as concern the public are stated below. 
The orchestra is to number sixty selected musicians; their time, so far as 
required for careful training and for a given number of concerts, to be 
engaged in advance. 
 
Mr. Georg Henschel will be the conductor for the coming season. 
The concerts will be twenty in number, given in the Music Hall on 
Saturday evenings, from the middle of October to the middle of March. 
The price of season tickets, with reserved seats, for the whole series of 
evening concerts will be either $10 or $5, according to position. 
Single tickets, with reserved seats, will be seventy-five cents or twenty-
five cents, according to position. 
 
Besides the concerts, there will be a public rehearsal on one afternoon of 
every week, with single tickets at twenty-five cents, and no reserved seats. 
The intention is that this orchestra shall be made permanent here, and shall 
be called “The Boston Symphony Orchestra.” 
 
Both as the condition and result of success the sympathy of the public is 
asked. 
 
H. L. Higginson 
 
Shortly after the orchestra’s first season had ended, Higginson took the unprecedented 
step of prohibiting musicians from working for other music ensembles, guaranteeing 
gainful employment for the entire winter season and establishing the country’s first 
orchestra devoted solely to concert performance.
63
 By the turn of the twentieth century, a 
summer pops season had been added, and the BSO “had become a national standard-
bearer for civic culture…. [inspiring] the creation of important orchestras in Cincinnati, 
Chicago, and Philadelphia, and a dramatic expansion of the New York Philharmonic.”64 
When Higginson resigned his post on 14 May 1918, the orchestra assumed a corporate 
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model, transferring ownership to a volunteer board made up of a growing number of 
guarantors. Nevertheless, the conservative legacy of Boston’s “foremost citizen”65 
continued to shape the organization and the relationship it cultivated between musicians 
and management; in 1942, the BSO became the country’s last major orchestra to 
unionize. 
 Clearly, American audiences were inundated with more and better performances 
of orchestral music in the second half of the nineteenth century than ever before, sparked 
first by traveling ensembles such as the Germania, Jullien, and Thomas orchestras and 
later by the New York Philharmonic and Boston and Chicago Symphony Orchestras. By 
1900, entrepreneur and collaborative leadership had been replaced by the corporate 
nonprofit in Chicago, Cincinnati (1894–95), and Philadelphia (1900).66 Symphonic music 
had officially overtaken opera as America’s musical pastime. Unlike in Europe, where 
ensembles benefited from the rise of state capitalism and government subsidy, American 
orchestras turned to wealthy patrons for support, starting a new chapter in their history 
that continues to present day. Although the origins of support differed across continents, 
both methods of subvention carried structural, cultural, and artistic consequences that 
were often at odds with the tastes and expectations of the general public.
67
 Theodore 
Thomas’ oft-cited mantra—that “the symphony orchestra shows the culture of its 
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community”—would soon seem incongruous, raising important questions regarding the 
value of institutional permanence in the face of an ever-changing cultural environment. 
An Orchestral Golden Age 
 As the cooperative, entrepreneur, and autocratic orchestras that pervaded 
nineteenth-century American musical life gave rise to board-governed, nonprofit 
institutions, the ways in which symphonic culture was produced and perceived began to 
change. The term “nonprofit” as we understand it today is a coinage of the 1960s, and 
refers to an organizational form that does not distribute profits to owners or shareholders, 
but instead reinvests them to help the organization in question pursue a charitable or 
social mission. The nonprofit’s early history can be traced to pre-Revolutionary America, 
where colonists took it upon themselves to meet certain responsibilities that in Europe 
had historically been assigned to the state.
68
 By the turn of the twentieth century, 
nonprofit organizations of all types began to appear in industries where the government 
failed to provide adequate services and for-profit firms could not turn a profit. With the 
advent of the 501(c)3 designation (1954), which excused groups from paying federal 
income tax and allowed philanthropists to write off their donations, these organizations 
implemented complex governance and funding structures that are still in place today. 
Unlike their for-profit counterparts, nonprofits—including orchestras, opera companies, 
and most presenting organizations—remain tied to a social mission that supersedes, and 
often conflicts with, a financial bottom line. Certain high-ranking members of each 
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nonprofit corporation (usually donors) elect an unpaid board of directors, which acts as 
the organization’s official governing body and is charged with keeping watch over its 
mission and staff.   
 As early as the 1850s, orchestras began to explore alternative patronage models as 
a means of ensuring survival in the newly industrialized Western world. Just as the 
nobility and clergy had served as the primary financiers of artistic work in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, nonprofits provided musicians with new channels of support 
while granting status to a class of cultural philanthropists. From a historical perspective, 
the corporate nonprofit structure emerged as a solution to shifting environmental 
demands. Musicians and administrators have continued to use the nonprofit model as a 
tool to cultivate private and institutional donations, gradually professionalizing the field 
by advocating for full season contracts and higher wages. This turn toward a more 
sustainable model did not occur over night, but instead took decades. Rather than relying 
on a network of personal ties, symphony orchestras now functioned as bureaucratically 
structured organizations that required professional management by trained 
administrators.
69
 The result was an even more complex organizational structure that 
featured an integrated “triple hierarchy,” led by a board chair (board of directors), 
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executive director (staff), and conductor (musicians; see Figure 1.1 for a graphical 
representation of this structure). The maturation of this model was crucial to legitimizing 
the orchestra field, leading to a twentieth-century golden age in which nearly every city 
housed a symphony orchestra and listeners from around the world could enjoy 
performances through radio broadcasts and commercial recordings. The consequences of 
these developments, both artistic and financial, have been far reaching and, as we shall 




Figure 1.1 The Corporate Nonprofit Orchestra Model 
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 In 1942, a handful of representatives from twenty-three regional orchestras met in 
Chicago to discuss how they might mediate these increasingly complex power structures,  
starting what would become the American Symphony Orchestra League and confirming 
the existence of an extensive network of volunteer and professional orchestras across the 
country. Founded by an experienced board member and manager from Kalamazoo, 
Michigan named Leta Snow, the League began as a professional organization that 
provided artistic, financial, and organizational support for smaller metropolitan and civic 
orchestras. In 1950, Helen M. Thompson was named Executive Secretary and quickly 
increased the scope and reputation of the League, inviting the country’s largest orchestras 
to become member organizations while advocating for higher wages, longer seasons, and 
more substantial government and community support.
71
 To be sure, the League has 
played a fundamental role in institutionalizing orchestral culture in America. But its 
policies and practices might also be seen as a reflection of the grassroots movement so 
conspicuous in the early part of the orchestra’s American history: fostered by a small 
group of wealthy women, developed among regional orchestras across the country, and 
marked by an ever-growing divide between professional managers and musicians. 
 Today the League includes nearly 1000 member organizations, as it continues to 
play a critical role in shaping the American orchestra, both on the stage and behind the 
scenes. In addition to hosting an annual convention, it offers seminars for orchestra 
leaders, sponsors yearlong fellowships in orchestra management, and publishes up-to-
date industry statistics and research on a variety of subjects.
72
 Yet, for all of the League’s 
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contributions to symphonic culture, scholars have yet to interrogate its role in 
combating—and in some cases propagating—the perennial challenges associated with 
live orchestral performance. As early as 1972, Philip Hart admitted publicly that the 
League does little more than “maintain the status quo,” but recent events suggest that it 
has also failed to foster a critically reflexive environment.
73
 Henry Fogel, who served as 
CEO of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra (1985–2003) before being appointed president 
of the League (2003–2008), wrote prophetically that “those who question the actual ethic 
of [the orchestra’s] structure might not be the best people to govern the institution.  Those 
who choose to be a part of the governing body should accept … the structure that history 
has handed them.”74 For fear of the unknown, administrators and musicians are 
uncomfortable questioning their organizations’ operating model and the basic 
assumptions that motivate it, choosing instead to “stay the course” and avoid disruptive 
change.  
 To fully professionalize the field, the League had to advocate for increased 
funding from not only individual donors but also foundations and government agencies. 
Although revenue from ticket sales continued to increase throughout the first decades of 
the twentieth century, these gains did little to cover the explosive growth experienced by 
the orchestra industry. Without hope of substantial government subsidy, their only 
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recourse was to raise the money by means of private donation.
75
 In fact, the tenets of 
nonprofit subsidy are rooted in a longstanding history of cultural patronage that pervaded 
nineteenth-century Europe and influenced the emergence of an American leisure class. In 
his recent book on philanthropic culture, historian Thomas Adam shows how different 
subsets of wealthy Europeans came to America and formed their own cultural 
institutions.
76
 Although some middle-class patrons supported the arts, their contributions 
paled in comparison to the massive endowments and bequests created by this new social 
and economic elite.
77
 Women would soon become important players in philanthropic 
circles as well, providing them cultural and political power that they had not otherwise 
attained. 
By the early 1960s, private contributions covered between thirty and fifty percent 
of most orchestras’ annual expenses.78 And, while the twenty-five largest orchestras 
reached over 500,000 consumers each year through subscription concerts and education 
initiatives, the average annual salary for musicians in these organizations during the 
1965-66 season was only $11,600.
79
 Even the largest regional ensembles paid their 
players less than $2,000 a year, making orchestra musicians “one of the most underpaid 
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professional groups in American society.”80 Two major milestones in large-scale support 
for the performing arts attempted to change this. The inception of the National 
Endowment for the Arts (1965) and the Ford Foundation Orchestra Grants Program 
(1966) brought hundreds of millions of dollars earmarked specifically for symphony 
orchestras, which in turn were expected to match these funds with their own capital 
campaigns. The International Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians (ICSOM) 
was founded at nearly the same time (1962), giving orchestral musicians a voice within 
the broader union environment. As a subsidiary of the American Federation of Musicians, 
ICSOM empowered orchestral musicians to negotiate contracts on their own behalf. Not 
coincidently, orchestra work stoppages reached an all-time high during this period, 
forcing managers to find more money and thus promoting industry growth through new 
and larger contracts for musicians.
81
 These concurrent forces had an immediate impact, 
allowing large orchestras to present 52-week seasons and pay their musicians a 
competitive full-time wage for the first time.
82
  
The ultimate goal of these funding initiatives was not only to make orchestras 
sustainable, but also to “bring more and better music to more people.”83 While demand in 
the form of paying audiences stagnated, the supply of professional musicians looking for 
work skyrocketed. Government and foundation granting agencies such as Ford stressed 
the continued professionalization of symphony musicians and administrators, ultimately 
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leading to a surplus of talent, unsustainable wage increases, and an oversupply of 
traditional concerts. According to the NEA, the number of professional orchestras in the 
U.S. rose from 58 to 144 between 1965 and 1980. Today, thousands of musicians 
graduate from conservatories without hope to find a permanent job, while the players in 
America’s top half-dozen orchestras receive annual salaries of between $130,000 and 
$400,000.
84
  Demand for their services, however, has only marginally increased since the 
1960s, resulting in a saturated market
85
 that still caters to a niche audience primarily 
interested in conservative programming. While it is true that wealthy audiences and 
foundations have carried the burden to cover these increasing costs, orchestras have done 




As mission-driven entities in a consumer-driven society, orchestras face a success 
paradox: to achieve artistic gains, they must use up valuable resources and, the more 
successful an organization becomes, the more resources (i.e. capital and time) are 
necessary to achieve continued growth and success. Put another way, even the most 
successful performing organizations find themselves struggling to reconcile their artistic 
and financial bottom lines. This conundrum is compounded by the fact that many grants 
                                                 
84
 The base salary for the New York Philharmonic reached $130,000 in 2009–10, while the concertmaster 
and other principal players can make upwards of $400,000 (www.guidestar.com) 
85
 Oversupply of traditional concerts is still a concern for performing arts organizations. In a February 2011 
address to theater administrators, current NEA chairman Rocco Landesman made the following remark: 
“You can either increase demand or decrease supply. Demand is not going to increase. So it is time to think 
about decreasing supply” (as quoted in Peter Marks, “NEA Chairman Provokes Heated Debate,” The 
Washington Post, 13 February 2011). 
86
 Recording contracts provided America’s largest orchestras and their musicians with significant operating 
revenue from the 1950s-80s, but the shift to digital technology has made it increasingly difficult to 
monetize recorded content. The Berlin Philharmonic’s Digital Concert Hall represents one possible 
alternative, but the overhead costs associated with this type of project are immense (please see chapter 5 for 
further discussion of how orchestras are leveraging technology to meet the demands of twenty-first century 
audiences). 
  40 
are earmarked for program-related costs, forcing orchestras and other nonprofits to use 
other funds to cover general operating expenses. While programming initiatives deliver 
social impact that can easily be seen and measured, other expenses—including staff 
salaries, building rental fees, insurance, and even utilities—are critical to an orchestra’s 
ability to implement these programs effectively. Without more support for infrastructure 
and research into better efficacy and distribution of their services, orchestras will 
continue to drain their limited resources.  
Yet the stability afforded orchestras by the nonprofit operating model conflicts 
with the spontaneous creativity associated with the music making process. How can one 
ensure “vitality and movement in spite of being bound by restrictions that, although 
necessary, make for excessive stability and can lead to asphyxia?”87 Rosanne Martorella 
and others have shown that, in the opera industry, a yearning for box office success “has 
led to a conservative, even reactionary repertory.”88 Indeed, it is impractical to cultivate 
flexibility and innovation within the confines of a complex and at times constraining 
organizational structure that was designed for fundraising purposes. As Lester Salamon 
and others have pointed out, the historical impetus for these organizations created a 
structure that is many ways antithetical to modern economic self-sufficiency.
89
 Although 
the modern nonprofit was designed to solve new organizational problems in the 
industrialized world, it soon produced its own set of challenges. Relying on donations 
alone leaves organizations in a precarious position, allowing them little recourse for 
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internal development, growth, and change. Below, I explore the current orchestra funding 
model in more detail, teasing out economic trends that have shaped artistic practice and 
reflect the orchestra’s unique challenges. 
The Income Gap 
 Due to the complex amalgam of private philanthropy, foundation grants, 
government support, and ticket sales, the revenue and cost structures of performing arts 
organizations have received particular attention from scholars outside of the humanities.
90
 
Indeed, economic concerns are deeply embedded in the production of a live orchestral 
concert. As referenced earlier in this chapter, William Baumol and William Bowen 
released a monograph-length study on the financial structures of and challenges facing 
performing arts organizations in 1966.
91
 It is not a coincidence that their work was 
published the year after the founding of the NEA, whose funding allowed orchestras to 
present more concerts and pay musicians a higher wage than ever before. While the 
claims Baumol and Bowen presented have long been recognized by the business 
community for their detailed level of analysis and relevance to the arts community, the 
music world has until recently largely ignored the study, choosing instead to concentrate 
on art’s purely aesthetic value. As the authors point out throughout their book, the 
disconnect between the performing arts and basic market mechanisms such as supply and 
demand has caused increasing levels of anxiety that have no easy or obvious remedy.
92
 
Despite the efforts of some orchestras to expand the social strata they serve, audiences 
continue to be drawn from an extremely narrow segment of the population. The financial 
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crisis that the orchestra has been confronted with since its beginnings is not temporary or 
contextual, but is substantively reinforced by its structure. In point of fact, the 
sustainability of orchestras and their economic structures is increasingly in doubt.  
 Although ticket prices and the absolute value of earned income have risen at rates 
proportional to inflation, these changes have been dwarfed by exponential increases in 
artistic and administrative costs, a phenomenon explained in part by the orchestra’s 
inability to capitalize on the productivity and efficiency gains experienced in other 
industries. Unlike in manufacturing, the performing arts do not create easily defined 
commodities such as a widget or wheel. Since the late-nineteenth century, symphony 
orchestras have employed between 60 and 120 musicians to perform compositions of a 
prescribed length; neither ensemble size nor performance time can be easily altered by 
technology or other work-related advancements. To increase productivity, Baumol and 
Bowen suggest that orchestras repeatedly program the same repertoire to decrease 
concert preparation costs. Yet this not only goes against the artistic tenets of most 
orchestras; it also fails to address the structural flaws of the organizational model. “Even 
if every major orchestral concert were sold out, the consequent increase in receipts would 
cover much less than one third of the total financial gap” between earned income and 
reported expenses, suggesting that demand is only part of the problem.
93
 
 Since the publication of this study, many industry insiders have termed the 
income or productivity gap “Baumol’s curse,” lending an almost mythical status to what 
is in fact a simply explained reality.
94
 The graph below depicts just how seriously this gap 
grew in the years following the advent of the 52-week season (see Figure 1.2). Between 
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1961 and 1971, the industry experienced tremendous growth, both in terms of artistic 
output, concert attendance (+76%), and operating costs (+196%).
95
 But less than 50% of 
these costs were covered by concert income, as “the behavior of the 1960s produced an 
increased earning gap as a result … of increases in output and wage rates immensely 
greater than those in the general economy.”96 The contributed revenue of foundations,  
individuals, and corporations have filled this gap and cemented the orchestra’s continued  
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survival, leading to Baumol’s prophetic conclusion that that the remainder of “profitable” 
society must foot costs incurred by performing arts organizations if they are to continue 
to exist. As recent times have shown us, however, the pockets of wealthy donors and 
foundations may not be deep enough to save the hundreds of orchestras around the 
country that struggle to balance their budgets and continue presenting concerts. 
 While no comprehensive empirical study of the income gap appears to have been 
undertaken since the 1970s, several reports offer supplemental data that can help clarify 
its development. Wolf’s 1992 analysis provides partial evidence of the gap’s continued 
growth, although a varied methodology and larger sample size make it impossible to 
directly compare his findings to those of Baumol and Bowen. Nevertheless, his work 
suggests that the curse has yet to be broken: 
In 1971, earned income provided 44 percent of the cost of providing 
13,000 concerts, leaving an income gap, per audience member, of $2.78 
that had to be raised from other sources. By 1981, earned income had sunk 
to 37 percent of expenses for 20,100 performances. Combined with 
revenue and expenses that had nearly tripled in 10 years, this left a per-
audience-member income gap of $7.95 that had to be raised. In 1991, 
earned income had improved as a percentage of expenses, coming in at 39 
percent, yet revenue and expenses, again, more than doubled over that 10-





The projections made by Baumol, Bowen, and later Hart and Wolf have been anecdotally 
confirmed by both the League of American Orchestras and Robert Flanagan’s 2008 
study, but no one has published comparable data to support these assertions. The final 
chapter of this dissertation includes an updated look at the income gap phenomenon, 
using data culled from the same twenty-eight orchestras included in the initial 1972 
study. 
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To deal with the seemingly insurmountable challenges associated with live 
ensemble performance, symphony orchestras have turned to the corporate nonprofit 
structure, which by definition subsists on philanthropic funds and shields organizations 
from market forces that would otherwise destroy them. It is not a coincidence that 
American orchestras have adopted this mode of survival, especially considering the lack 
of public support they receive. Nonprofits often operate in “industries in which the 
organization of such firms as governmental entities are serious alternatives.”99 This 
means American orchestras have less direct access to capital and other resources, a fact 
that is counterbalanced by greater autonomy and flexibility. Economist and 
organizational theorist Henry Hansmann raises several important points as to why the 
performing arts in America choose to be designated as nonprofits as opposed to other 
organization forms.
100
  To warrant government support, orchestras must serve the greater 
public—a benchmark that the symphony orchestra has never truly met. Hansmann argues 
that the degree of donative financing in the performing arts serves as form of “voluntary 
price discrimination, the need for which is dictated by the unusual cost and demand 
structure of [the] industry.”101 Unlike the popular arts—including the movies, pop music, 
and even Broadway productions—the classical arts feature concentrated demand and 
unsustainable overhead costs. More than 40% of orchestra and opera ticket buyers donate 
additional funds to help cover these expenses, meaning that the clients consuming the 
services and the donors underwriting them are often one in the same.  
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The orchestra is not alone in its struggle to navigate a nonprofit identity that is as 
cumbersome as it is beneficial. One must remember that, to achieve tax-exempt status, an 
organization must provide charitable services that result in some kind of public good. 
These two characteristics are fundamental to the historical formation of the nonprofit 
sector, but major cultural shifts have resulted in many organizational forms that exhibit 
dubious ties to their original designation as public charities. The nonprofit’s complicated 
governance structure can also be unwieldy. The San Francisco Symphony, for example, 
has over 80 board members, many of whom are high profile donors to the orchestra. 
While these boards may supply fundraising connections and expanded professional 
networks, they often do not govern effectively. Paradoxically, the perception held by 
those outside of the sector is rooted in the romanticized image of a small, private charity 
staffed by volunteers.
102
 As the definition of charity has expanded, so has the degree of 
professionalization and organizational diversity within the sector. Yet the original 
legislation enforcing the economic structure of these organizations remains relatively 
unchanged, leaving orchestras ill-equipped to deal with their ever-changing environment. 
An Organizational Perspective 
When considered en masse, the explanations above suggest that the crisis facing 
orchestras is to a large degree structural in nature. Although organizational theory might 
hold new answers as to why these institutions continue to cling to structures and 
strategies that are no longer effective, few explicit connections between orchestras and 
the organizational literature exist. Nearly all of the empirical research devoted to the 
orchestra deals with issues of leadership and team dynamics. J. G. Hunt’s eloquent study 
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of conducting as a mode of shared leadership is perhaps the best example of how 
orchestras have served as a means to understand organizational behavior.
103
  For Hunt, 
the dynamic between conductor and musician is derived from the antiquated notion of the 
maestro, or master, in which musicians have no real power or recourse in performance. 
To be an effective team of creative individuals, the conductor must be a facilitator and 
mentor (human relations model), an innovator and broker (open systems model), a 
producer and director (rational goal model), and a coordinator and monitor (internal 
process model).   
This interpretation of creative power stems from Max Weber’s theory of 
charismatic authority, in which artistic leadership is “endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”104 Yet this charisma 
is often thwarted by a process of routinization, as administrative measures stifle the 
unbridled creativity of musicians in an attempt to achieve organizational stability and 
security. The diffusion of creative leadership serves as a governing principle in Howard 
Becker’s Art Worlds, which conceives of artwork as a fundamental product of 
cooperative activity.
105
  Art worlds, defined as “all the people whose activities are 
necessary to the production of the characteristic works which the world defines as art,” 
are social organizations that are largely bounded by convention or tradition.
106
 According 
to Becker, “people who cooperate to produce a work of art usually do not decide things 
afresh.  Instead, they rely on earlier agreements, agreements that have become part of the 
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conventional way of doing things in that art.”107  This tacit contract between artists and 
audiences makes conventionalized action less costly in time and energy, but it does not 
posit avant-garde work as an impossibility—it simply makes it more costly, and thus 
rarified and marginalized. 
It makes perfect sense, then, that orchestras are conservative creatures. In his 
foundational essay on social structure and organizations, sociologist Arthur Stinchcombe 
analyzes the phenomena behind conservative, inertia-laden organizations.
108
 A high 
degree of formal organization usually correlates to a relatively high level of homogeneity, 
allowing populations to preserve their historical integrity. Organizational forms, he 
argues, tend to be created in spurts, and often align with important historical moments, 
such as war, industrial revolution, or developments in communication and transportation 
technology. As time passes and these organizational forms become older, they become 
more deeply embedded and ritualized. For the orchestra, this means that the schism 
between high and low culture that defined its very conception is maintained, despite 
shifts in cultural practice that beg for change. The form and structure of such an 
organization are thus rooted in its historical context, or in the environment of the past, not 
the present: 
The organizational inventions that can be made at a particular time in 
history depend on the social technology available at the time. 
Organizations which have purposes that can be efficiently reached with 
the socially possible organizational forms tend to be founded during the 
period in which they become possible. Then, both because they can 
function effectively with those organizational forms, and because the 
forms tend to become institutionalized, the basic structure of the 
organization tends to remain relatively stable.
109
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In the case of the orchestra, the structure has become wedded to norms that are no longer 
in place, ignoring important changes to the broader institutional environment in favor of 
historical precedent. The cycle of embedded organizational forms perpetuates itself, with 
older forms fostering a sense of familiarity and comfort, even if they are no longer 
profitable or efficient.  
 Although Stinchcombe’s theory explicates the historical conservatism associated 
with most orchestras, it does not fully explain why organizations remain tied to 
ineffective forms, nor does it describe how adaptations and variations occur in the face of  
mimetic pressures. In her study on organizational imprinting in the context of the Paris 
Opera, Victoria Johnson resolves this tension between individual creativity and 
environmental constraints with the concept of “cultural entrepreneurship.”110 Imprinting 
or “time stamping”—the continual recycling of structures and strategies after an 
organization’s founding—has been described as a cultural truism, but Johnson argues that 
cultural entrepreneurs mediate the tension between individual creativity and 
environmental constraints, positing imprinting as an agent-driven process much akin to 
the one enacted by orchestra audiences and musicians today.
111
 Yet while this framework 
helps to explain how and why cultural institutions like the orchestra were started, it does 
not clarify why subsequent phases of imprinting occur, enabling certain behaviors of an 
organization to be reproduced continuously. What happens when these organizations and 
the rituals they enact are no longer understood by potential consumers, remaining 
unintelligible to all but a select few?  Such a strategic failure is often mirrored by 
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structural defects that constrain an organization from implementing change, thus creating 
a self-fulfilling cycle of underperformance.   
Management scholars Gerald F. Davis and Richard Scott have provided an 
updated look at why organizational structure might be constrained by inertial forces.
112
 
They suggest that forms persist because there is either no competitive selection system, or 
traditionalizing forces and outside ideologies explicitly support these forms.
113
  This is 
certainly true of the orchestra, which is marked by a conservative culture and a strategy 
of emulation. The misalignment of stakeholder expectations regarding performance—
defined broadly—breeds faulty structures, as well.  Different groups of consumers (those 
who attend concerts), customers (those who fund concerts), and other members of the 
organizational community have different definitions of success and perceptions of value.  
This fundamental disconnect leads to what Marshall Meyer and Lynne Zucker call the 
“permanently failing organization,” supporting the argument that despite fundamental 




 The orchestra’s inability to address these issues and adapt to its surroundings is 
mirrored by the lack of scholarship that confronts these problems. Indeed, these barriers 
to change make it seemingly impossible for orchestras to escape the “permanently 
failing” nonprofit model. According to Michael Hannan and John Freeman, “for wide 
classes of organizations there are very strong inertial pressures arising from both internal 
arrangements and from the environment. To claim otherwise is to ignore the most 
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obvious feature of organizational life.”115 In addition to being constrained by their own 
history, organizations face a sector-wide predilection for high inertial forces. They argue 
that modern society favors organizations with complex and embedded structures, 
especially when those organizations feature hierarchical layers of management.
116
 
Although Hannan proposes several viable theories of change—including population 
ecology, rational adoption, and random transformation theory—it seems clear that 
structural transformation in any context is difficult, and can lead to an organization’s 
disintegration and downfall. 
Nevertheless, this does not explain the orchestra’s disengagement with some basic 
economic, artistic, and social realities. Understanding these organizations as 
manifestations of larger cultural or societal systems may help to explain this imbalanced 
relationship. Edgar Schein’s theory of organizational culture proposes that “the members 
of a culture hold values and conform to cultural norms because their underlying beliefs 
and assumptions nurture and support these norms and values.”117 But what happens when 
these values change? While organizational transformation might be a difficult process, 
many scholars have theorized what makes substantive change possible. Richard Scott 
argues that, although the process of institutionalization might inhibit an organization’s 
nimbleness in reacting to its environment, it does not discount its role as an active player 
in the process: 
Organizations are affected, even penetrated, by their environments, but 
they are also capable of responding to these influences creatively and 
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strategically.  By acting in concert with other organizations facing similar 





This is not to say that alternative viewpoints do not exist.  DiMaggio’s theory of 
institutional isomorphism implies that, for mature organizational fields, change is 
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
119
 Cultural entities are especially susceptible to 
isomorphism, becoming increasingly similar even as rational actors try to change them.  
As the level of interaction between and among organizations within a field increases and 
a level of awareness among participant organizations that they are involved in a common 
enterprise develops, an organization’s structure becomes increasingly inflexible. In other 
words, the constraining process of isomorphism forces one organization to resemble other 
organizations that face similar environmental challenges. DiMaggio also hypothesizes 
that “the greater the extent to which technologies are uncertain or goals are ambiguous 
within a field, the greater the rate of isomorphic change.”120 This certainly resonates with 
the orchestra industry, which has historically been reluctant to adapt advancements in 
technology that might make its operating model more productive and ultimately more 
viable in the contemporary cultural marketplace.   
Organizational structures and behaviors can impact artistic practice, as well. 
Michael Jensen’s work on market identities in the American opera industry focuses on 
how strategic programming trends might be linked to audience development and 
retainment.
121
 According to Jensen’s analysis, opera audiences are overwhelmingly 
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conservative in their aesthetic tastes, and newly composed or avant-garde operas 
presented by these companies serve only to appease artistic convention and expectation, 
not audience interest. Robust market identities, defined as “the co-existence of divergent 
but interdependent identity dimensions,” are most likely to appear in markets with 
divergent audiences and between-category competition. In essence, by staging the token 
unconventional production, opera companies feign aesthetic development while meeting 
the conventional demands of their audience. 
This same nexus between organizational structure and artistic practice exists in 
the symphonic world, and is the crux of my dissertation. Although much of the remaining 
chapters offer a historical perspective, I end the dissertation by discussing some 
theoretical and practical implications that invite future work on the orchestra and its 
twenty-first century transformations. The mechanisms and processes associated with 
organizational change have been widely studied, due in part to the recent volatility of the 
global finance industry. William Barnett and Glenn Carroll define change as a continuous 
process, drawing a distinction between core and peripheral change to predict an 
organization’s likelihood of survival,122 while Hannan, Lólos, and Carroll argue that by 
understanding change as a series of integrated and related transformations, organizations 
are more likely to achieve long-term success.
123
 More recently, Fabio Rojas has explored 
how individuals acquire power through “institutional work,” ultimately overcoming 
formal constraints to gain authority and enact change.
124
 Little, if any, of this work has 
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explored how change unfolds in the nonprofit performing arts, producing an empirical 
gap that this dissertation begins to fill. 
Indeed, the orchestra’s conservative past makes it an ideal case study for when 
and how organizational forms and practices change in the face of considerable pressures 
to conform. The most notable research done in this area stems from Jutta Allmendinger 
and Richard Hackman’s study of seventy-eight orchestras after German reunification. 
They contended that drastic political changes (i.e. socialist vs. non-socialist political rule) 
resulted in appropriate organizational adaptations only when orchestras had previously 
exhibited healthy behavior and autonomous leadership.
125
 This tension between strong 
institutional forces and changing environments resonates just as strongly in contemporary 
America, where orchestras struggle to reconcile employee expectations with economic 
realities. According to Dwight Johnson, former chairman of the board of the Hartford 
Symphony Orchestra,  
Neither management nor musicians can afford to apply traditional union-
management practices to symphony orchestras. Symphony orchestras are 
too fragile and too dependent on the good will of their communities to 
employ the hard-nosed, adversarial bargaining approaches often used in 
the business world…. The price of a work stoppage is too great for the 
average orchestra. Work stoppages generate ill will for institutions that 




The message is clear: without a more viable or flexible business model, the orchestra’s 
struggle to survive must hinge on mutual trust and community support—something many 
ensembles are finding more and more difficult to secure.
127
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Looking Ahead 
 Although the research cited above offers no simple solutions, an organizational 
perspective can help us come closer to addressing the challenges these institutions face.  
Noted composer, conductor, and intellectual Pierre Boulez realized long ago that “what 
we need is a think tank, to say how we can organize differently and to propose models of 
organization for those who are unable to conceive of new ways of organizing…. Once 
they have practical models, they can think, maybe, of trying them out.”128 While many 
temporary solutions have been suggested—including pay cuts, increased government 
support, more substantive collaboration, and leveraging social enterprise to increase 
revenue—no practical models have emerged. The theories discussed herein indicate that, 
to successfully break the inertial pressures that currently stifle orchestras, managers must 
be willing to take considerable risk and reevaluate their organization’s structure, 
strategies, and mission. While prior organizational success was often rooted in economies 
of scale, subdivision of work, and well-defined hierarchies of authority, the new global 
marketplace favors rapid product development, context-specific strategies, and 
spontaneous team building that focuses on innovation, creativity, and inspired 
leadership.
129
 Replacing immovable hierarchical structures with process-driven strategies 
might lead to increased flexibility and productivity. 
 In 2009 Peter Dobrin was, along with Greg Sandow, one of the most prominent 
music journalists to publish a critique of the orchestra’s untenable business model. In his 
words, “Real change happens only in times of crisis. I’d say that time is here–and, if it 
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causes some players and administrators to choose institutional reinvention over personal 
enrichment, not a moment too soon.”130 In the chapters that follow, I aim to show that the 
“time of crisis” to which Dobrin refers is in fact historically contingent, stemming from 
structures and strategies conceived at the turn of the twentieth century. Next, I examine 
three symphonic organizations that have endured structural transformations or 
adaptations to ensure survival. In each case, I have chosen a crisis or opportunity that 
demonstrates how orchestras have struggled to align musical and economic objectives 
with the expectations of their community and broader environment. These examples are 
by no means exhaustive; instead, they are intended to make a cohesive argument 
regarding the interconnectedness of history, structure, and cultural production in the 
American orchestra. 
Each of the remaining chapters invokes a variety of methodological techniques to 
substantively connect organizational behavior and structure with various components of 
artistic practice, including programming and performance trends, audience reception, and 
even musical style. Chapter 2 documents the New York Philharmonic’s transition from a 
cooperative to a corporate nonprofit model in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
Although this shift came after the incorporation of orchestras in Chicago, Cincinnati, St. 
Louis, and Philadelphia, the challenges encountered by musicians and managers in New 
York illuminates an early struggle to mediate musical and financial concerns through a 
new operating model. Using material from the orchestra’s archives and programs 
database, my work builds on the scholarship of Barbara Haws, Howard Shanet and others 
to connect a shift in organizational structure with repertoire choices, audience 
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demographics, and artistic reputation, all of which were subsequently shaped by a 




Forty years later, the Louisville Orchestra attempted to transform itself from an 
unknown regional ensemble to an internationally recognized hotbed for contemporary 
music. Chapter 3 details the story of Robert Whitney, Charles Farnsley, and the 
Louisville Orchestra New Music Project, which between 1948 and 1958 resulted in over 
one hundred world premieres, a newly-formed record label, and a shift in how orchestras 
supported the creation and performance of contemporary music. From administrative, 
financial, and artistic documents housed at the University of Louisville archives, a 
remarkable story emerges that underscores the value of community support for long-term 
success. Chapter 4 examines the development of an entire youth orchestra movement 
known simply as “El Sistema.” Ethnographic research and findings from a series of 
interviews suggest a tension between the movement’s grassroots, community-based 
structure and more traditional, top-down management practices. The ensuing conflict 
problematizes the use of classical music as a universal vehicle for social action and 
questions who exactly is benefiting from this work—America’s youth or the ailing 
orchestra industry itself. The dissertation concludes by taking stock of the twenty-first 
century American orchestra and sharing some of the more innovative (and historically-
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informed) practices being implemented today, connecting past and present to inform how 
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Chapter Two    
                                                                                                            
Achieving Permanence: The Reorganization of the  
New York Philharmonic, 1902–28 
Introduction 
 As America’s oldest operating symphony orchestra, the New York Philharmonic 
Society has been operating on a near-continuous basis since 7 December 1842, when the 
group presented its first concert at the Apollo Room in lower Manhattan. Fifty years later, 
however, the Philharmonic could no longer consider itself the country’s first or best, as 
more “permanent” ensembles sprung up in Boston, Chicago, and even New York.1 
Despite their efforts to rival the best orchestras in the world, leaders of the Philharmonic 
encountered innumerable hurdles in their quest to secure the city’s best musicians and 
present regular symphonic concerts of the highest quality. Indeed, the ensemble’s 
prestigious history as a purveyor of great art is inextricably linked to an organizational 
narrative that is as multifarious as it is understudied. To quote Gustav Mahler, who would 
later become the orchestra’s music director, “If the purpose of an artistic institution is 
good performances, then there is an incongruity between means and purpose that can be 
                                                 
1
 The notion of “permanence” becomes a fixation for American orchestra builders in the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century, when figures such as Henry Lee Higginson and Theodore Thomas began to articulate 
their desire for ensembles that rehearsed and performed on a regular basis and employed the same 
ensemble of musicians week in, week out. Walter Damrosch claimed that his New York Symphony Society 
(founded 1878) achieved “permanence” in 1891 with the help of some wealthy patrons, but the group’s 
chronic under-rehearsal suggests otherwise. For first-hand discussions of permanence in an orchestral 
context, see John H. Mueller, The American Symphony Orchestra: A Social History of Musical Taste 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1951), Theodore Thomas and Goerge P. Upton, Theodore 
Thomas: A Musical Autobiography (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1905) and Walter Damrosch, My 
Musical Life (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923)). 
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rooted only in the weakness of the institution’s organization.”2 For the turn-of-the-
century Philharmonic, this meant that the power and responsibility previously held by 
musicians had to be reapportioned to a new class of wealthy philanthropists. In short, a 
new operating model was needed: one that empowered non-musicians to make 
organizational decisions while requiring them to shoulder the increasing costs associated 
with live performance. 
 Between 1902 and 1928, the Philharmonic capitulated to prevailing market forces, 
transforming from a musician-owned-and-managed cooperative to a membership 
corporation administered by a board of volunteers. Yet the popular decree that “Mahler, 
and no one else … reorganized and developed the Philharmonic”3 is simply untrue. As 
Figure 2.1 suggests, the shift toward a corporate nonprofit operating model happened in 
fits and starts, mediating between opposing factions while negotiating the cultural and 
economic landscape of industrial America. Over the course of more than half a century, 
the orchestra’s musicians gradually conceded both artistic and administrative authority in 
the hopes of achieving higher wages, better working conditions, and professional 
legitimacy. This process, driven by an ever-growing divide between labor and 
management, was linked closely to the unionization of orchestral musicians at the turn of 
the century.
4
 The tenuous interrelationships between musician, conductor, and board  
 
                                                 
2
 Quoted in the Neue Frie Presse, 27 August 1907, 11 (reproduced in Zoltan Roman, Gustav Mahler’s 
American Years, 1907–11: A Documentary History (Stuveysant, NY: Pendragon Press, 1988), 38). 
3
 Max Smith, New York Press, 16 January 1911. 
4
 Stephen Couch has argued that “while musicians tended to consider themselves gifted professional artists, 
an examination of their actual working conditions shows them to have been much more akin to the 
conditions of factory laborers than to the conditions in which professionals work. The process was not one 
of professionalization, but rather one which shows marked resemblance to the proletarianization of factory 
labor” (Couch, “The Orchestra as Factory: Interrelationships of Occupational Change, Social Structure and 
Musical Style,” in Art and Society: Readings in the Sociology of the Arts, edited by Arnold W. Foster and 




Figure 2.1 Important Organizational Events, 1842–1928 
                                                 
5
 R. Ogden Doremus is elected the first non-musician president by the Philharmonic members. 
6
 During Carnegie’s tenure as president (1902–09), violinist and Vice President Richard Arnold chaired most board meetings due the president’s absence 
(Meeting Minutes, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
7
 Clarence Mackay (chairman) and Willem Mengelberg (conductor) joined the Philharmonic through its acquisition of the National Symphony Orchestra. 
8
 The position of “president” is given to Henry Harkness Flagler, who joined and enlarged board of directors after the Philharmonic’s merger with the New York 
Symphony Society. 
 
Year Structure Artistic Leader Administrative Leader 
1842 Cooperative Conductor, in consultation with musician leadership Board President (musician) 
1867     Board President (non-musician)5  
1877   T. Thomas   
1891   A. Seidl   
1898   E. Paur   
1902   W. Damrosch A. Carnegie/R. Arnold6 
1906   V. Safonoff   
1909   G. Mahler, in consultation with non-musician board Guarantors Committee 
1910     Executive Committee/Manager  
1912  Corporation J. Stransky Board President/Manager 
1922   Stransky/W. Mengelberg C. Mackay/A. Judson7 
1923   Mengelberg   
1926   Mengelberg/A. Toscanini/W. Furtwängler   
1928   Toscanini President/Chairman/Manager8  
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were only compounded by the addition of paid professional staff and the development of 
a layered bureaucracy that would subsequently shape how orchestras produced music. In 
New York, these tensions reached a fevered pitch when, in 1902, Walter Damrosch 
issued an ultimatum to members of the Philharmonic: restructure so that he have 
complete artistic authority and a board of non-musicians retain administrative power, or 
find another conductor. The musicians rejected the proposal, however, preferring to 
maintain autonomous control until 1909. Yet with the continued exodus of Philharmonic 
members (to the better-paying Metropolitan Opera) and patrons (to various other New 
York arts organizations), the musician-led board of directors was forced to accept Mary 
Sheldon’s plan to reorganize the Philharmonic as a “permanent” ensemble managed and 
funded by a group of guarantors. By the end of the 1908–09 season, Gustav Mahler had 
been named the ensemble’s new music director and the orchestra was well on its way to 
reestablishing itself as one of the nation’s best. 
 Nevertheless, the Philharmonic’s financial state was no better in 1911 than it had 
been three years earlier, and many of Sheldon’s guarantors were prepared to withdraw 
their support.
9
 Instead, wealthy publishing tycoon Joseph Pulitzer died that year and 
bequeathed $500,000 to the Philharmonic, with an additional $500,000 promised if the 
orchestra completed its structural transformation from a musician-owned-and-managed 
cooperative to a board-governed institution, thus cementing a shift that had begun a 
decade earlier. Using material culled from the Philharmonic’s archives, I build on the 
work of Barbara Haws, Howard Shanet, and others to confront the long-standing myth 
                                                 
9
 Sheldon had convinced 106 guarantors to give nearly $85,000 annually to underwrite the Philharmonic’s 
deficit, with the hope that after three years the orchestra would possess a substantial patron base that could 
cover the majority of the organization’s costs through ticket sales and small donations. 
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surrounding the orchestra’s reorganization in the first decades of the twentieth century.10 
Doing so connects a shift in organizational structure with programming choices, audience 
demographics, and artistic reputation, all of which were subsequently shaped by a 
booming metropolis undergoing cultural upheaval at the hands—and wallets—of a new 
elite. When viewed in this light, the Philharmonic’s transformation can be understood as 
a prolonged attempt to align musical and economic objectives with the expectations of an 
emerging community. 
 To understand the details of the Philharmonic’s transformation and its subsequent 
role in shaping artistic practice, we must first consider the underlying reasons why such a 
shift occurred in the first place. Although some historians have leant credibility to Alma 
Mahler’s claims that Mary Sheldon and the guarantors overworked her husband and 
accelerated his eventual death, private correspondence and board meeting minutes 
suggest that something far less sinister was at work.
11
 Sheldon’s—and later Pulitzer’s—
desire to reinvigorate the Philharmonic likely grew from their involvement in a broader 
social movement that had been spurred on by the rise of the middle class several decades 
earlier. While we cannot know for certain why the guarantors chose to save the 
Philharmonic, I would suggest that their collective motivation stemmed from two 
seemingly opposing sources: their elite status, gained through the accumulation of great 
wealth, and their genuine interest in educating the public through the concerts with lower 
                                                 
10
 Barbara Haws is head archivist and historian for the New York Philharmonic, and much of what follows 
is shaped by my conversations with her and by her paper, “New York and the Philharmonic in the Time of 
Mahler: The Transformation from a Cooperative to a Managed Institution” (paper given at the Annual 
Meeting of the Society for American Music, 19 March 2010). See also Howard Shanet, Philharmonic: a 
history of New York's Orchestra (New York: Doubleday, 1975). 
11
 Most of these assertions originate from contemporary newspaper reports and Alma’s Erinnerungen, 
which is notoriously unreliable but has nevertheless been used by historians to link Mahler’s death with the 
guarantors. This topic is discussed in considerable detail later on in this chapter (for more, see Horowitz, 
Classical Music in America, 193 and Henry-Louis De La Grange, Gustav Mahler: A New Life Cut Short 
(1907–1911), Vol. 4 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 (pub. in French, 1984)). 
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ticket prices and accessible programming.
12
 In one sense, Sheldon and others saw 
symphonic music as a product to be cultivated for and consumed by the affluent and 
educated. Yet the class-based markers of orchestral culture contradicted their desire to 
share this music with a broader public. The resulting paradox suffuses much of the story 
that follows. 
 To be sure, the dramatic transference of power from a cooperative of musicians to 
a wealthy elite is indicative of a more widespread development around the turn of the 
century. As Thomas Adam, David Hammack, and others have noted, European 
conceptions of philanthropy influenced the emergence of a modern American “cultural 
cityscape,” underwritten by a diverse leisure class seeking to exercise their social power 
and dominate urban life.
13
 Women were an especially important part of this movement, 
which for the first time enabled them to exercise significant power through their 
participation on volunteer committees and boards. Although Adam supports his argument 
by tracing the transnational migration of philanthropy in the visual and plastic arts, the 
same processes inundated orchestral institutions, which became servants to patrons with 
ample time and money. This did not mean that Philharmonic musicians were immediately 
disenfranchised of their powers, however. On the contrary, they maintained significant 
administrative control until the early 1920s, when some of the more senior members of 
                                                 
12
 This second point is plainly stated in Sheldon’s many editorials concerning the reorganization of the 
Philharmonic (usually published in Musical America), as well as Pulitzer’s original bequest to the 
Philharmonic (Archives of the New York Philharmonic, also discussed in an article by Arthur Judson in the 
St. Louis Post Dispatch, 6 April 1947). 
13
 Adam later distinguishes between this leisure class and other donors, using German verbiage to point out 
that while many people would give to the arts (Spenden), only the social elite sought to create new 
institutions and endowments to educate others and cement a legacy for their class and their family (Stiften) 
(Thomas Adam, Buying Respectability: Philanthropy and Urban Society in Transnational Perspective, 
1840s to 1930s (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009). For a broader perspective 
on the proliferation of wealth and expertise in 1880–1910 New York, see David C. Hammack, Power and 
Society: Greater New York at the Turn of the Century (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1982). 
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the orchestra retired from their posts.
14
 In the end, the guarantors’ desire to further the 
cause of symphonic music and “reconcile the commercially possible with the artistically 
desirable” outweighed the musicians’ principles of autonomy, which were quelled by 
larger salaries and extended contracts.
15
  
 The Philharmonic was neither the first nor the last orchestra to adopt this new 
system of patronage, which in time would form the foundation of the modern nonprofit. 
The artistic consequences of this evolving institutional framework should not be 
overlooked, as shifts in programming strategies, artistic reputation, and audience 
reception paralleled the orchestra’s reorganization. Analysis of the Philharmonic’s annual 
reports and digital concert database provide a detailed snapshot of the group’s repertoire 
choices, which shift from Beethoven and Wagner to a more heterogeneous assortment 
over the first decades of the twentieth century. At the same time, the artistic ideology 
espoused by those in charge began to trend toward public education, reflecting the 
audience-oriented perspective of a new philanthropic class.
16
 Although it may not have 
been their intention to meddle in the Philharmonic’s artistic affairs, the guarantors 
acquired a degree of control that allowed them to influence what music was performed 
and for whom. These developments are echoed in the rhetoric used by contemporary 
board members, patrons, and music critics, whose definitions of “success” and 
“excellence” depended on an ever-evolving cocktail of musical expression, technical 
precision, stage presence, and organizational stability. Tracing how these definitions 
                                                 
14
 I refer here most notably to Richard Arnold (violinist and vice president, 1895–1918) and Felix Leifels 
(double bassist, secretary (1902–21), and manager (1911–21) of the Philharmonic). 
15
 As quoted in Shanet, Philharmonic, 218. 
16
 The repertoire associated with public education was at first no different than the repertoire programmed 
on subscription concerts: familiar nineteenth-century symphonies and concerti with the occasional work by 
an American or other contemporary composer. This would later change, however, as pieces such as 
Britten’s Young Peoples Guide to the Orchestra (1945) were explicitly designed with education in mind. 
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changed over time, and understanding such changes through shifts in political and 
cultural priorities, can help to explain wide-ranging aesthetic trends that continue to 
shape the audience experience.  
The Early Philharmonic, 1842–1902 
 As one might suspect, the New York Philharmonic and its story have been 
subjected to considerable scholarly inquiry, and for good reason. Four monograph-length 
histories along with dozens of articles and a newly digitized archive provide a remarkably 
rich, and often times contradictory, narrative which contemporary researchers are left to 
reconsider. Each of the first three histories was commissioned by the Philharmonic for an 
anniversary celebration and represents more or less a journalistic account of the 
orchestra’s operations.17 The fourth book, Howard Shanet’s Philharmonic: A History of 
New York’s Orchestra, represents the most recent and rigorous attempt to catalogue the 
orchestra’s history. Published in 1975, Shanet’s account builds on each of the earlier 
studies by providing a more comprehensive analysis of the Philharmonic as both a 
musical and socio-cultural entity. Buoyed by extensive archival evidence, his work is 
laudable for its breadth and detail. Nevertheless, Shanet’s longtime position as program 
annotator for the Philharmonic provides an insider’s perspective that at times betrays an 
emotional connection to the orchestra, rendering certain aspects of his history overly 
                                                 
17
 These histories nonetheless provide essential information concerning the Philharmonic’s early years, 
including complete concert and program listings (Henry Edward Krehbiel, The Philharmonic Society of 
New York: A Memorial; Published on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the founding of the 
Philharmonic Society (New York and London: Novello, Ewer & Co., 1892), James Gibbons Huneker, The 
Philharmonic Society of New York and Its Seventy-Fifth Anniversary: A Retrospective (New York: 1917),  
and John Erskine, The Philharmonic-Symphony Society of New York: Its First Hundred Years (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1943)). 
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nostalgic.
18
 My goal here is to augment Shanet’s and others’ work by concentrating on 
the Philharmonic’s reorganization and using archival documents to substantiate certain 
artistic events and developments within a broader organizational narrative that has yet to 
be considered. 
 Although the Philharmonic lists 1842 as its founding date, various local orchestras 
existed much earlier, including the short-lived philharmonic societies of 1799 and 1824, 
respectively. It was not until 17 February 1853 that the “real” Philharmonic was 
incorporated under New York state law. Earlier iterations of the orchestra were loosely 
organized, with musicians giving anywhere between three and six concerts annually at 
venues like the Academy of Music. Concert admission was limited to a small base of 
subscribers and friends until 1851. Much like the entities we call corporations today, the 
Philharmonic was a privately owned, self-governing cooperative that distributed each 
year’s profits amongst its members. Musicians were paid an annual dividend that was 
calculated as a percentage of ticket sales net any expenses incurred throughout the 
season.
19
 Only the conductor and the librarian received guaranteed salaries.
20
 Inspired by 
the orchestras of London (1813) and to a lesser extent Vienna (1842), New York elected 
its performing members and appointed a small board of musicians to govern the 
                                                 
18
 Some of the longer interpretive passages in Shanet’s book tend to romanticize several longstanding 
myths (including, for instance, his discussion of Mahler’s death and its connection to the guarantors). 
19
 According to Article 7, Sec. 1 of the Philharmonic’s By-Laws, “After the last regular Concert of each 
season, the Board of Directors shall, after defraying or providing for all expenses of the Society, divide 
among the actual performing members of the season then passed, the funds remaining in the hands of the 
Treasurer, with the exception of a small balance, that is to be carried over to the next season; each 
performing member shall receive his full dividend, or part of the same, according to the time of attendance” 
(Amended 18 October 1890, reproduced in Box 498-01-02; Folder: Minutes 1890–1903; Record Group: 
Board of Directors; Minutes for Business Meetings, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
20
 Early conductors of the Philharmonic usually received a certain number of “shares” of each year’s profit, 
but were guaranteed a fixed amount regardless of the orchestra’s financial performance. If a conductor 
were to make more than this, as was often the case, he usually returned the difference to the orchestra (By-
Laws of the Philharmonic Society of New York, Article 3, Sec. 5 and 6, amended 19 October 1890, 
Archives of the New York Philharmonic).  
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Philharmonic.
21
 The board of directors—consisting at first of a president, vice president, 
treasurer, and secretary—was charged with booking concert venues, tallying receipts, 
hiring conductors, and overseeing elections.
22
 
 If one were to take a closer look at the Philharmonic’s early by-laws, one would 
see just how complex its operations were. Despite giving only a handful of concerts each 
year, the society boasted seventy Actual Members, all of whom had the right—and as we 
will see later, the responsibility—to play onstage with the Philharmonic.23 To be elected 
to membership, musicians had to not only be deemed proficient on their instrument but 
also prove their New York state residence, pay a nominal initiation fee and recurring 
annual tax, and sign a declaration promising to conform to the ensemble’s constitution.24 
By its second season, the Philharmonic added another class of membership for 
professional musicians who were interested in attending rehearsals and concerts (also for 
an annual fee). The “Associate Members” category soon grew to accept non-musicians, 
presumably to increase the number of tickets that were sold at evening concerts and the 
                                                 
21
 Musicians wishing to become actual members were elected by ball count, in which exist members could 
vote “yes” by placing a white ball in a box and “no” by placing a black ball in the box. 
22
 Additional directors were added to the board at various times throughout the Philharmonic’s history (for 
instance, by 1890 there were ten directors in total), and a trio of trustees was entrusted with any non-
musical property that the society owned (Box 498-01-02; Folder: Minutes 1890–1903; Record Group: 
Board of Directors; Minutes for Business Meetings, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
23
 By the first decade of the twentieth century, the number of actual members who performed regularly with 
the Philharmonic had dropped considerably, forcing the board of directors to hire temporary substitutes (see 
Figure 2.12 for a breakdown of funds spent on substitute musicians).  
24
 An amended definition of “actual member”  can be found in an 18 October 1890 version of the 
Philharmonic’s By-Laws, Article 1, Sec. 1: “Each Actual Member shall be a professor of music and an 
efficient performer on some Orchestral instrument. Every candidate for membership shall have been a 
permanent resident of New York or its immediate vicinity during the year previous, and shall be proposed 
at a meeting prior to that of being balloted for, when a majority of two-thirds of all the votes of members 
present shall be necessary for election. No candidate for membership shall be balloted for until after having 
performed at one concert and the requisite rehearsals. Each Actual Member, when elected, shall pay an 
initiation fee of twenty five dollars, and sign a declaration to conform to the Constitution, By-Laws and 
Regulations of the Society. Every Actual Member shall pay an annual tax of three dollars” (Reproduced in 
Box 498-01-02; Folder: Minutes 1890–1903; Record Group: Board of Directors; Minutes for Business 
Meetings, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
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open rehearsals that preceded them.
25
 The first woman was admitted as an associate 
member in 1847, and by the mid-1850s more women than men could claim non-
performing membership with the Philharmonic. This trend continued for a half-century, 
paving the way for women like Mary Sheldon and Mrs. W.H. Taft to become power 
brokers on the American orchestra scene.
26
 
 While women began to voice their interests in the organization of classical music, 
men of great wealth and repute were given leadership roles within the Philharmonic. 
Reserved for “eminent citizens” only, Honorary Associate Membership allowed a select 
group of patrons to attend any Philharmonic concert for free. And, for the first time in its 
history, the orchestra elected a non-musician president in 1867.  R. Ogden Doremus, a 
chemist and professor at the New York Free Academy, was a long-time admirer and 
associate member of the Philharmonic. As a well-established New Yorker with intimate 
knowledge of how professional organizations operated, Doremus was seen as an ideal 
candidate for the post of president, which increasingly required certain organizational 
skills and professional contacts that most musicians did not possess. In 1881, banker 
Joseph Drexel was elected president, followed by E. Francis Hyde (elected 1888) and 
Andrew Carnegie (elected 1902). The Philharmonic would never again be run by a 
musician.  
 This is not to say that the orchestra lacked artistic leadership, however. Musicians 
maintained considerable power through their participation in annual meetings and on the 
board of directors. The constant struggle between artistic and financial concerns caused 
                                                 
25
 During the 1845–46 season, Associate Membership increased from 12 to 56 (Annual Reports, Archives 
of the New York Philharmonic). 
26
 Mrs. W.H. Taft, wife of President William Howard Taft, would play a leading role in the formation of 
the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra Association in 1894. 
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the board to hire Theodore Thomas as its conductor in 1877, after a disastrous season in 
which Leopold Damrosch nearly derailed the orchestra through mismanagement.
27
 In 
fact, Thomas had been offered the job in 1876, but declined due to a conflict of interest 
between the Philharmonic and Thomas’ own traveling orchestra, which performed a 
number of concerts each year in New York. Thomas had enjoyed a long relationship with 
the Philharmonic, having been elected to Actual membership as a violinist in 1854, but 
his true calling was as an entrepreneur, managing his own orchestra as both conductor 
and administrator.
28
 When he joined the Philharmonic as music director, he continued to 
conduct concerts with his own orchestra, which “came more and more into direct 
competition with the Philharmonic.”29 The two orchestras soon shared many of the same 
musicians as well, including future concertmaster and board member Richard Arnold. 
See Figure 2.2 for a partial list of the musicians who joined the Philharmonic the year 
Thomas was hired. 
 Despite his frenetic touring schedule, or perhaps because of it, Thomas’ tenure 
with the Philharmonic was both productive and profitable, at least compared to previous 
seasons. He conducted nearly all of the orchestra’s concerts from 1877 to 1891 and 
received ten (later augmented to twenty) shares of each year’s dividend.30 Musicians also 
benefited from the Philharmonic’s success, enjoying larger dividends and access to a  
 
 
                                                 
27
 During Damrosch’s single season as conductor, the Philharmonic’s annual dividend dropped from over 
$100 to $18 per player. After his dismissal in 1877, he would go on to form the New York Symphony 
Society, which figures prominently later on in this chapter. 
28
 See Chapter 1, “Early Orchestra Operating Models” for a more detailed discussion of Thomas’ career. 
29
 Hart, Orpheus in the New World, 26. 
30
 Thomas did not conduct concerts during the 1878–79 season due to his role in starting a Conservatory of 
Music in Cincinnati (Ibid). 
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Figure 2.2 New membership role, 1877 (courtesy of the Philharmonic archives) 
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“Sinking-Fund” that served as the proto-pension fund for retired members.31 
Nevertheless, one must wonder how Thomas’ dictatorial leadership style colored his 
relationship with the Philharmonic musicians and board. Although the latter’s 
cooperative structure endowed musicians with the power to accept or reject Thomas’ 
programming, a series of amendments to the Philharmonic’s By-Laws suggests that 
musicians were beginning to exploit their own democratic ideals, regularly missing 
rehearsals and concerts to perform with other musical outfits that offered more money.
32
 
When Thomas left to become music director of the newly incorporated Chicago 
Symphony Orchestra Association, he left for one reason: the failure to establish a 
permanent orchestra in New York. In his own words, 
What I wished was a large orchestra, sufficiently subsidized to enable it to 
hold the rehearsals necessary for artistic performances, its object and aim 
to be to attain the highest artistic performance of master-works, and to set 
a standard for the whole country, and give New York one of the greatest 





For Thomas, the Philharmonic’s cooperative structure had failed to achieve desirable 
artistic or organizational results. In Chicago, Charles Norman Fay had established a 
                                                 
31
 According to an amendment to the Philharmonic’s By-Laws, “There shall be a Sinking-Fund, the 
interest of which shall be equally divided among members who shall have been retired on account of old 
age or disability” (By-Laws of the New York Philharmonic Society, Article 8, Sec. 1, amended 18 October 
1890 and reproduced in Box 498-01-02; Folder: Minutes 1890–1903; Record Group: Board of Directors; 
Minutes for Business Meetings, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
32
 According to these amendments, musicians could no longer miss a rehearsal/concert for another New 
York engagement without permission from the board (Article 1, Sec. 2), and members were fined for 
missing business meetings ($1), private or extra rehearsals ($3), parts of regular rehearsal ($0.50 if late, 
$1.00 if more than a half hour late, $2.00 for leaving early), and public rehearsals or concerts ($10) (Article 
6, Sec. 1). Members also were required to attend three rehearsals prior to performing in concert. In a 
subsequent amendment dated 7 November 1894, musicians were to be stripped of their membership rights 
if they did not perform with the Philharmonic for two consecutive seasons. Whether all of these rules were 
enforced or not is unclear, but Adolph Hartdegen did loose his membership after missing two seasons’ 
performances (as stated in 30 December 1896 board meeting minutes, Box 498-01-02; Folder: Minutes 
1890–1903; Record Group: Board of Directors; Minutes for Business Meetings, Archives of the New York 
Philharmonic). 
33
 Thomas, Autobiography, 100. 
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guarantee fund and a board of wealthy philanthropists that would govern a full-time 
orchestra of salaried musicians. This model—the corporate nonprofit—would soon find 
its way to New York, but not without considerable effort. 
 With the departure of Thomas came another heroic figure in the Philharmonic’s 
history. Born in Hungary, conductor Anton Seidl continued to hone the Philharmonic’s 
artistic identity by building relationships with contemporary composers such as Antonin 
Dvořák and curating what others have called a “Wagner cult” in late nineteenth-century 
New York.
34
 This should come as no surprise, given Seidl’s earlier appointment as music 
director of the Metropolitan Opera and the city’s obsession with Wagner’s music in 
general.
35
 According to Philharmonic records, Seidl programmed Wagner thirty-six times 
during his tenure, making him the most-often performed composer of the 1890s.
36
 Extant 
financial records also suggest that the orchestra had achieved some degree of financial 
stability, prompting the board of directors to increase the number of public rehearsals and 
concerts from six to eight in 1897.
37
 Yet it is not clear if the orchestra’s ticket sales 
continued to cover all of the costs associated with producing and presenting concerts. As 
early as 1892, Philharmonic president E. Francis Hyde offered a financial guarantee for 
three special concerts to celebrate the orchestra’s fiftieth anniversary, foreshadowing a 
move toward private patronage that would continue to strengthen.
38
 
                                                 
34
 See for example Horowitz, Classical Music in America, 251. 
35
 This “obsession” is well documented in the contemporary accounts of music critics, some of whom 
found such idolization irrational and unbecoming (see “Decay of the Wagner Cult,” The New York Times, 
15 April 1894). 
36
 Beethoven was second with twenty-eight performances, and Dvorak third with fourteen (Concert 
Programs, 1891–98, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
37
 Board meeting minutes, 7 September 1897 (Box 498-01-02; Folder: Minutes 1890–1903; Record Group: 
Board of Directors; Minutes for Business Meetings, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
38
 In a letter to the board dated 7 October 1891, Hyde writes: “Referring to the recommendation of the 
Board of Directors, that the Semi-Centennial Celebration of the Society take the form of three concerts to 
be held on the evenings of April 21 and 23, 1892 and on the afternoon of April 22, I take great pleasure in 
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 In an attempt to underwrite the increasing costs of the Society, members of the 
board began to experiment with various methods of fundraising, including a failed 
attempt to establish an endowment fund “used for defraying the expense of the Society, 
for the Society’s Concerts, for Salaries to Officers, Conductor and active Members.”39 
The Philharmonic also looked to other orchestras for alternative financing models. After 
Seidl’s sudden death on 28 March 1898, the Philharmonic hired Emil Paur, former 
conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra.
40
 Like Chicago, Boston was considered a 
permanent orchestra of considerable artistic quality, a fact that was not lost on New 
Yorkers thanks to Boston’s monthly pilgrimage to Carnegie Hall. What truly made 
Boston the envy of all American orchestras, however, was the complete and unflagging 
patronage of Henry Lee Higginson. In what was a tacit attempt to mimic Boston’s 
success, the Philharmonic recruited one of New York’s wealthiest men, Andrew 
Carnegie, to be its president in autumn of 1901. At his first board meeting, Carnegie was 
introduced amidst cheers, sharing at length his “views about the value of art … as 
dependent upon the impression it created with those for whom it was intended.”41 Just for 
whom the Philharmonic’s performances were intended is not clear, but there is no doubt 
that the tension between wealthy guarantors like Carnegie and the broader public 
continued to shape the orchestra’s future. 
                                                                                                                                                 
saying the I gladly guarantee the financial success of the concerts, and will advance from time to time any 
monies necessary for preliminary expenses…. In this way, the celebration expenses can be entirely kept 
apart from the regular disbursements of the season” (Ibid.). 
39
 This amendment was proposed on 4 October 1901, only to be rejected by the Society’s membership on 
30 October 1902 (Ibid). 
40
 Paur’s contract was renewed in March of 1901. He received 42 of 54 votes and was contracted for twelve 
shares, amounting to no less than $2,500 each year (22 March 1901 board meeting minutes, Ibid). 
41
 Board meeting minutes, 21 November 1901, Ibid. 
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First Attempt at Reorganization, 1902–08 
 After the completion of Carnegie’s first season as president, the Philharmonic 
held its annual elections for new musicians and officers on 20 May 1902. Richard Arnold 
was elected vice president for the eighth consecutive year and Felix F. Leifels was 
elected secretary, replacing August Roebbelen, who had held the position since 1883.
42
At 
the same meeting, Walter Damrosch was elected conductor of the Philharmonic, beating 
out Emil Paur by an impressive thirty-three votes. Damrosch’s appointment is significant 
for several reasons. Like his father Leopold, Walter had made his name as conductor of 
the New York Symphony Society, and had a history of familial disdain for the 
Philharmonic.
43
 Founded in 1878, the Symphony Society programmed newer repertoire, 
performed more concerts, and marketed themselves more forcefully than their cross-town 
rival. In fact, Damrosch’s orchestra had claimed permanent status in 1891 with the help 
of a few wealthy patrons, but its reputation for under rehearsed performances made it 
difficult to overtake the older and more prestigious Philharmonic.  
 According to Damrosch’s autobiography, which freely exhibits a flair for the 
dramatic, his appointment as conductor of the Philharmonic came as a surprise: 
In the spring of 1902, at the close of my second season with [Maurice 
Grau at the Metropolitan Opera], I received an invitation from the New 
York Philharmonic society to become its conductor. This invitation was a 
great surprise to me, as the Philharmonic had been, ever since my father’s 
day, the rival orchestra…. It had always been a cooperative association, 
                                                 
42
 Surprisingly, longtime violinist and trustee Anthony Reiff, Jr. is absent from the 1902–03 board of 
directors listing. Reiff, Jr., whose father was a founding member of the Philharmonic, is listed as a non-
performing member in the orchestra’s records, but that year’s annual report lists him as a candidate for the 
position of secretary, which was ultimately given to Felix Leifels. Minutes form the 20 May 1902 elections 
meeting list Leifel’s adversary as Fred Wagner, so it is unclear if Reiff did in fact run for office or if he 
simply did not perform for a year. The timing of this result is especially interesting when one considers 
Reiff’s staunch opposition against reorganizing the Philharmonic. 
43
 Damrosch’s feelings about the Philharmonic are stated in no uncertain terms throughout his biography 
(Walter Damrosch, My Musical Life (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1924). 
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composed of the members of the orchestra, who had complete control of 
its affairs, receiving no salaries, but dividing the profits equally among 
themselves at the end of each season. I accepted the conductorship, but 
found very soon that my acceptance was a blunder. The society had come 
upon evil days, and under its last conductor attendance had dwindled to 
less than one-half. Of the membership of the orchestra only the skeleton 
remained, and I found to my amazement that of the hundred players at the 




While many of these assertions may be based in truth, they obscure why Damrosch 
accepted a position with his “rival orchestra” in the first place. As the Symphony Society 
had been rendered temporarily dormant since 1898, he likely saw the Philharmonic’s lack 
of firm leadership as an opportunity. With his election in hand, he went about “gathering 
together a fund large enough to produce the same conditions and results as Higginson 
achieved [in Boston] … and, above all, to put the management of the Philharmonic in the 
hands of a committee which should not be composed of members of the orchestra, but of 
music lovers and guarantors of the fund.”45 Damrosch had instigated what would be the 
first of several attempts at reorganization for the Philharmonic, usurping artistic authority 
from the heavy-handed board and delegating business operations to a committee of non-
musicians. 
 At a special meeting called on 18 December 1902, Damrosch expounded upon his 
vision of a reorganized Philharmonic. According to the minutes,  
Mr. Damrosch said that, as the subscriptions to the Philharmonic Concerts 
had decreased significantly and, as the competition of rival organizations 
with backing of unlimited wealth can no longer be met by ordinary 
methods, the only way to successfully compete and keep the Society in the 
position of the foremost New York orchestral organization financially and 
artistically is to acquire a subsidy or fund and with this object in view he 
had approached the President, Mr. Andrew Carnegie.
46
 
                                                 
44
 Ibid., 206. 
45
 Ibid., 207. 
46
 Box 498-01-02, Folder: Minutes 1890–1903, Record Group: Board of Directors; Minutes for Business 
Meetings, p. 274, Archives of the New York Philharmonic. 
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It is no coincidence that Carnegie plays a part in this story. Before his appointment with 
the Philharmonic, he had served as president of the Symphony Society (since 1892) and 
spearheaded the building of Carnegie Hall with Damrosch in mind. At the December 
meeting, Carnegie agreed to start a New York Philharmonic Society Orchestra Fund 
(later renamed the Permanent Orchestra Fund) with a $5,000 gift, provided that “the 
performing members of this organization … contribute five percent of the dividends 
derived by them from the regular series of eight public rehearsals and concerts … 
towards the said Fund.”47 
 By January of 1903 Damrosch’s Fund had become a reality, thanks in large part 
to a group of philanthropists who had joined forces to help build a permanent orchestra in 
New York. The fund was administered not by the Philharmonic’s board of directors, but 
instead by a committee of appointed trustees chaired by Samuel Untermyer. Other 
members included Mary Sheldon, John Jay Knox, William P. Douglas, Alexander T. Van 
Nest, Frances Hellman, Miss Caroline De Forest, Lucy How Draper, Isaac N. Seligman, 
John Notman, Edward L. Rogers, Edward D. Adams, and Harry Harkness Flagler—
future president of both the Symphony and Philharmonic societies.
48
 Damrosch 
approached the Philharmonic board with hopes of receiving a three-year guarantee on his 
contract, but the musicians declined, pointing out that they were “not vested with the 
power of electing or appointing officers and, moreover, the election of an officer for a 
longer period than one year would have required an alteration of the bylaws.”49 




 Listed in a letter to subscribers dated 8 January 1903 (Box 006-02-19; Folder: Correspondence 
Regarding the Formation of the Permanent Orchestra Fund; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of 
the New York Philharmonic). 
49
 Damrosch’s initial request is transcribed in the minutes of a 31 December 1902 meeting (Box 498-01-
07; Folder: Minutes 1899–1904; Record Group: Board of Directors; Minutes of the Meetings of the 
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Damrosch smartly withdrew his request before it went before the entire membership, 
choosing instead to take his chances on the success of the Permanent Orchestra Fund and 
the Philharmonic’s reorganization.50 
 The conductor’s vision was not realized, however—at least not yet. On 18 
February 1903 the musicians of the Philharmonic held a special meeting to discuss the 
proposition laid out by Damrosch, Untermyer, and the others. A specially formed 
musicians committee determined that the proposal was in reality “an ultimatum [that], in 
fact, demanded … the entire affairs of the organization, financial, governmental, and 
artistic be placed in the hands of a Board of Directors.”51 They collectively drafted a 
letter to the Fund committee, insisting that the reorganization would “seriously interfere 
with the control of [the Philharmonic’s] affairs by it’s [sic] members which has always 
been its vital principle, and that the future prosperity of the Society would thereby be 
imperiled.”52 This sentiment was echoed in a public letter to Philharmonic subscribers. In 
it, the musicians explained their reasons for rejecting the proposed reorganization: “The 
Trustees of the proposed fund would … have a very large voice in managing the affairs 
of the … society, but … no provision was made for any control by the Society over the 
fund in the hands of the Trustees.” [italics theirs]53 The musicians’ fear and mistrust of  
                                                                                                                                                 
Directors of the New York Philharmonic Society, Archives of the New York Philharmonic), while the 
board’s response can be found in Box 006-02-19; Folder: Correspondence Regarding the Formation of the 
Permanent Orchestra Fund; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic. 
50
 Damrosch later downplayed his interest in an extended contract, insisting that he “made it particularly 
clear that [his] selection as a conductor for the following year was not in any way a necessary part of the 
reorganization scheme, as it seemed … that the only way to achieve a real permanent orchestra for New 
York was to unite the conflicting factions and to let the choice of conductor be made after the organization 
had been properly placed upon a sound and comprehensive base” (Damrosch, My Musical Life, 209). 
51
 As quoted in the minutes of a special meeting for members, 28 February 1903. Members of the 
musician’s committee included Anthony Reiff, Jr., Richard Arnold, Felix Leifels, August Roebbelen, Louis 




 The musicians go on to explain that reorganization would lead to a dilution of the Philharmonic’s artistic 
standards and current constitution, “which provides that new members shall have resided here a year; shall 
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the guarantors stemmed in large part from a proposed shift in board composition that 
would result in a new—and for the musicians, disadvantageous—balance of power.54 As 
shown in Figure 2.3, however, the board remained unchanged, empowering the same 
small group of musicians and disallowing significant organizational change despite an 
ever-evolving cultural landscape. The only non-musician elected to the board, Andrew 




 If Carnegie’s attitude toward Damrosch’s reorganization plan was one of 
indifference, however, there were others invested in its eventual success. The Fund 
committee continued to fight for what was becoming a losing cause, publishing the terms 
of their proposal in the New York Tribune in an attempt to garner public support. Harry 
Harkness Flagler wrote an accompanying letter to the editor clarifying the committee’s 
rationale: 
[The orchestra would become] permanent in the sense that its more 
important members would be subsidized for the season, that it should meet 
frequently for rehearsal and should give at least one concert in New York  




                                                                                                                                                 
pass a rigid trial as to their competency, shall be recommended by the Board of Directors, and then be 
elected by a two-thirds vote of the members of the Society” (Letter to Subscribers on 18 April 1903, 
Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
54
 According to the proposal, “the directors were to be fifteen, eight representing the society and seen the 
trustees of the fund (to this, it may be said, the society raised the objection that, the president having no 
vote except in case of a tie, the board would at the best be evenly divided, and when the vice-president 
presided the decision would rest with the trustees of the fund)” (Letter to the Editor, New York Herald 
Tribune, 15 March 1903). 
55
 Carnegie wrote a letter addressed to Anthony Reiff., Jr. concerning the reorganization plan, but this 
correspondence and thus its contents have been lost (Minutes from board meeting held on 26 March 1903, 
Box 498-01-02; Folder: Minutes 1890–1903; Record Group: Board of Directors; Minutes for Business 
Meetings, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). Nevertheless, Carnegie’s ambivalence comes across 
clearly in a letter to Damrosch: “It is all to [sic] sad. I cannot quite stand it but don’t be too deeply 





Figure 2.3 NY Philharmonic Board of Directors, 1900–09 (courtesy of the Annual Reports, Archives of the New York Philharmonic) 
Year President 
Vice 
President  Treasurer Secretary Directors 
1900–01 E. F. Hyde R. Arnold H. Schmitz A. Roebbelen 
Bergner, Klugescheid, Kester,  
Laendner, Leifels, Schmidt 
1901–02 A. Carnegie R. Arnold H. Schmitz A. Roebbelen 
Dannreuther, Klugescheid, Kester, 
Kircher, Laendner, Leifels  
1902–03 A. Carnegie R. Arnold H. Schmitz F. Leifels 
Dannreuther, Klugescheid, Kester,  
Laendner, Roebbelen, Schmitt,  
1903–04 A. Carnegie R. Arnold H. Schmitt F. Leifels 
Bauer, Dannreuther, Klugescheid, 
Kester, Roebbelen, Schmidt 
1904–05 A. Carnegie R. Arnold H. Schmitt F. Leifels 
Heine, Klugescheid, Kester, Kurth,   
Roebbelen, Schmidt 
1905–06 A. Carnegie R. Arnold H. Schmitt F. Leifels 
Hauser, Klugescheid, Kester,   
Kurth, Roebbelen, Seiferth 
1906–07 A. Carnegie R. Arnold H. Schmitt F. Leifels 
Hauser, Klugescheid, Kester,      
Roebbelen, Ruhlender, Seiferth 
1907–08 A. Carnegie R. Arnold H. Schmitt F. Leifels 
Hauser, Klugescheid, Kester,      
Roebbelen, Ruhlender, Seiferth 
1908–09 A. Carnegie R. Arnold H. Schmitt F. Leifels 
Hauser, Kalkhof, Laurendeau,     
Roebbelen, Ruhlender, Seiferth 
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movement, for it required a much smaller outlay than would be needed for 




What had started as Damrosch’s personal mission had transformed into the collective 
vision of the city’s most devoted cultural philanthropists. Yet with the growing dissent 
voiced by musicians, Damrosch removed himself from the negotiations, setting a 
precedent of neutrality that music directors still practice today.
57
 
 By the end of the 1902–03 season it had become clear that the reorganization had 
failed, in large part due to the inevitable repercussions associated with the empowerment 
of the guarantors and, by proxy, Damrosch. The conductor later recalled that “the 
members of the [orchestra] were not unfavorably disposed toward our scheme. The idea 
of being guaranteed a yearly salary instead of sharing problematic yearly profits naturally 
appealed to them.”58 Yet several of the Philharmonic’s senior-most musicians—including 
Arnold and August—had already been told that this new “scheme” would require their 
demotion or retirement. This of course was deemed unacceptable, sealing the fate of the 
proposed reorganization plan. Damrosch conceded defeat to Arnold in a letter dated 7 
April 1903, maintaining to the end that 
The Philharmonic orchestra of today is incomplete … [and] some of the 
best players are often drawn away by other organizations which offer 
greater pecuniary inducements… To be compelled, as some of your 
members are, to play at the dances in October and the balls in January is 
no proper preparation for a symphony concert, and I had hoped that the 
orchestral fund, judicially used, would enable us … to place the orchestra 
                                                 
56
 Submitted to the editor of the New York Tribune on 13 March 1903 and published two days later 
(reproduced in Box 006-02-08; Folder: Letter to Subscribers; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives 
of the New York Philharmonic). 
57
 As orchestras unionized and the collective bargaining process became more complex and tenuous, the 
role of music director became one of dispassionate and neutral observer. This dynamic is maintained by 
most of today’s conductors, who as a rule do not publicly endorse one side (i.e. management) over the other 
(i.e. musicians). 
58
 Damrosch, My Musical Life, 208. 
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in a position where its members would no longer be compelled to earn 




Whatever Damrosch’s true intentions were, his dynamic and sometimes overbearing 
personality seems to have split the guarantor’s committee into two factions. One, 
represented by Henry Harkness Flagler, praised Damrosch for his insight and would go 
on to support the Symphony Society’s subsequent resurgence.60 The other, represented by 
Mary Sheldon, would continue without Damrosch to form New York’s first permanent 
orchestra. 
 But we are getting ahead of ourselves. With Damrosch gone, the musicians were 
back in control of the Philharmonic, choosing to hire esteemed guest conductors instead 
of a single music director and thus reorienting themselves as the center of the orchestra’s 
operations. Former board president E. Francis Hyde worked with Arnold, Roebbelen, and 
Leifels to form a Conductor’s Committee and procure the best talent available, including 
Felix Weingartner, Willem Mengelberg, Richard Strauss, and Theodore Thomas.
61
 Yet 
the lack of artistic continuity soon affected the Philharmonic’s reputation, leading to the 
extended appointment of Russian émigré Wassily Safonoff, a conservative conductor 
who programmed Tchaikovsky more often than Beethoven and Wagner.
62
 He also posed 
little threat to the musicians, who vetted all of Safonoff’s programming decisions and 
refused the conductor’s suggestion that a fourth rehearsal be added prior to each 
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 Published in the 12 April 1903 edition of The New York Times and reproduced in George Martin, The 
Damrosch Dynasty: America’s First Family of Music (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983), 171–2. 
60
 Flagler publicly lauded Damrosch in a letter dated 19 March 1903, and would later become the primary 
donor for the Symphony Society in 1914. Upon completion of the 1928 merger with the Philharmonic, 
Flagler was named president of the Philharmonic-Symphony Society. 
61
 Box 498-01-12; Folder: Conductors’ Committee Minutes 1904–05; Record Group: Board of Directors, 
Archives of the New York Philharmonic. 
62
 In Russia, Safonoff was known as “Vasily Safonov.” During his tenure with the Philharmonic, he 
programmed Tchaikovsky twenty-one times, Beethoven eighteen times, and Wagner sixteen times 
(Programs, 1906–09, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
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concert.
63
 In late 1908 Safonoff was reportedly offered a three-year contract extension, 
only to have the announcement reneged less than two weeks later.
64
 While the 
Philharmonic musicians had preserved their autonomy, the orchestra was “in serious 
trouble owing to the resignation of a number of its best players,” as members flocked to 
the Metropolitan Opera and popular theaters for more steady work and better pay (see 
Figure 2.4).
65
 This attrition included the resignation of eight regular members and two  
directors on 18 September 1908, forcing the orchestra to hire substitute musicians at an 
alarming rate. $8,683 was spent on non-member musician fees during the 1907–08 
season alone, exceeding the amount received by the orchestra’s actual members.66 As 
Shanet points out in his book, the Philharmonic “hardly had the right to be called an 
orchestra anymore; one could say that they functioned more as a cooperative concert 
management of thirty-seven men who hired the performers necessary to put on a concert  
 
Figure 2.4 New York Philharmonic Membership, 1900–09 (Courtesy of the Annual 







1900–01 74 59 (80%) 
1901–02 71 58 (82%) 
1902–03 74 59 (80%) 
1903–04 72 56 (78%) 
1904–05 73 56 (77%) 
1905–06 67 54 (81%) 
1906–07 70 55 (79%) 
1907–08 65 50 (77%) 
1908–09 63 37 (59%) 
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 According to Minutes for a1 October 1907 Board Meeting (Box 498-01-01; Folder: Annual Meeting 
Minutes 1904–1932; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
64
 The original announcement was published in Musical America 8, no. 12, 1 August 1908, 2, while the 
correction was printed in The Musical Courier 57, no. 7, 12 August 1908, 19. 
65
 Reported in The Musical Courier 57, no. 6, 5 August 1908, 20. 
66
 The dividend for the 1907–08 season was set at $266, but only 37 actual members received a full share 
(Annual Report, 1907–08, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
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series.”67 With the rejuvenation of Damrosch’s Symphony Society and Mahler’s  
appointment at the Metropolitan Opera, the Philharmonic struggled to remedy recurring 
shortfalls in its cooperative structure. 
Second Attempt at Reorganization, 1908–11 
 Richard Arnold, Felix Leifels, and the rest of the Philharmonic board had done 
their best to maintain the orchestra, but by the end of the 1907–08 season it was 
becoming all too apparent that Walter Damrosch had been right. Transforming the  
ensemble’s organizational structure was necessary if the orchestra was to grow and 
succeed in the city’s competitive cultural environment. Mary Sheldon, an integral 
member of the Philharmonic’s first guarantors’ committee, had not forgotten that vision 
and remained committed to the formation of a permanent orchestra in New York. In April 
of 1908, she gathered twelve other philanthropists to form a new committee charged with 
the sponsorship and production of four festival concerts at Carnegie Hall.
68
 The impetus 
for these concerts was Gustav Mahler, who had been invited to New York by Heinrich 
Conried in late 1907 to conduct the Metropolitan Opera. Although Mahler’s compositions 
left most contemporary critics bewildered, his reputation as a world-class conductor 
remained unquestioned. Sheldon and her committee recognized this and, wanting to 
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 Shanet, 202. 
68
 Along with Sheldon, one other woman served on both the 1902 and 1908 committees—Mrs. William H. 
Draper. Other members of the Committee for the Four Festival Concerts were Charlotte B. Arnold, Mrs. 
William T. Bull, Mrs. Foxhall P. Keene, Mrs. H. Van Rensselear Kennedy, Mrs. George Montgomery 
Tuttle, Mr. Alexander Lambert, Mr. Dave Hennen Morris, Mr. Patrick A. Valentine, Mr. Felix Warburg, 
Mrs. William P. Douglas, and Mrs. Samuel Untermyer. The husbands of both Douglas and Untermyer had 
been involved in the 1902 reorganization attempt (published in a public letter dated 24 April 1908, 
reproduced in Zoltan Roman, Gustav Mahler’s American Years, 1907–1911: A Documentary History 
(Stuveysant, NY: Pendragon Press, 1988), 129–130). 
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capitalize on his absence from the American concert stage, set out to hire him.
69
 They 
also saw an opportunity to try and establish the permanent orchestra they had so long 
desired: 
We feel that a man of Mr. Mahler’s eminence … will have trained the men 
to such a degree of perfection, that, if in the future, another conductor 
should have to be considered, this orchestra already formed shall be of 
such a standard of excellence as to appeal to other eminent conductors 
should the moment arise to engage them. Mr. Mahler sees the promise of 
the very best in orchestral development in this country and it only rests 




To be sure, Sheldon’s four-concert series was only the tip of a much larger musical 
iceberg, and while Mahler played a central role in her plan for New York’s first 
permanent orchestra, his participation was not essential.
71
 Contemporary reports claimed 
that Sheldon’s plot was nothing more than “the outcome of an attitude of disgruntlement 
toward former associates in the directorate of the organization conducted by Walter 
Damrosch.”72 Damrosch himself cultivated this theory, publicly referring to Sheldon’s 
committee as “two or three restless women with no occupation and more money than 
they seem to know what to do with.”73  
 Although we do not know if or why Sheldon held a grudge against the Symphony 
Society’s conductor, it is clear that her intentions transcended petty personal conflict. In 
response to Damrosch’s public dismissal, an anonymous author wrote that 
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 Damrosch and the New York Symphony Society actually beat Sheldon to the punch, inviting Mahler to 
guest conduct the orchestra on November 29 and December 8 and 3, 1908. According to reports, however, 
his experience was less than memorable, given the ragged state of the orchestra and its musicians: “Herr 
Mahler complained bitterly of the orchestra and said that as many members of the orchestra neither came to 
rehearsals nor, if they did come, stayed as he wished them to, his conducting was reduced to more or less of 




 According to an editorial in The Musical Courier, Hans Richter was invited to be the conductor of 
Sheldon’s orchestra before Mahler was approached (The Musical Courier 58, no. 1, 6 January 1909, 20).  
72
 Musical America 8, no. 2, 23 May 1908, 1. 
73
 Quoted in “Reflections,” The Musical Courier 57, no. 13, 23 September 1908, 21f. 
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The orchestral situation [in New York] had been one of despair, hopeless 
at times, seemingly incorrigible. It is time for “restless” women and others 
and men with courage and quiet determination to get together and retrieve 
the situation…. The committee of “restless” women will not stop until the 




Sarcasm aside, Sheldon and her “restless” committee took the prospect of a new 
permanent orchestra very seriously. Sheldon consulted with no less than Richard Strauss 
and Felix Mottl, who suggested that a world-class concert orchestra must perform 90–100 
concerts over a thirty-month season—a steep jump from the nine pairs of concerts 
produced by the Philharmonic each year.
75
 Such growth would be necessary, however, if 
a new orchestra was to stake itself as New York’s best. With the semi-regular presence of 




 What the city lacked was a genuinely permanent ensemble and a discerning 
audience to appreciate it. Sheldon and the other committee members represented a 
growing community of wealthy Americans who yearned for the rich cultural heritage 
associated with European high society. And, while the guarantors could not claim Mozart 
or Beethoven as their own, they could build an American “Vienna Philharmonic” and 
cultivate the public’s appreciation for transcendent art.77 Yet with the abundance of 
musical talent already present in New York, it made little sense to start an orchestra from 
scratch. Despite the Philharmonic’s previous refusal to reorganize, Sheldon and Richard 
Arnold brokered an agreement that would have the society serve as the nucleus for New 
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 Given the context of this statement, it seems likely that Sheldon wrote it herself (Ibid.). 
75
 “New York to Have Notable Orchestra,” The New York Times, 23 August 1908, C1. 
76
 In addition to the Philharmonic and Symphony societies, the Boston Symphony Orchestra traveled 
regularly to New York, and the Russian Symphony Orchestra presented a series of eight concerts at 
Carnegie Hall since 1904. 
77
 This statement refers to the Vienna Philharmonic’s reputation as the world’s best orchestra, and not its 
cooperative structure, which the guarantors were trying to erase in New York. 
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York’s first truly permanent orchestra. It is unclear who initiated this conversation, but it 
was public knowledge that the Philharmonic desperately needed to undergo “basic 
reforms that would increase the number of its rehearsals and concerts,” and that Sheldon 
was willing “to provide the necessary funds” to do so, “on condition that the existing 
cooperative system of management be abandoned.”78 With organizational structure as its 
fundamental determinant, a proposal shifting power to the guarantors’ committee was 
drafted on 6 February 1909 and the musicians accepted it without hesitation on February 
12.
79
 What had once been an impossibility had become a necessity.  
 The entire text of the proposal is reproduced below. In it, the guarantors outline a 
new way of doing things, replacing the Philharmonic’s old membership structure with 
salaried musicians, regular rehearsals, weekly concerts, and a third-party management 
system. Total artistic authority was shared between the appointed conductor and a newly 
formed board, which consisted of only three musicians and seven guarantors.  
 
 Proposal for Reorganization
80
 
It is proposed to organize an orchestra in New York for the performance 
of the highest order of music, under the exclusive and absolute direction of 
a competent conductor, the members of which shall devote their time to its 
work for a period of at least twenty-three weeks in each year. It is 
possible, with your cooperation, to use the corporate form of the 
Philharmonic Society for the purpose and thus enlarge its activities, place 
it on a more stable basis and at the same time cherish its history and 
traditions. To do this, however, involves some radical changes in its 
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 The first quotation comes from an editorial by music critic Richard Aldrich in The New York Times 
(published 20 December 1908), while the second comes from a letter by Mary Sheldon published in The 
New York Press on 11 December 1908 (reproduced in De La Grange, Gustav Mahler, 365–66). 
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 According to the minutes of a special members’ meeting called on 12 February 1909, “The following 
action was taken by the Society: regularly moved and seconded to suspend all By Laws that may conflict 
with the business arrangement of the foregoing proposition. Carried unanimously” (Box 498-01-01; Folder: 
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organizations and methods, the principal one of which is the employment 
of the members of the orchestra for a fixed period upon a stated salary, 
irrespective of their membership in the Society, to give their time to the 
work of the orchestra during the term of employment. With the approval 
of the conductor, the present orchestra will be continued under existing 
conditions of assignment and retirement.  
 
A further and quite as necessary a change is to place the management of 
the affairs of the Society entirely under the control of the persons who will 
finance the undertaking. With this end in view certain persons, whose 
names are appended hereto (and it is understood others may be added to 
this list from time to time), have undertaken to make good to the extent of 
the amount set opposite their names respecting any deficiency in the 
receipts of the Society to meet its expenses (including the expenses of its 
conductor) in each of the three years beginning October 1, 1909, provided 
that the Society be reorganized upon a basis satisfactory to a designated 
committee. 
 
As such Committee we beg, on their behalf, to lay before you the 
following proposition: 
 
The Guarantors will undertake to make good the deficiency, if any, to the 
receipts of the Society for the ensuing three years, beginning October 1, 
1909, and to advance from time to time the necessary funds to meet 
current expenses, upon the following conditions: 
 
1) The Board of Directors of the Society and its officers shall consist of 
such persons as the Committee shall designate, of whom at least three 
shall always be chosen from the actual members as at present defined in 
the By Laws [i.e. musicians]. 
 
2) The Board of Directors shall chose such officers, conductor, manager, 
and other employees, make such contracts, and take such other action as 
the Committee shall designate, and shall take no action without its 
approval. 
 
3) The Conductor, subject to the approval of the Committee, may change 
and add to the membership of the orchestra, and the Board of Directors 
shall make such contracts with the member of the orchestra as the 
Committee shall require. The Committee undertakes that the contracts 
shall not be for a less period than twenty-three successive weeks. 
 
4) The By Laws shall be amended as required by the Committee. 
 
5) No new member of the Society shall be elected except with the 
approval of the Committee. 
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6) The existing Pension Fund will be administered only for the benefit of 
the existing members of the Society, by a Committee which the present 
organization of the Society may elect. We may add that the Guarantors 
hope, in the ensuing three years, to raise an endowment fund which will 
establish the orchestra upon a permanent basis, and in that event the 
guarantors should have a prior rate to continue the orchestra. 
 
We venture to submit herewith a form of resolution to be passed by the 
Society, which we shall deem a satisfactory acceptance by the Society of 
our proposition, and under which contracts for the ensuring season may be 
made with a conductor and members of the orchestra. 
 
Resolved that the proposition of the persons named in the letter, signed by 
Mary R. Sheldon, Ruth Dana [Draper], Henry Lane [Eno], Ernest H. 
Schelling, George R. Sheldon, and Nelson D. Spencer, dated February 6, 
1909 
 
As reflected in the first line of this proposal, the Philharmonic, which had originally 
served a utilitarian function for working musicians, was on its way to becoming a bastion 
for high art. 
 To see her plan through to fruition, Sheldon had recruited 91 guarantors who had 
promised to collectively deliver $85,363 each year for three years to match any costs not 
covered by ticket sales.
81
 Between February 1909 and the spring of 1911, a small 
committee consisting of Sheldon (chairwoman), Ruth Draper, Nelson Spencer, Henry 
Eno, Ernest Schelling, and musicians Richard Arnold and Felix Leifels (secretary) met 
nineteen times and acted as the Philharmonic’s formal governing body.82 The original 
board of directors was not officially dissolved until 1912, but most of the orchestra’s 
musicians were rendered powerless by the guarantors, with the exception of Arnold and 
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 In actuality, the total guarantee fund consisted of $64,563 renewed for three years and $20,800 in one-
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Leifels.
83
 Mahler’s contract was ratified on 30 March 1909, and the terms were 
ambitious. His salary of $25,000 may seem exorbitant when compared to those of 
previous conductors, but Mahler’s scheduled workload included forty-six concerts over a 
twenty-four week period—far short of the 100 concerts suggested by Strauss but an 
astonishing augmentation of the eighteen performances programmed during the 1908–09 
season. The guarantors clearly felt that by producing more concerts, the orchestra could 
sell more tickets. improve its artistic quality, and become the standard bearer for 
American orchestras.  
 Mahler got to work almost immediately, conducting two trial concerts on 31 
March and 6 April 1909 featuring Beethoven’s Symphonies no. 7 and 9, respectively. 
Reviews were mixed, although there was universal agreement on the complete 
incompetence of the timpanist, who “bombarded” listeners’ ears with his playing.84 
Richard Aldrich of The New York Times thought “the playing of the orchestra was of a 
remarkable precision, rhythmic energy and elasticity and a pulsing vitality that have long 
been absent from it,”85 while the Tribune’s Henry Krehbiel remarked that the orchestra 
“played as they have played when masters have called on them on rare occasions in the 
past. Not only was the tone of the band brilliant but there was amazing crispness of 
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 On 21 March 1909, Arnold was appointed administrative manager (with a salary of $3,500), and Leifels 
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attack, precision and homogeneity of tone.”86 Yet Krehbiel, who would become one of 
Mahler’s harshest critics, later rescinded his compliments, lamenting that the concerts 
“seem to have been arranged for the purpose of provoking comparisons, not only between 
rival bands and rival conductors, but between the performances of the same band under 
different conductor.”87 He is referring, of course, to Damrosch and the Symphony 
Society, who considered Mahler and the Philharmonic bitter rivals.
88
 Nevertheless, the 
guarantors had come a long way in realizing their vision for a permanent orchestra in 
New York: “Mrs. Sheldon, Mrs. Untermyer and the ‘permanent fund’ raisers, who know 
by now something more of their public, looked down from their boxes last night. They 
had shown this public that their dream of a ‘new Philharmonic’ may come true.”89 
 The Philharmonic’s reorganization was viewed as a step in the right direction by 
many, including Mahler, who had resigned his post with the Vienna Philharmonic after 
growing dissension with the orchestra’s musicians. Yet while Mahler’s artistic direction 
no longer hinged on the preferences of a musicians’ cooperative, he would still have to 
temper his musical ideals with the expectations of Sheldon and the guarantors. The 
relationship between Mahler and the guarantors’ committee has become the stuff of 
legend, but archival documents and private correspondence suggest that their interactions 
were relatively benign. The Philharmonic’s directors entrusted—even expected—Mahler 
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 Damrosch’s disdain for the Philharmonic is no surprise, especially when one considers his own failed 
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 Probably penned by James Gibbons Huneker, Evening Sun, 7 April 1909 (quoted in De La Grange, 388). 
There were, of course, those that disagreed. According to Anthony Reiff, Jr., the organization “is merely an 
experiment, after its trial the old order may be restored to vogue” (Musical America 10, no. 4, 5 June 1909, 
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to reshape the orchestra and hire the best musicians available, including a new 
concertmaster, principal flute, and timpanist.
90
 Indeed, Mahler was for the most part “in 
full control … of the programming and personnel,” replacing nearly half of the old 
Philharmonic’s roster prior to the first concert of the 1909–10 season.91 
 Even if the guarantors granted Mahler considerable artistic license, however, he 
had to negotiate the rules and regulations of New York’s musicians’ union, which had 
amassed considerable power since its founding in the mid-nineteenth century. In 
accordance with the union’s “sixth-month” rule, which required foreign-born musicians 
to live in the United States for half a year before entering into union contracts, Mahler 
encountered great difficulty in his attempts to hire musicians who lived and worked in 
Europe. His frustration with the union’s restrictions is reflected in a personal letter to 
Richard Arnold, who had traveled to visit Mahler in Toblach to discuss personnel and 
programming for the upcoming season.
92
 Although Mahler’s correspondences from that 
summer suggest that union-related squabbles were front of mind, he was nevertheless 
able to procure the area’s finest musical talent. Given the excitement associated with his 
own appointment and a newly instated weekly salary of $35, Mahler was able to attract 
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 Mahler was authorized to spend up to $6,000 in hiring the Philharmonic’s new concertmaster 
(Guarantors’ Minutes, 7 April 1909, Box 498-01-13; Folder: Guarantor’s Minutes 1909–11; Record Group: 
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principal players from both the Boston Symphony and Metropolitan Opera orchestras—
two ensembles that had historically pilfered musicians from the Philharmonic. 
 Upon the start of Mahler’s first full season as music director, critics noticed 
continued improvement in the orchestra’s “technical proficiency,” “brilliant tone,” and an 
“amazing crispness of attack.”93 Such advancements were to be expected, given the 
Philharmonic’s new rehearsal schedule and Mahler’s reputation as an orchestral task 
master. With hopes that the orchestra’s new success was just the beginning of a long and 
fruitful development, some critics tempered the immediacy of their praise and suggested 
that higher standards would yet be attained. According to the New York World, “one must 
remember that as Rome was not built in a day, neither is a first rate symphony orchestra 
made in one series of nine rehearsals, even under such a master as Mahler.”94 The 
Philharmonic’s guarantors were no doubt pleased by the orchestra’s artistic progress, and 
hoped that it would translate into box office success and organizational stability. To quote 
Musical America,  
The advent of Gustav Mahler as conductor … and the re-establishment of 
the orchestra upon a permanent basis … has raised the organization to a 
standard that make[s] it possible … [to] establish a business system 
calculated to keep the Philharmonic well in the front rank of the great 




To ensure the proper management of what was now a full-time orchestra, Sheldon and 
the guarantors relinquished day-to-day control of the Philharmonic to a professional 
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administrator.
96
 Although Felix Leifels had held the position of business manager since 
the beginning of the 1909–10 season and had been offered a $7,000 contract extension, 
the guarantors eventually hired Loudon Charlton.
97
  
 Charlton was deemed suitable for the job based on his qualifications as a well-
known concert and artist manager, representing pianist Ossip Gabrilowitsch, among 
others. Yet just as would happen with Arthur Judson several decades later, Charlton was 
roundly criticized in the press for promoting his own clients through Philharmonic 
performances, something that Sheldon firmly denied.
98
 She insisted that “Mr. Charlton … 
has no hand in the regulation of the artistic side” of the Philharmonic.99 Indeed, it seems 
as if the responsibility of engaging soloists lie with Mahler alone, although there is some 
conflicting evidence to the contrary.
100
 Regardless of Mahler’s autonomy in shaping 
artistic policy, Charlton’s influence was short lived. After only a year on the job, he was 
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chapter. 
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replaced by none other than Felix Leifels, who retained at least partial administrative 
control of the Philharmonic until Judson’s appointment in 1922.101 
 Before delving into the heavily mythologized relationship between Mahler and 
the guarantors, we must first understand the formal channels through which they 
influenced and communicated with one another. Between 25 January and 1 February 
1911, a new executive committee was appointed and charged with governing the 
orchestra “during the intervals between meetings of the General Committee…. [But the] 
Committee shall not have the power to authorize the making of any contract for the 
engaging of a conductor, manager, or members of the orchestra.”102 In addition to the 
creation of an executive committee, the guarantors formed finance and program 
committees to “prepare a scheme for the raising of all funds necessary for the work of the 
organization” and “supervise the selection of music to be played at the various concerts 
of the Society.”103 Much has been made about the formation of these three sub-
committees and their intrusion into Mahler’s leadership of the Philharmonic, but it is 
unclear what role if any they played in substantively shaping the orchestra’s artistic 
policy or aggravating Mahler’s illness.104 
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 Leifels’ final contract, dated 1 April 1918 and slated to last three years, included an annual salary of 
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 According to Henry Louis De La Grange, “Mahler’s situation with his employer, the Guarantor’s 
Committee, was influenced by these new measures. Instead of being subject to the authority of a fairly 
large group of society people who did not meet often, and whose musical competence was limited, he was 
now de facto under the authority of two much smaller groups, the Executive and Programme committees” 
(De La Grange, Gustav Mahler, 1163). Archivist Barbara Haws disagrees: ““The previous Philharmonic 
cooperative organizational system was committee-driven with specific groups responsible for ‘business’, 
‘audit’, the ‘library’, ‘election and ‘program’, all of them submitting reports to the general membership. In 
rereading the Guarantor’s minutes they seem to be in search of an adequate management structure that will 
  96 
Mahler’s Death and a New Philharmonic 
 By the winter of 1911, Mahler’s relationship with both the musicians and the 
guarantors was tenuous at best. The conductor had asked that his salary be augmented to 
$30,000 due to an increased concert load (66, up from 46 the season prior). After ongoing 
negotiations arbitrated by Samuel Untermyer, the guarantors’ committee agreed to 
supplement Mahler’s existing contract with an additional $3,000.105 Mahler’s financial 
demands, which were likely influenced by his wife Alma’s extravagant lifestyle, 
compelled the guarantors to consider another conductor for the 1911–12 season. 
According to minutes from a committee meeting,  
The question of engaging a conductor for next season was discussed. A 
letter from Mr. Franz Kneisel, who has been unofficially requested to state 
if his services for the position of Conductor are available, was received 
and read. Mr. Kneisel stating at length that he would feel highly honored 
to accept the position, that however, he cannot leave his present field of 
activity for a contract of one year only. It was resolved … to unofficially 
inquire from Mr. Mahler his attitude regarding the acceptance of the 




Thus although the guarantors’ relationship with Mahler was marked by moments of 
mistrust, it appears as though they remained committed to, or at least accepting of, 
Mahler as the Philharmonic’s primary conductor.  
                                                                                                                                                 
function for them and it appears that they have turned to the experiences among them—the members of the 
old Philharmonic committee. I do not believe that the Program Committee was created because they were 
dissatisfied with Mahler’s programming, but that it was formed at the same time as the Executive 
Committee and the Auditing Committee to create a structure that would survive any conductor and be 
fiscally responsible to donors” (Ibid., 1170–71). 
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 Quoting minutes from a guarantors’ meeting on 4 January 1911, “Mr. Mahler has appeared with a 
committee … before Mr. Samuel Untermyer as arbitrator regarding a demand of Mr. Mahler for an addition 
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the arbitrator was rendered against the Committee but that Mr. Mahler has conceded, at the suggestion of 
Mr. Untermyer, to reduce his claim to $3,000” (Box 498-01-13; Folder: Guarantor’s Minutes 1909–11; 
Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
106
 Ibid. 
  97 
 This is not the sense one gets when reading excerpts from Alma Mahler’s 
Erinnerungen, however. Published some ten years after her husband’s death, Alma’s 
personal memoirs include several passages concerning Mahler’s position with the 
Philharmonic, most of which are full of critique and disdain for the guarantors. One in 
particular is worth quoting here: “One day in mid-February [1911] he was asked to go 
and see Mrs. Sheldon…. There he found several gentlemen from the Committee. He was 
severely taken to task … [and] was so taken aback and furious that he came home 
trembling in every limb.”107 While there is further evidence that such a meeting occurred, 
one must wonder what actually took place. As De La Grange and others have pointed out, 
Alma Mahler’s written recollections often exaggerate and even misrepresent events and 
facts. But why would the guarantors call Mahler to a private meeting with only two 
months left in the season, and what were they chastising him for? Given the context 
provided above, it seems reasonable to extrapolate that the meeting pertained to Mahler’s 
contract renegotiation. If this was indeed the case, the guarantors were simply fulfilling 
their fiduciary duties as overseers of the Philharmonic and its mission. Although the 
atmosphere surrounding these negotiations was surely unpleasant, there is no reason to 
believe that the guarantors were maliciously intruding on their conductor’s artistic vision, 
nor that Mahler was aware of the recent formation of a programming committee.
108
  
 When more than a month had passed since Mahler’s last concert on 21 February 
1911, however, newspapers began reporting that “there is division somewhere within the 
Philharmonic … It is well known what happens to a house divided against itself. Until the 
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Philharmonic Society awakens to the true nature of its difficulties there is no possibility 
that it can succeed in the high enterprise upon which it ventured forth at the time of its 
reorganization.”109 Due in part to Alma’s erroneous claims, historians have continued to 
lend credence to the theory that Sheldon and the ladies of the guarantors’ committee were 
responsible for Mahler’s return to Vienna and his eventual death.110 What in reality was 
caused by a fatal infectious disease has instead been explained by the supposed 
ideological disparity between Mahler’s Viennese upbringing and New York’s relatively 
conservative musical community.
111
 To be sure, Mahler and the guarantors had their 
disagreements, which were likely exacerbated by the conductor’s declining health, his 
poor command of the English language, and Alma’s never-ending conspiracy theories.112 
That said, there is no hard evidence that proves Mahler felt overly constrained or 
mistreated by the guarantors, and certainly nothing that would precipitate his death on 18 
May 1911.  
 Whether the guarantors were acting selflessly to better the state of orchestral 
performance in New York or were leveraging their elite status to wield power over an 
artistic institution is up to interpretation, but it seems clear that they were searching in 
earnest for an organizational structure that would support a permanent orchestra of the 
highest quality. As one of “the most conservative musical centers in the world,” turn-of-
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the-century New York was at once ripe for and resistant to cultural upheaval.
113
 
Convincing the city’s music critics and listening public of the inherent value embedded in 
a permanent civic orchestra would take considerable time and persistence. Unfortunately 
for Mahler, the Philharmonic would not acquire the support necessary to complete its 
reorganization until after his death. But the conductor’s departure was not a prerequisite 
for the corporate model to take root in New York. On the contrary, the progress achieved 
during Mahler’s tenure created an essential foundation on which future efforts could 
build. 
Josef Stransky and the Pulitzer Bequest, 1911–21 
Suddenly without a conductor, the Philharmonic had to move quickly if it was to 
continue presenting concerts and operating as the city’s foremost orchestra. 
Concertmaster Theodore Spiering filled in as temporary conductor for the remainder of 
the 1910–11 season, and Felix Leifels left for Europe in search of another virtuoso music 
director with the name recognition to attract American audiences. To be sure, the summer 
after Mahler’s death must have been a challenging one for all of those that had supported 
the Philharmonic in its transformation from a musician’s cooperative to a corporate 
nonprofit. And, with Leifels in Europe and Mary Sheldon increasingly absent from 
committee and board meetings, the orchestra’s leadership was at a crossroads. Since 
1909, much of the power that had previously been allotted to musicians had become the 
purview of the guarantors’ committee. The divide between the old Philharmonic board 
and the guarantors is reflected in the scheduling and documentation of administrative 
tasks. No annual meetings were held in 1910 or 1911, and minutes from the guarantors’ 
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meetings were kept in a separate diary until the beginning of the 1911–12 season, when 
Leifels returned from Europe and began recording minutes in the orchestra’s pre-1909 
notebook. It seemed as if the old Philharmonikers had returned to power, both 
symbolically and literally.
114
 Subsequent board meetings became all-musician affairs, 
leading to the somewhat unexpected appointment of upstart Czech conductor Josef 
Stransky as the orchestra’s new music director.115 
 Although Stransky brought some much-needed consistency to the Philharmonic, 
the orchestra’s uncertain artistic future was compounded by a faltering business model. 
The Philharmonic’s finances were no better in 1911 than they had been three years 
earlier, due in part to stagnant ticket sales and the ever-increasing costs associated with 
weekly performances.
116
 For each and every performance, ticket receipts failed to cover 
general operating expenses, and thus as the number of concerts grew so too did the 
aggregate deficit. Yet just as the guarantors’ three-year pledge of support was winding 
down, the orchestra received an unprecedented bequest from one of America’s wealthiest 
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men. Publishing tycoon and philanthropist Joseph Pulitzer died on 29 October 1911 and 
six weeks later the Philharmonic’s board announced his gift of $1 million, although much 
of New York had known about Pulitzer’s philanthropic intentions for at least a year.117 In 
a confidential letter to his own newspaper offices written sometime in 1908, Pulitzer 
expressed with characteristic candor his interest in the orchestra’s organization and 
administration: “I want a report on the Philharmonic Society, not as it is superficially, 
nominally, and apparently, but who really runs it…. I want this very brief, but reliable; 
from the inside, not the outside.”118  
 Although Pulitzer had supported the orchestra in the past, he had done so in 
moderation, and thus his bequest must have come as a surprise for many. The gift came 
in two parts. The first, written into Pulitzer’s will on 23 March 1909, consisted of up to 
$500,000 and set out to “place [the orchestra] on a more independent basis and … 
increase the number of concerts to be given in New York, which … will not have too 
severely classical programs and [will be offered] to the public at reduced rates.”119 He 
also suggested that the Philharmonic might honor his memory by programming his three 
favorite composers. It seems as though orchestra leaders took Pulitzer’s requests to heart, 
instituting a series of Saturday night concerts at “popular prices” in 1914–15 and 
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 Pulitzer’s second bequest, also for $500,000, dictated that the Philharmonic 
become “a membership corporation under the laws of New York, representing the 
general public, with a membership of not less than one thousand paying dues,” thus 
cementing the orchestra’s structural transformation from a cooperative to a board-
governed institution.
121
 Members of the orchestra’s board met in February and March of 
1912 to discuss the details of the bequest and draft a new set of by-laws that met 
Pulitzer’s conditions, augmenting the number of directors from ten to twelve.122 The 
subtext of Pulitzer’s gift suggests a continued shift away from the artist and toward the 
audience, marking the Philharmonic’s broader adoption of a nonprofit ideology, 
dedicated to the education of a broader public.  
 It was the wealthy patron, however, who maintained control over the orchestra 
through the subsidy of its mission. The Philharmonic’s newly amended by-laws reflect 
this ever-growing distinction between musical and non-musical members. Four new 
categories emerged: Musical, Annual, Sustaining, and Honorary Associate members.
123
 
Non-musicians were elected by the board of directors and asked to pay a minimum of 
$10 each year, while those who contributed more than $1,000 were granted special 
                                                                                                                                                 
John Erskine, The Philharmonic-Symphony Society of New York: Its First Hundred Years (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1943), Appendix). 
121
 Interestingly, the membership corporation laws of early-twentieth-century New York required that the 
Philharmonic not distribute stock or overlap with existing insurance law. These restrictions required the 
orchestra to do away with its pension fund and change its mission statement, which had previously included 
“the relief of distressed actual members, their widows and children” and thus conflicted with the Insurance 
Law of 1895 (Annual Meeting Minutes, 16 March 1912, Box 498-01-01; Folder: Annual Meeting Minutes 
1904–1932; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
122
 The board of directors met to discuss the specifics of Pulitzer’s bequest on 28 February 1912, and the 
membership voted to adopt a new set of by-laws drafted by a committee of five musicians on March 16. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Anthony Reiff, Jr., who represented the Philharmonic’s old guard, tendered his 
resignation from the committee shortly thereafter (Box 606-01-02/19; Folder: Board of Directors and 
Executive Committee Minutes, 1911–28; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York 
Philharmonic). 
123
 Article II, Section 2 through 5, Amended By-Laws of the New York Philharmonic, 16 March 1912. 
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privileges and responsibilities (see Figure 2.5).
124
 The orchestra’s most generous donors 
could “appoint by will or other writing a successor or successors to himself, one 
successor for each ten thousand dollars of his contribution, and each successor may 
appoint one person to succeed himself.”125 This sort of “grandfather clause” afforded 
generations of wealthy Americans insider access to the Philharmonic, ensuring a 
hierarchy of haves and have-nots that in some quarters has yet to be erased. The 
empowerment of the few also meant the continued marginalization of the Philharmonic 
musicians. The new by-laws mandated that only three of the twelve directors be musical 
members, and by 1928, musicians on the board were outnumbered six to one.
126
  
 With these new regulations in place and the promise of Pulitzer’s gift in hand, the 
Philharmonic continued to grow its operations and plan a new season of concerts. 
Unfortunately, the monies from the bequest had still not been transferred to the orchestra, 
owing to the fact that the Philharmonic had yet to prove to the executors of Pulitzer’s 
estate that his conditions had been met. The process was further exacerbated by Mrs. 
Edith Moore, who had been personally named in Pulitzer’s will and demanded further 
remuneration from three institutional beneficiaries of the tycoon’s estate: the  
 
 
                                                 
124
 Annual members were divided into three classes with dues of $10 (first class), $25 (second class), and 
$50 (third class), while Sustaining members were known either as a “Fellow for Life (at least $1,000), 
“Fellow in Perpetuity” (at least $10,000), or “Patrons” (at least $50,000) (Box 004-11-40; Folder: Pulitzer 
Bequest: classes of membership; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York 
Philharmonic).  
125
 Amended By-Laws, Article III, Section I, 16 March 1912. 
126
 In 1912, 98 Sustaining Members were elected, along with the following directors: Richard Arnold 
(musical), Arthur Curtiss James, Ralph Pulitzer, Mary R. Sheldon, Felix F. Leifels (musical), Otto T. 
Bannard, Harriet C. Cheney, Rudolf E.F. Flinsch, Henry Schmitt (musical), Annie B. Jennings, Nelson S. 
Spencer, and Hector W. Thomas (Box 004-11-40; Folder: Pulitzer Bequest: classes of membership; Record 
Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
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Figure 2.5 Memorandum detailing the Philharmonic's new membership scheme (courtesy 
of the Philharmonic archives) 
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Metropolitan Museum of Art, Columbia University, and the Philharmonic Society.
127
 
Without Pulitzer’s gift, the orchestra quickly found that it was spending much more than 
it could bring in, forcing the board to take out three lines of credit totaling more than 
$50,000, including a personal loan from Mary Sheldon.
128
 In fact, Sheldon would not live 
to see Pulitzer’s promise become a reality. Shortly after her death on 16 June 1913 the 
Philharmonic defaulted on a $30,000 loan, and a small committee was formed to 
approach the executors of Pulitzer’s estate and see if the bequest could “be expedited in 
any way.”129 
 The orchestra did finally receive the bulk of Pulitzer’s gift—$875,000—in 
November of 1913, although $100,000 had to be paid directly to Edith Moore per the 
agreement outlined above. Yet while the size of Pulitzer’s gift hastened the 
Philharmonic’s reorganization efforts and helped it to form one of the first permanent 
endowments of any American orchestra, at least half of the funds were restricted. In fact, 
the orchestra could only access $20,000–$40,000 in interest each year, which did not  
                                                 
127
 According to a letter dated 3 May 1913 written by Nelson Spencer, special counsel for the 
Philharmonic, “Mrs. Moore demands that her income be increased to $50,000 and a payment of $300,000 
out of the principal of the estate. The difference between the income of her trust under the will and what 
she demands, some $22,000 a year, is to be provided by the members of the family out of their incomes. It 
is proposed that the principal payments shall be provided by a contribution of $100,000 each by the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, Columbia University and the Philharmonic Society out of income directed to 
be paid to them under the trust established by the Sixth Clause of the first Codicil of the Will…. The 
Directors of the Philharmonic Society are disposed to accede to the provision under these circumstances, if 
no other reasonable method can be arranged for the adjustment of Mrs. Moore’s demands…. They wish 
me, however, to point out to you [John Milburn, lawyer for Mrs. Moore] that the position of the Society is 
somewhat different from the other two specified beneficiaries, in large part because it is dependent upon 
receiving the bequests in their integrity, and has entered upon obligations in expectation of this receipt, 
which expectation it believed itself justified in entertaining by the course of events since Mr. Pulitzer’s 
death” (Box 606-01-02/19; Folder: Board of Directors and Executive Committee Minutes, 1911–28; 
Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
128
 These included a $30,000 six-month loan at 6% from Kissel, Kinnicutt & Co. (15 January 1913), a 
private loan from Sheldon (5 February 1913), and another $10,000 loan on 26 March 1913 (Ibid.). 
129
 According to minutes from a board of directors meeting on 9 September 1913, “Mr. Flinsch and Mr. 
Cooper agreed to act as a committee of two to visit Mr. Hornblower and Mr. Ralph Pulitzer for the purpose 
of ascertaining if the Pulitzer bequest may be expedited in any way” (Ibid.). 
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Figure 2.6 Disbursement of Pulitzer’s Bequest (courtesy of the Philharmonic archives)130 
Date Amount 
November 1913 $775,000  
December 1914 $50,000  
February 1916 $919.01  
March 1916 $1,073.44  
August 1916 $60,410.05  
    
TOTAL: $887,402.50  
 
come close to meeting the organization’s annual deficit. In an unprecedented and 
previously unreported move, the Philharmonic board hired Charles Norman Fay to serve 
as an executive consultant.
131
 Fay, who was well known in the orchestra world as the 
patron who had recruited Theodore Thomas to Chicago and spearheaded the 
establishment of a permanent orchestra there, was to secure at least $30,000 in donations 
for both the Philharmonic’s endowment and a new building fund. This development has 
to my knowledge never been discussed in the scholarly literature, which is especially 
surprising considering Fay’s unique role in creating the first permanent orchestra on the 
corporate model. In a proposed letter to subscribers, Fay outlined his strategy, which 
hinged on a new hall built especially for the Philharmonic:  
In … other cities, particularly in Boston and Chicago, their Orchestras 
have been established upon a firm and permanent financial basis. In the 
case of the Boston Orchestra, its audiences are limited only by the size of 
its hall, and its large annual deficit is met by the public-spirited generosity 
of Mr. Higginson; in the case of the Chicago Orchestra, it is able to meet 
its expenses only by the ownership of and income from its own Concert 
                                                 
130
 It is worthwhile to note that the 1922 balance of the Pulitzer Fund was only $521,849.34, suggesting 
that the Philharmonic’s board was drawing from the fund’s principal and thus violating the terms of 
Pulitzer’s bequest (Miscellaneous: Clarence Mackay Papers, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
131
 Fay’s appointment was announced in a 18 February 1914 letter to the board, which detailed the 
stipulations of his contract: $500 per month starting immediately (Box 606-01-02/19; Folder: Board of 
Directors and Executive Committee Minutes, 1911–28; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the 
New York Philharmonic). 
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Hall. It is quite shameful that New York, with its greater possibilities, has 




It is not clear how committed the Philharmonic was to Fay’s vision, but on 24 April 1914 
the board abruptly terminated his contract and shelved plans for a new concert hall.
133
 
 The challenges associated with the administration of the Pulitzer Fund serve to 
highlight the ever-present tension between the Philharmonic’s artistic vision and its day-
to-day operations. Times critic Richard Aldrich proclaimed that “there are difficulties and 
dangers which even a sufficient endowment will not succeed in avoiding. These 
difficulties and dangers are almost insuperable from the control of such an enterprise by a 
committee of laymen or women.”134 Yet by 1917, the Philharmonic’s twenty-member 
board of directors consisted almost entirely of “laymen or women” who underwrote the 
orchestra’s increasingly heavy concert load, which had more than quadrupled since 1908. 
In his 75
th
-anniversary address to the Philharmonic’s members, the board’s president 
noted that  
There has been nothing to indicate to the trustees any dissatisfaction 
among the membership…. Are we not bound to believe that if there were a 
widespread impression, outside of the columns of a certain newspaper, 
that your directors are either incompetent of deliberately betraying the 
Society’s musical ideals, we should have heard from our membership at 
length and with frequency?  We have received no such protests…. This is 
a democratic society and its officers desire nothing so much as to stimulate 





                                                 
132
 Quoted in the board meeting minutes, 7 April 1914 (Ibid.). 
133
 Board meeting minutes, 24 April 1914 (Ibid.). 
134
 Richard Aldrich, “The Pulitzer Gift to the Philharmonic and What It May Accomplish,” The New York 
Times, 19 Nov. 1911, X7. 
135
 The paper singled out here is likely a reference to Henry Krehbiel’s New York Tribune (quoted in 
Annual Meeting minutes, 2 April 1917, Box 498-01-01; Folder: Annual Meeting Minutes 1904–1932; 
Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
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While we cannot know for certain the degree of symbiosis felt between the 
Philharmonic’s board and its musicians, the above excerpt’s defensive posture suggests 
that the orchestra’s reorganization had come at a cost. 
Acquiring the Competition, 1921–28 
 The rise of contentious labor relations between union musicians and management 
was not unique to New York, and might be understood as an inevitable byproduct of the 
orchestra industry’s continued professionalization. The Philharmonic had come a long 
way since its first reorganization attempts in 1902, but the orchestra still faced 
considerable competition from other local performing arts organizations. To quell any 
doubts concerning its status atop New York’s orchestral scene, the Philharmonic set out 
to dismantle its competition. Although terms such as “merger,” “acquisition,” and 
“hostile takeover” are usually saved for conversations devoted to the manufacturing and 
finance industries, these and other techniques were used by the Philharmonic to corner 
the city’s musical market and obtain new institutional support networks (i.e. donors and 
ticket buyers) so that they might fulfill their artistic ambitions.
136
 
 The competition facing the Philharmonic included not only its long-standing rival, 
the New York Symphony Society, but also the fledgling National Symphony, which was 
founded in 1919 and sponsored by Adolph Lewisohn and Clarence Mackay. Originally 
called the “New Symphony Orchestra of the Musicians,” the orchestra devoted its first 
season to performances of contemporary music under the direction of composer Edgard 
Varèse. With lackluster audience support, however, Mackay hired conductor Willem 
                                                 
136
 For a fascinating study of how organizations use the merger process to better future performance and 
create new institutional identities, see Shawn M. Clark, Dennis A. Gioia, David J. Ketchen, Jr., and James 
B. Thomas, “Transitional Identity as a Facilitator of Organizational Identity Change during a Merger,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 55, No. 3 (September 2010), 397–438. 
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Mengelberg to replace Varèse in 1920. Mengelberg was one of Europe’s most well 
respected maestros, and his appointment captured the attention of New York’s listening 
public. After the 1920–21 season, the Philharmonic board approached the National 
Symphony and offered to buy out Mengelberg’s contract, enticing the conductor and 
some of his best musicians to join forces with New York’s oldest orchestra.137 During the 
1921–22 season Mengelberg split conducting duties with Stransky, but the latter quickly 




 The greatest asset acquired from the National Symphony, however, may have 
been Mackay himself. A former president of the Postal Telegraph Company, Mackay’s 
longtime support of New York’s art scene would now be focused toward the 
Philharmonic.
139
 Upon joining the board, Mackay was named Chairman—a post he 
would hold until 1938—and he brought with him a handful of wealthy bankers and 
businessmen who would infuse the orchestra with new money and leadership well into 
the mid-twentieth century.
140
 Despite Mackay’s influence, however, not all of the 
orchestra’s constituents were pleased with the merger. Over the course of the next three 
years, Mengelberg replaced nearly half of the Philharmonic’s original musicians, and 
                                                 
137
 Official letterhead from the 1921–22 season introduces the orchestra as “The Philharmonic Society of 
New York, Founded 1842, Merged 1921 with the National Symphony” (Archives of the New York 
Philharmonic). 
138
 On 8 February 1923, the Philharmonic’s executive committee chose not to renew Stransky’s contract, 
choosing instead to “reward” the conductor with a $15,000 gift for his “loyal efforts” as music director, 
although one might instead interpret the payment as a form of hush money (Box 606-01-14; Folder: Board 
of Directors and Executive Committee Minutes, 1911–28; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of 
the New York Philharmonic). 
139
 In addition to being a well-known cultural philanthropist, Mackay also had a daughter, Ellin, who 
would later marry songwriter Irving Berlin (Mackay famously opposed the union). 
140
 Bankers Otto Kahn and Alvin Krech joined the Philharmonic board as vice presidents, and Mackay 
would later convince Frederic Juilliard and Marshall Field to serve as directors. Mrs. Lytle Hull (of the 
Astor family) also joined the Philharmonic in 1921, forming an Advisory Committee that would later serve 
as the basis of an all-female Auxiliary Board that fundraised on behalf of the orchestra. 
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“despite the increased receipts, the income of the Society … [was] still far below its cost 
of maintenance,” with ticket sales covering less than 60% of the annual budget.141 Arthur 
Judson was hired to succeed Felix Leifels as manager and executive secretary in 1922, 
representing perhaps the final step in appropriating administrative power from the old 
Philharmonic musicians. With Judson at the helm, the orchestra acquired yet another one 
of its competitors in May 1923—The City Symphony, which had been formed the year 
prior by Senator Coleman DuPont.
142
 Unlike its earlier merger with the National 
Symphony, however, the Philharmonic “would not take over the orchestra personnel, 
conductor, or other employees of the City Symphony, and would not assume any of its 




 Judson, along with Mackay, played a pivotal role in shaping the new 
Philharmonic. A professional arts administrator with prior orchestra (Philadelphia 
Orchestra) and artist management experience, Judson was a notoriously imposing figure, 
and his vision for the Philharmonic included bringing the world’s best conductors—
Mengelberg, Arturo Toscanini, and Wilhelm Furtwängler—to New York. To attract 
Europe’s virtuoso conductors, however, the Philharmonic would first need to establish 
itself as the city’s best orchestra, and while many believed that the Philharmonic had 
earned that title long ago, some supporters of Walter Damrosch and his orchestra claimed 
otherwise. In truth, the Symphony Society had been in a state of decline since the early 
                                                 
141
 Quoted from a letter to Philharmonic board members dated 30 March 1922 (Box 005-04-42; Folder: 
Papers of Charlie Triller; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
142
 Under the baton of Dirk Fochl, the City Symphony gave fifty concerts during its first season, but total 
receipts barely exceeded $21,000 (Shanet, The Philharmonic, 247). 
143
 One of the most prominent backers of the City Symphony to join in supporting the Philharmonic was 
Mrs. Louise Ryals de Cravioto (Ibid., 248). 
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1920s, but Damrosch’s connections to some of the city’s most powerful men—including 
Andrew Carnegie and Henry Harkness Flagler—made him and his orchestra worthy 
adversaries. Yet despite the history of bad blood between the two ensembles, a merger 
had been suggested as early as 1910, sowing the seeds for what would in 1928 become 
the Philharmonic-Symphony Society of New York.
144
 
 The concept of a merger between the city’s two largest orchestras became an 
identifiable trope in the late 1910s and 1920s. Board member John D. Rockefeller, Jr. 
suggested that cooperation, rather than competition, would benefit both organizations,
145
 
and Arthur Judson initiated discussions with the Symphony Society’s manager to 
combine the two orchestras’ concert seasons as a means of minimizing overhead costs.146 
In the summer of 1926, Mackay met with Damrosch and Flagler to discuss the possibility 
of consolidation, as the two orchestras were “giving more concerts than the music loving 
public of New York could adequately support…. One consolidated orchestra could 
supply New York with all the concerts it requires in addition to those given by visiting 
orchestras.”147 At the request of Mackay and the Philharmonic board, Judson outlined the 
                                                 
144
 An anonymous author in The Musical Courier wondered, “Why not amalgamate the New York 
Symphony and Philharmonic and create a real permanent proposition to meet the tremendous operatic 
competition and put one of the Damrosches in, or both, as conductors.” The reference to “both” 
Damrosch’s refers to Walter and his brother Frank, who was also a conductor (“Reflections,” The Musical 
Courier 61, no. 7, 17 August 1910, 5). 
145
 Rockefeller, Jr. mentions the possibility of a merger in the context of a letter from Adolph Lewisohn, 
who was a staunch supporter of the Symphony Society before his involvement in founding the National 
Symphony. According to Rockefeller, “it would seem … that Mr. Lewisohn would have done better to 
have sought cooperation at the outset with … other orchestras, rather than competition” (Letter from 
Rockefeller, Jr. to Cooper, dated 26 August 1919, Box 004-11-48; Folder: Rockefeller Foundation; Record 
Group: Development, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
146
 In a letter to Clarence Mackay dated 23 March 1923, Judson discusses the possibility of merging 
seasons with the Symphony Society. He proposes keeping the orchestras’ respective subscription series 
separate, include 13 weeks (61 concerts) for Damrosch and 12 weeks (41 concerts) for Mengelberg. The 
total estimated cost to the Philharmonic for its half of the season would be $309,650 (Archives of the New 
York Philharmonic). 
147
 Memorandum, “Tentative Suggestions for Consolidation,” revised 7 and 13 July 1926,  D-B Collection, 
Box 9, Library of Congress. 
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pros and cons of a merger with the Symphony Society in early 1927, indicating that “the 
tendency of critical opinion in the newspapers is definitely against the elimination of one 
of the two symphony orchestras.”148  
 Despite these concerns, the boards of the Philharmonic and Symphony societies 
announced a merger between the two organizations on 26 March 1928, hoping that the 
ensuing consequences for both the orchestra and the city’s musical public would be more 
positive than negative.
149
 According to the official announcement, 
The boards of directors of the two societies have unanimously reached the 
conclusion that the cause of orchestral music in New York will be 
promoted by the consolidation of the two societies and the concentration 
of the efforts of the consolidated society upon the support of a single 
orchestra … Several considerations prompted this decision. One was the 
constantly mounting cost of giving orchestral concerts and the burden of 
the recurring task of raising the necessary money to provide for the 
deficits of the two orchestras … It is hoped that the combined efforts of 
the friends of both existing orchestras will eventually result in securing a 
sufficient endowment and pension fund to place the consolidated orchestra 
upon a sound basis as a permanent, self-supporting institution in no way 





Combining the considerable resources of each orchestra, both artistic and economic, 
would go a long way in securing a permanent future for the new Philharmonic. Starting in 
the 1928–29 season, the orchestra’s board would consist of twenty-eight members, 
including seventeen directors from the Philharmonic and ten from the Symphony  
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 Judson articulates his opinions regarding a possible merger to Mackay in a letter marked “Personal and 
Confidential” on 21 January 1927. Despite his reservations, Judson found no overarching reason to dismiss 
the possibility of a permanent merger between the two orchestras (Archives of the New York 
Philharmonic). 
149
 The announcement was made public in a multi-page article featured in the New York Herald Tribune 
the following day (“Symphony Merged with Philharmonic,” New York Herald Tribune, 27 March 1928). 
150
 Official announcement of merger, 26 March 1928 (Miscellaneous: Clarence Mackay’s papers, Archives 
of the New York Philharmonic). 
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 Only four of the twenty-eight directors were musicians. An executive 
committee and auxiliary board were also formed, and although both contained supporters 
of the original Philharmonic and the Symphony societies, those associated with the 
former represented the clear and powerful majority.
152
 
 The only director of the Symphony Society not offered a seat on the 
Philharmonic’s board was Walter Damrosch, who had maintained complete artistic and 
                                                 
151
 The officers included the following (position and original affiliation): Clarence Mackay (chairman, 
NYP), Harry Harkness Flagler (president, NYS), Frederick Juilliard (first vice president, NYP), Otto Kahn 
(VP, NYP), Marshall Field (VP, NYP), Paul Cravath (VP, NYS), Henry Seligman (VP, NYS), Charles 
Triller (treasurer, NYP), Richard Welling (honorary secretary, NYS), and Arthur Judson (Executive 
Secretary, NYP), among others. One director, Ernest F. Wagner, seemed to be a completely new addition, 
while John W. Davis had served as an associate director with the Symphony Society. The Philharmonic 
also maintained five trustees who were responsible for the orchestra’s material property and resources. All 
were original members of the Philharmonic: Marshall Field, Frederick Juilliard, Otto Kahn, Clarence 
Mackay, and Charles Triller (Ibid.). 
152
 The executive committee consisted of twelve directors (seven from the Philharmonic and five from the 
Symphony Society), and the auxiliary board was incorporated as a separate entity on 14 May 1929. Its 
expressed function was “to raise funds for the maintenance of The Philharmonic-Symphony Society of 
New York, and for the furtherance of any other work in the cause of music in which The Philharmonic-
Symphony Society of New York shall be engaged. It shall also assist in any and all other duties which may 
from time to time be allotted by the Board of directors of The Philharmonic-Symphony Society of New 
York” (By-Laws of the Auxiliary Board, Article 1, Sec. II, Box Number: 007-01-14; Folder Title: 
Auxiliary Board By-Laws; Record Group: Development, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
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administrative control of his orchestra until the very end. With the new Philharmonic, 
Damrosch took a tertiary role behind Mengelberg and Arturo Toscanini, who had joined 
the orchestra in 1926 and quickly become its primary conductor.
153
 Mackay and Judson 
invited Damrosch to conduct four subscription programs and a series of children’s 
concerts in 1928–29, but the offer was not renewed. In what might be viewed as a 
symbolic shift in power, Damrosch was unable to convince the leaders of the 
Philharmonic to hire the Symphony’s musicians without a formal audition. Instead, “the 
choice of players from both organizations … [was] left in the hands of Mr. Toscanini,” 
who went on to replace over half the orchestra, leaving only twenty-three musicians from 
the Symphony Society.
154
 In his annual Chairman’s Report, Mackay reflected on the 
merger, which was recognized by the State of New York on 8 June 1928 and resulted in a 
newly integrated organizational structure, a $200,000 guarantee fund, and unprecedented 
artistic gains.
155
 For those entrusted with the new Philharmonic-Symphony Society, the 
merger brought the group one step closer to its goal of being the world’s best orchestra.156 
 As has already been discussed, however, the Philharmonic’s adoption of the 
modern nonprofit model failed to solve the fundamental economic challenges associated 
with live performance. Despite acquiring three of its competitors, the Philharmonic did 
not reach three times the number of listeners, nor did it become three times as profitable. 
On the contrary, the orchestra’s institutional growth was driven in part by an increase in 
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 For the 1928–29 season, the Philharmonic board originally anticipated having Toscanini conduct 51 
concerts, Mengelberg 44, Damrosch 24, Schelling 5, and Beecham 4 (Chairman’s Report, 24 May 1928, 




 According to Mackay, the new orchestra would have “a guaranty [sic] of $200,000 a year for three 
years, $75,000 to be subscribed by Mr. Flagler and his associates, and $125,000 by the supporters of the 
Philharmonic Society” (Ibid.). 
156
 Mackay outlines three primary goals for the newly-merged orchestra, which continues to carry the 
official designation “Philharmonic-Symphony Society of New York”: a new hall, an endowment that 
would amass $100,000 or more in interest annually, and an adequate pension fund (Ibid.). 
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artistic and operating expenses. Between 1921 and 1928, the Philharmonic’s budget grew 
from $421,000 to over $700,000, and although ticket sales covered a significant portion 
of expenses, such drastic expansion tested the philanthropic limits of what was still an 
elite circle of wealthy patrons.
157
 The mentality undergirding the modern American 
orchestra seemed to suggest that bigger was better.
158
 This is not to say that the 
Philharmonic failed to achieve what it set out to accomplish twenty-five years earlier. 
What was once a loose cooperative of musicians had become New York’s finest musical 
ensemble. During the 1928–29 season, over 301,500 people attended the orchestra’s 129 
concerts—a statistic that was dwarfed be the orchestra’s international radio audience.159 
Building on the work of Damrosch, Carnegie, Sheldon, and Mahler, the merger 
orchestrated by Mackay and Judson ensured that the Philharmonic would achieve its 
loftiest goal: permanence. From Mackay’s perspective, 
It [is] hardly necessary to mention the artistic success achieved during the 
season, for the fact that practically every concert was sold out to the entire 
seating capacity and almost always the entire standing room capacity, was 
sufficient indication that the high artistic standards of previous seasons 
had not only been maintained, but in a measure increased…. The orchestra 
as now existing is by far the best which the Society has ever had, and 




The orchestra’s new organizational structure, adopted laboriously over two decades, 
succeeded in supporting the Philharmonic’s extensive concert schedule and growing 
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 Data culled from Annual Reports, 1921–28, Archives of the New York Philharmonic, and the transcript 
of the Chairman’s Report, 24 May 1928 (Miscellaneous: Clarence Mackay’s papers, Archives of the New 
York Philharmonic). 
158
 One could argue that this mentality still exists today, as orchestras are grouped by—and in some circles 
ranked by—budget size (this is reflected in the actions of the Detroit Symphony Orchestra musicians 
during their 2010–11 strike, in which they fought—and ultimately failed—to keep the orchestra’s base 




 Quoted from Annual Meeting minutes, 2 April 1928 (Box 498-01-01; Folder: Annual Meeting Minutes 
1904–1932; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
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musician salaries, ultimately—and perhaps unexpectedly—aiding the institutionalization 
of high art in early twentieth-century America.  
A Closer Look: Programming 
 To substantively connect this shift in organizational structure with artistic 
practice, one must first reflect on the Philharmonic’s evolving programming strategies, 
which in turn reflected the increasingly fraught interactions between musician, conductor, 
board, and public. The most obvious trend during the reorganization period is a 
proliferation of concerts, both in and outside of New York. As outlined in Figure 2.8, the 
number of subscription concerts grew from 16 to 89 between 1900 and 1929, and these 
programs were augmented by yearly benefit concerts and a budding touring schedule that 
brought the orchestra to audiences across the country.
161
 In truth, the Philharmonic took 
the first steps toward becoming a global ambassador for orchestral music in April of 
1901, when an amendment to the charter allowed the orchestra to present concerts outside 
of Manhattan for the first time.
162
 Touring became a significant part of the 
Philharmonic’s artistic identity during Mahler’s tenure.163 In his first full season as music 
director, regional tours to Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Boston, Northampton, New Haven, 
Hartford, and Springfield were added, along with several new subscription series, 
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 In 1928–29, 46 of the Philharmonic’s 135 concerts—or roughly 34%—represented non-subscription 
events (Annual reports, Archives of the New York Philharmonic).  
162
 “At any regularly called meeting, the Society may, by a vote of a majority of the members present, 
decide to give one or more Concerts beyond the limits of the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York…. 
The Board of Directors shall have authority to select the members of the Society … who shall take part in 
such concerts…. The expenses of, and receipts from, such concerts shall be kept by the Treasurer entirely 
separate and distinct from the regular series of Rehearsals and Concerts” (Amendment to the by-laws, 
Article V, Sec. 8, 17 April 1901, Box 498-01-02; Folder: Minutes 1890–1903; Record Group: Board of 
Directors; Minutes for Business Meetings, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
163
 For a detailed discussion of the Philharmonic’s touring schedule during Mahler’s tenure as music 
director, see Mary H. Wagner, Gustav Mahler and the New York Philharmonic Orchestra Tour America 
(Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2006). 
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Figure 2.8 NY Philharmonic Concerts, 1900–28 (courtesy of the Philharmonic archives) 
Year Concerts (total) Concerts (Subscription) 
1900–01 16                                  16* 
1901–02 16                                  16* 
1902–03 16                                  16* 
1903–04 17                                  16* 
1904–05 18                                  16* 
1905–06 18 16 
1906–07 20 16 
1907–08 21 16 
1908–09 18 16 
1909–10 47 39 
1910–11 66 50 
1911–12 79 48 
1912–13 83 51 
1913–14 71 50 
1914–15 81 52 
1915–16 139 51 
1916-17 90 58 
1917–18 86 60 
1918-19 84 60 
1919–20 94 65 
1920–21 147 54 
1921–22 95 81 
1922–23 101 90 
1923–24 110 82 
1924–25 113 84 
1925–26 117 76 
1926–27 122 64 
1927–28 129 85 
* half of these concerts were billed as “public rehearsals” 
 
 
including a “historical” cycle on Wednesday evenings, a Beethoven cycle on Friday 
afternoons, and four popular Sunday afternoon concerts.
164
 Although this expansion in 
performance output was an integral part of the guarantors’ plan for reorganization, it 
appears as though the thematic organization of repertoire was Mahler’s doing.165 
                                                 
164
 Marvin Lee Von Deck, “Mahler In New York: His Conducting Activities in New York City, 1908–11,” 
(dissertation, NYU School of Education, 1973), 146. 
165
 Ibid. 
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The orchestra’s new scheme of producing as many concerts as possible can be 
explained not by changes in demand, but by a desire to increase ticket revenue and keep 
musicians employed by a single ensemble year-round. The guarantors and other 
supporters of the orchestra saw these as necessary prerequisites in their fight to build 
demand and a broader appreciation for orchestral music in New York. According to the 
Philharmonic’s then-manager, Loudon Charlton, 
The working out of a new and broad scheme … is a managerial problem 
of great interest. Evidence of our ultimate success in this direction is 
already apparent, and the one thing which we are now directly aiming for 
is to put the Philharmonic next season on a basis of one hundred concerts a 




When the Philharmonic finally surpassed the 100-concert mark in 1915–16, the orchestra 
had come no closer to achieving self-sustainability through ticket sales.  
 By the same token, the orchestra’s rapid growth had little effect on the variability 
of its programming practices. Figure 2.9 details the Philharmonic’s repertoire by 
composer nationality between 1895 and 1914—the years central to the orchestra’s 
reorganization.
167
 Perhaps the most obvious trend is the dominance of Austro-German 
repertoire, which makes up between 50–80% of the orchestra’s total programming. Not 
surprisingly, the performance of German music begins to fall off before World War I, and 
Russian music is championed most ardently during the tenure of Wassily Safonoff, a 
Russian expatriate. The Philharmonic’s programming became slightly more 
heterogeneous after 1908–09, including a brief swell in the performance of American 
music, but such changes in variability can likely be explained by the increased volume of  
                                                 
166
 Quoted in The Musical Courier, 8 October 1910. 
167
 The data represented in this graph comes from the Philharmonic’s annual reports and the appendices of 






Figure 2.9 New York Philharmonic Programming Trends, 1895–1914 
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performances in general. Indeed, the Philharmonic’s shift in organizational structure 
seems to have had little impact on programming practices or innovations, as the vast 
majority of works performed continued to be drawn from the late-eighteenth to late-
nineteenth centuries. In the decade before its reorganization, the orchestra produced five 
world premieres; in the decade following, it produced only six.  
It should come as no surprise that the Philharmonic’s programming remained 
conservative. For example, although Anton Seidl’s cultivation of Wagner helped to 
develop audience’s taste for chromatic music of the late-nineteenth century, it would take 
nearly thirty years for Brahms’ symphonic music to enter the Philharmonic’s canon.168 If 
we take a closer look at the most-often performed repertoire around the time of the 
orchestra’s reorganization, we find a story of three composers. As shown in Figure 2.10, 
the musical works of Wagner, Beethoven, and Tchaikovsky pervaded the orchestra’s 
programming throughout the early part of the century, although performances of the latter  
fell off during Toscanini’s reign as music director.169 Mahler complemented familiar  
works by these and other composers with those of the distant past (Bach) and the present 
day (Strauss).
170
 Of all of the Philharmonic’s conductors between 1900 and 1930,  
                                                 
168
 It is worthwhile to note that Walter Damrosch’s Symphony Society was known as the more progressive 
of the two orchestras, though his performances were often criticized for their lack of preparation and artistic 
merit. According to Damrosch’s biographer, George Martin, “The Philharmonic had the more subtle 
conductor [in Seidl]; the New York Symphony, the more adventurous programming” (Martin, The 
Damrosch Dynasty, 169). 
169
 For a more detailed breakdown of the Philharmonic’s repertoire during Toscanini’s notoriously 
conservative tenure, see Mueller, The American Symphony Orchestra, 68). 
170
 Bach and Strauss were the third and fourth most-performed composers between 1909 and 1911, 
receiving twenty-two and twenty performances, respectively. Strauss’s tone poem Till Eulenspiegel was a 
particular favorite, receiving ten performances in 1909–10 alone. Mahler also introduced Philharmonic 
audiences to his own music (eight times over the course of two seasons), although such performances were 
almost always received with mixed or negative reviews. After his first season, Mahler confessed to the 
press that he had “made no plans as yet for my concerts for next season, [but] I shall divide the programmes 
more or less evenly between the classic and the modern schools, and I shall play good music of all 
nations…. I shall not play too many of my compositions here myself. That might be misunderstood. I 





Figure 2.10 Most Programmed Composers (total # of performances) 
Safonoff Mahler Stransky Mengelberg Toscanini 
Tchaikovsky (21) Wagner (72) Wagner (996) Beethoven (117) Wagner (232) 
Beethoven (18) Beethoven (47) Tchaikovsky (416) Wagner (96) Beethoven (148) 
Wagner (16) Bach (22) Beethoven (317) Strauss (90) Brahms  (62) 
Mendelssohn (10) Strauss (20) Liszt (237) Tchaikovsky (87) Mendelssohn (45) 
Mozart (5) Tchaikovsky (15) Dvořák (179) Berlioz (56) Debussy (44) 
Rubinstein (5) Berlioz (14) Strauss (164) Brahms (54) Bach (39) 
Schumann (4) Liszt (10) Rimsky-Korsakov (131) Bach (53) Rossini (35) 
Bach (3) Schumann (10) Saint-Saens (114) Weber (38) Strauss (32) 
Berlioz (3) Smetna (10) Mendelssohn (112) Liszt (32) Mozart (31) 
Schubert (3) Mahler (8) Schubert (111) Mozart (29) Haydn (28) 
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Mengelberg had the most progressive taste in repertoire, as evidenced by his seminal 
performances of Strauss, Stravinsky, and Mahler. 
Yet even if the Philharmonic’s programming was slowly becoming more 
balanced, any shift away from its focus on nineteenth-century masterworks would take 
far longer than its reorganization efforts. In the 1910s, Josef Stransky attempted to shape 
the listening habits of critics and audience members by introducing a number of recent 
American compositions, including those by Bingham, Chadwick, Foote, Hadley, Herbert, 
Kramer, MacDowell, Morris, Paine, Powell, Schelling, Whithorne, and Wilson.
171
 
Stransky also pushed “to popularize the Philharmonic, initiating Young People’s 
Concerts, orchestral lectures, Evening of Light Music … and other innovative schemes” 
in line with the suggestions laid out by Pulitzer in his will.
172
 Such efforts did not go 
unnoticed by the general public, with at least one patron finding Stransky’s programs “far 
more interesting than those of the Boston Symphony.”173 Despite this high praise, 
however, the Philharmonic’s programming practices remained relatively consistent with 
those of other orchestras, and reflected the prevailing artistic ideology of the time. 
It is not clear how much power the board of directors yielded in shaping the 
Philharmonic’s programming. Stransky seemed especially prone to the influence of the 
orchestra’s guarantors, who from time to time would request that he program certain 
                                                 
171
 Mahler scholar De La Grange considers Stransky’s programming “enormously varied” when compared 
to Mahler’s, thanks in large part to the former’s emphasis on “French, English, Russian, Czech, … 
Scandinavian … [and] American compositions (De La Grange, Gustav Mahler, 1192). 
172
 Ibid., 1192. 
173
 Quoting A.R. Shattuck, a patron of both the Philharmonic and the Boston Symphony Orchestra whose 
letter of appreciation (dated 27 March 1916) was read during the Annual Meeting held on April 3
rd
 of the 
same year (Box 498-01-01; Folder: Annual Meeting Minutes 1904–1932; Record Group: Board of 
Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). Benjamin Kohon, a former Philharmonic bassoonist, 
confided that Stransky  “was a sort of society conductor, … he catered to popular tastes; always a 
Tchaikovsky program and a Wagner program and a Beethoven program” (quoted in De La Grange, Gustav 
Mahler, 1217). 
  123 
repertoire.
174
 But he was not the only conductor to capitulate to critical or popular 
demand. In 1922–23, Mackay spearheaded a project he called “The Greater 
Americanization of the Philharmonic” in an attempt to foster nationalist pride through 
classical music. The board hired composer and conductor Henry Hadley with the 
expressed purpose of introducing audiences to contemporary American music on a more 
regular basis, including a new a series of low-priced concerts at Lewisohn Stadium.
175
 
Records suggest that Mackay and Judson were acutely aware of the Philharmonic’s 
potential as a shaper of public taste, going so far as to articulate their programming 
philosophy in a letter to Mengelberg: 
[It is an] absolute necessity for the formation of a series of programs 
which will meet the requirements of the American public at a critical 
period in the existence of the Philharmonic Society, and the Executive 
Committee asks from Mr. Mengelberg, in accordance with the contract 
which is held with him, cooperation not only in fact but in spirit, and that 
his approval of the programs outlined, made by Mr. Judson, be cabled 
promptly on receipt of this letter….176 
 
While popular wisdom holds that conductors such as Mahler were autocratic in their 
choice of repertoire, the Philharmonic’s concert programming represented an ongoing 
negotiation between artist and patron. 
 Before the reorganization, the musician-led board of directors had the last word in 
all programming decisions. Richard Arnold and Felix Leifels engaged soloists and 
changed concert repertoire without the approval of Safonoff, privately scolding the 
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 According to the minutes from a 12 February 1913 board meeting, the Philharmonic’s executive 
committee sent Stransky a list of repertoire to consider for the following season, including symphonies by 
Tchaikovsky, Berlioz, Rachmaninoff, and Hadley (Box 606-01-02 through 19; Folder: Board of Directors 





 Quoted from a letter drafted by Judson and shared at a 18 July 1923 board meeting (Box 606-01-02/19; 
Folder: Board of Directors and Executive Committee Minutes, 1911–28; Record Group: Board of 
Directors, Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
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conductor when he bought parts for and programmed a new work without their 
permission.
177
 After the guarantors’ rise to power, Mahler was formally entrusted with 
the Philharmonic’s musical operations. Yet the organization’s artistic chain of command 
was markedly more blurred in practice. In his first year as music director, Mahler himself 
realized that 
Although I have a well-formed idea of the musical end I wish to reach I 
am not so particular about the methods of getting there that I am not open 
to suggestion. During the next few months I shall study the audiences of 
the Philharmonic with care. But I intend to let my public and the music 
critics of the press help me in picking out the musical way we should 
go…. The general aim of our concerts of the coming season will be to 
educate and for that reason I have formed several series… For the regular 
subscribers of previous years there will be the eclectic programs. The 
Beethoven cycle will be for the education of the lovers of classical music, 
for the education of my orchestra and for the students. The historical cycle 
… also should have its interest.178 
 
Mahler’s remarkable attentiveness to the expectations of not only his critics but his 
consumers is at odds with the picture so often painted by the popular press. There is 
nothing to substantiate the claims that his programs were maliciously shaped or altered 
by the guarantors’ committee.179 On the contrary, it seems as though Mahler was both 
aware and accepting of his role as the head of what was in some ways still very much a 
                                                 
177
 Board meeting minutes from 16 September 1908 (Box 498-01-03; Folder: Minutes 1903–12; Record 
Group: Board of Directors; Minutes of the Meetings of the Directors of the Philharmonic Society, Archives 
of the New York Philharmonic). 
178
 Note the new cycles Mahler programmed, including the historical cycle, which featured the conductor 
on continuo (The Musical Courier 59, no. 17, 27 October 1909, 20). Mahler stated similar goals in The New 
York Times, pointing out that “The symphonic concerts, in any community, form the musical structure on 
which the development of the people must stand … Yet in my work here, I shall be governed to a large 
extent by the wishes of the public and the newspaper music critics” (The New York Times, 24 October 
1909, 13). 
179
 Upon learning of his illness in February 1911, the board requested that replacement conductor 
Theodore Spiering honor all of Mahler’s repertoire choices. Nevertheless a newspaper editorial claimed 
that Mahler “had difficulty in making out his programmes this season, that in almost every instance his 
programmes have been changed for some reason or another by members of the Board of Directors” (The 
New York Times, 1 March 1911, 13). The Philharmonic’s manager, Loudon Charlton, vehemently denied 
this in a subsequent interview, insisting that “Mr. Mahler and the management are now, and have been 
throughout the season, working in perfect harmony. There have been no differences as to the programmes 
or policy” (The New York Times, 13 March 1911, 9). The truth is likely somewhere in between. 
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cooperative, mediating lofty artistic ideals with the mundane economic realities of 
modern day concert production.
180
 
A Closer Look: Orchestra Economics and the Audience 
 While it may be difficult to quantify changes to the Philharmonic’s artistic 
landscape, it is far more straightforward to make financial comparisons. Figure 2.11 
explicates us how the orchestra’s shift to a corporate operating model led to dramatic 
organizational growth subsidized by a wealthy few.
181
 This data, pulled from the 
orchestra’s annual reports and board meeting minutes, provides an unfettered glimpse at 
the Philharmonic’s rapid expansion. One can clearly see how expenses and ticket sales 
closely mirror each other before the orchestra’s reorganization, then drastically diverge. 
After a drop in revenue during the crisis of 1908–09, the Philharmonic experienced a 
burst of growth. The following season saw a 71% increase in ticket sales, accompanied 
by a 373% increase in expenditures. Members of the guarantors’ committee happily filled 
the gap between these two measures, but the continued economic expansion inspired by 
Pulitzer’s bequest and the acquisition of several local ensembles made it increasingly 
difficult for an elite group of philanthropists to foot the bill.
182
 As has already been  
 
                                                 
180
 One can get a sense of how and why the Philharmonic’s administration influenced programming 
through the following story published in the Tribune. Upon hearing that Ovide Robillard (an enforcer of 
French copyright and leader of the Societe des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique) would soon 
insist that certain French works be licensed at a new and higher rate, Loudon Charlton “told Mr. Robillard 
that I would show him our next programme, and that if we could not reach an understanding I should 
simply eliminate all the disputed works.” (quoted in The New York Tribune, 11 January 1911, 7). 
181
 Please note that no detailed financial records survive from 1911–12, and thus data is not included for 
those years. For another graphic representation of the Philharmonic’s expansion, see Baumol and Bowen, 
Performing Arts—The Economic Dilemma, 185, which roughly traces the orchestra’s expenses between 
1843 and 1964. The authors attribute shifts in budget size to broader economic and political events such as 
the Great Depression and World War I and II, as opposed to the Philharmonic’s reorganization. 
182
 As a restricted endowment fund, Pulitzer’s bequest produced only $20,000–$40,000 in interest 





Figure 2.11 The New York Philharmonic's Income Gap, 1900–28 
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mentioned, the remarkable financial growth surrounding the Philharmonic’s 
reorganization was caused primarily by an increase in the number of concerts and newly 
instated salaries for conductor and musicians. Figure 2.12 outlines a partial breakdown of 
the orchestra’s expenditures between 1900 and 1911.183 Notable highlights include an 
increased dependence on substitute musicians in the years leading up to 1909, as well as 
fluctuations in the dividend received by performing members at the end of each season.
184
 
Following the reorganization, musician pay increased in absolute terms but decreased 
when corrected for the number of rehearsals and concerts performed. For instance, the 
$266 dividend for the 1908–09 season translates into approximately $5.90 per service, 
while the following season’s base salary was set at approximately $454, or $4.13 per 
service.
185
 The same phenomenon can be applied to conductor salaries, which increased 
twenty-fold between 1900 and 1910.
186
 Given Mahler’s grueling performance schedule, 
however, his per concert earnings equaled only $353 in 1910–11—a twenty-percent pay 




                                                 
183
 This data comes directly from the Philharmonic’s annual reports, with the exception of the 1909–10 
season data, which is reported in a 7 December 1911 letter to the guarantors. Figures either do not exist for 
or are not applicable to those cells marked “N/A”  (Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
184
 Remember that dividend payments took the place of musician salaries before reorganization, and were 
calculated as a percentage of the season’s ticket sale surplus. 
185
 Estimates for the 1908–09 season are calculated for eighteen concert performances (nine unique 
programs) and twenty-seven rehearsals (or three rehearsals per concert program), while the estimates for 
the 1909–10 season are calculated for 47 concerts (16 programs) and 64 rehearsals (or 4 rehearsals per 
concert program). The base salary for the 1909–10 season was actually set at $7 per concert and $2 per 
rehearsal, and thus the $4.13 figure represents a weighted average. Union regulations soon increased the 
minimum salary to $8 per concert and $4 per rehearsal (Musical America 12, no. 21, 1 October 1910, 9). 
186
 It is worthwhile to note that conductor salaries for the years 1903–09 were drawn from a special 
Conductors’ Fund, and thus are not listed in the annual reports or board secretary’s notebook. 
187
 Mahler’s contract for the 1910–11 season stipulated a salary of $25,000, but he later requested an 
additional $5,000 due to the proposed number of concerts. After arbitration, he was set to receive a salary 
of $28,000--$3,000 above his total 1909–10 compensation—but due to his early exist and eventual death, 





Figure 2.12 Financial Comparison, 1900–11 (Courtesy of the Annual Reports, Philharmonic archives) 
Year Ticket Sales Expenses Dividend Pension Fund Conductor Substitutes 
1900–01 $34,688.50  $36,712.54  $204  $22,856.35  $2,448  $6,826  
1901–02 $35,620.75  $38,336.17  $200  $23,547.99  $2,500  $6,742.50  
1902–03 $28,489.75  $30,302.75  $116  $24,892.82  $1,392  $6,069  
1903–04 $38,661.25  $40,722.95  $204  $25,862.77             N/A $7,242.50  
1904–05 $50,171.50  $50,781.24  $325.16  $26,272.83             N/A $7,983  
1905–06 $49,740.75  $50,681.52  $303  $26,892.32             N/A $8,871  
1906–07 $55,335.25  $56,317.76  $390  $27,700.27             N/A $8,269  
1907–08 $49,614.75  $50,846.38  $301.70  $28,541.87             N/A $8,683  
1908–09 $37,099.75  $38,732.91  $266                 N/A            N/A $8,406.30  
1909–10 $63,323  $183,136.41                 N/A                N/A $25,000             N/A 
1910–11 $91,640  $189,691.74                 N/A                N/A $28,000             N/A 
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The Philharmonic’s increasingly hectic concert schedule strained the musicians’ 
artistic capacities as well, and any improvements to working conditions or compensation 
simply exacerbated the orchestra’s cost structure.188 By 1926, the orchestra boasted an 
annual deficit of nearly $150,000, prompting the board of directors to launch a new 
campaign aimed at reestablishing the endowment and pension funds that had been 
depleted during the Philharmonic’s reorganization.189 The musicians’ unanimous support 
for this initiative represented their continued shift from an ideological cooperative to a 
professionalized ensemble increasingly governed by union politics. Remember that, in 
1902–03, the musicians had opposed Damrosch’s call for a permanent endowment, 
insisting that such a measure went against the very tenets that the orchestra was founded 
upon. But things had changed, as “an increasing share of the Philharmonic’s public … 
was made up of that affluent class of ladies and gentlemen—especially ladies—that could 
afford to spend Friday afternoons at a concert, away from work or home.”190 High 
Society had staked its claim on the Philharmonic, and even though individual ticket 
                                                 
188
 According to a public memorandum drafted by the guarantors on 1 March 1912, “It is believed that 
expenses cannot be reduced any more, and that further improvements in receipts may confidently expected; 
but even if every seat at every concert in New York and Brooklyn were sold, there would remain every 
season a very large, unavoidable shortage. It seems also that the present number of 84 concerts … marks 
the physical limit for first-class work.” As has already been discussed, however, the orchestra would 
quickly exceed the 84-concert mark, thanks to extensive touring and a lengthened subscription season 
(Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
189
 The deficit (calculated as the difference between expenses and ticket revenue) grew to $146,677 by the 
end of the 1925–26 season, and at the annual meeting held on 5 April 1926, a Mr. Manoly urged “that a 
campaign to establish both [an endowment and pension fund] should be launched at the earliest possible 
date…. It was the unanimous opinion of the meeting that Mr. Manoly’s arguments were sound and 
indisputable.” By 1931, three pension accounts totaling more than $135,000 were distributing funds to 
retired musicians, including the New York Philharmonic Fund, the New York Symphony Fund, and the 
Philharmonic–Symphony Fund (Annual Meeting minutes, 5 April 1926 and 6 April 1931, Box 498-01-01; 
Folder: Annual Meeting Minutes 1904–1932; Record Group: Board of Directors, Archives of the New 
York Philharmonic). 
190
 Shanet argues that these ladies “ensured their privilege by taking full-season subscriptions” for Friday 
afternoon concerts only, and thus cementing the Philharmonic’s new weekly concert schedule. Friday 
afternoons remain a popular timeslot for orchestral concerts, and are often patronized by retired audience 
members (Shanet, The Philharmonic, 183). 
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prices were relatively affordable, the orchestra’s most fervent supporters remained 
members of an elite sub-community.
191
 Such allegiances made it difficult for the 
Philharmonic to engage broader audiences, and likely played an important role in 
spurning some of the city’s most powerful music critics.192  
Conclusions: Form Matches Function 
 In his summation of the Philharmonic’s reorganization efforts, Howard Shanet 
paints a colorful picture that outlines the conflicting concerns of the orchestra’s 
musicians, financiers, and audience. In his words, 
Richard Arnold and his colleagues had waged a stirring but futile 
campaign to save their beloved cooperative society. They had tried 
everything that experience and ingenuity suggested…. But as long as their 
affairs were managed collectively by a membership that drifted in and out 
of their handful of concerts each year, while they earned their livings 
elsewhere, they could not compete with the big-business methods of the 
great subsidized orchestras that were being built by wealthy America…. 
After sixty-seven years, the cooperative society of professional musicians, 
democratically deciding who their conductor would be, what music they 
would play, where they would play it, and how much they would charge 
for the privilege of attendance at their performances, was to be converted 
into an orchestra hired and administered by a little group of wealthy 




                                                 
191
 The cost of attending a Philharmonic concert in 1911–12 ranged from 38 cents to $12.50, or 
approximately $8.80 to $290 in 2010 dollars—roughly in line with ticket prices today (inflation calculated 
using www.westegg.com).  More work is needed to understand the historical trajectory of ticket pricing and 
its effects on concert attendance and audience demographics. 
192
 The relationship between the Philharmonic and the city’s music critics, especially Henry Krehbiel of 
the New York Tribune, was notably volatile. Philharmonic musician and board member Anton Reiff, Jr. 
sent a letter to the New York Herald as early as 20 December 1904 to protest “the unfair treatment accorded 
the Society by the musical edition” of the paper (Box 498-01-03; Folder: Minutes 1903–12; Record Group: 
Board of Directors; Minutes of the Meetings of the Directors of the Philharmonic Society, Archives of the 
New York Philharmonic). The relationship between orchestra and critic reached a fevered pitch during 
Mahler’s tenure in New York, a subject discussed at length by De La Grange, Martin, and Horowitz in their 
books on Mahler, Damrosch, and classical music in America, respectively. Krehbiel’s personal vitriol 
against Mahler is most apparent in his lengthy obituary for the composer, which was published in the 21 
May 1911 edition of the New York Tribune and was later opposed by a number of artists sympathetic to 
Mahler and his music, including the great pianist Ossip Gabrilowitsch (“An Open Letter to the Music Critic 
of the New York Tribune,” Musical America, 21 October 1911). 
193
 Shanet, The Philharmonic, 204. 
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Hyperbole aside, Shanet’s vivid description alludes to the Philharmonic’s ongoing 
struggle to match form with function, which propelled the orchestra’s adoption of a new 
organizational structure that would better serve its mission: bringing art of the highest 
quality to as large a public as possible. To achieve this synergy between art, audience, 
and economics, Mary Sheldon and a group of guarantors took it upon themselves to 
govern and subsidize New York’s first permanent orchestra. 
 In a January 1911 article published in The New York Press, critic Max Smith 
argued that “it was Gustav Mahler, and no one else, who reorganized and developed the 
Philharmonic orchestra.”194 Yet the process was far more complex, and depended on far 
more people, than Smith acknowledges. Influenced by the foresight of Walter Damrosch 
and the spectacular success of the Boston and Chicago Symphony Orchestras,
195
 the 
guarantors worked with Mahler and musicians like Richard Arnold and Felix Leifels to 
reorganize the Philharmonic and assure its permanence.
196
 The Philharmonic was 
certainly not the first major orchestra to encounter the challenges inherent to cooperative 
management, nor was it the first ensemble to adopt a corporate nonprofit operating 
model.
197
 Nevertheless, the interplay of patronage, organizational structure, and artistic 
                                                 
194
 Max Smith, untitled article in The New York Press, 16 January 1911. 
195
 The Philharmonic’s respect for (and jealousy of) the Boston Symphony Orchestra was fundamental to 
its reorganization efforts, at least for Mary Sheldon: “In our plans for the future we have tried to model the 
Philharmonic Orchestra on the plans of the Boston Symphony Orchestra” (“Mrs. George Sheldon Tell of 
Philharmonic Orchestra’s Ideals,” Musical America 13, 4 February 1911, 37). 
196
 The trope of permanence remains central to the Philharmonic’s executive management through at least 
the 1920s, when Clarence Mackay preached that “no orchestra can achieve real and lasting success until its 
permanency is assured” (underline his, Chairman’s address, 30 October 1923, Box 606-01-15; Folder: 
Board of Directors and Executive Committee Minutes, 1911–28; Record Group: Board of Directors, 
Archives of the New York Philharmonic). 
197
 In his study of patronage and organizational structure in the orchestras of New York and London, 
sociologist Stephen R. Couch articulates the difficulties associated with cooperative management structures 
and argues that the cooperative structure of the London Symphony Orchestra has been maintained due to 
government subsidies and the lack of significant private support that could “offer the musicians a stable, 
year-round income in return for control of the orchestras.” Couch also finds that, despite the diverging 
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practice in early-twentieth-century New York sheds some light on a remarkable process 
that was anything but smooth and congruous. The preceding pages argue that, by 
acknowledging these interactions, we can better understand the Philharmonic’s history 
and the link between artistic and commercial practice more generally. 
 Although this chapter’s discussion of the Philharmonic’s reorganization concludes 
in 1928 with the merger of the Philharmonic and Symphony societies, the story does not 
end there. The legacy of the Pulitzer bequest continued to shape the orchestra’s 
operations well into the middle of the century, both financially and organizationally. 
Extant letters and financial records suggest that the Philharmonic began draining the 
Pulitzer Fund to finance the orchestra’s concerts, a fact that seems to have been 
investigated and later swept under the rug by Mackay and other senior board members.
198
 
And, although the orchestra’s reorganization resulted in the formation of a membership 
corporation, such structural designations were later replaced by Non-Profit Corporation 
                                                                                                                                                 
structures of the New York Philharmonic and London Symphony Orchestra, their respective programming 
strategies are practically identical (Stephen R. Couch, “Patronage and Organizational Structure in 
Symphony Orchestras in London and New York,” 116). 
198
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41; Folder: Pulitzer Bequest,1911–57; Record Group: Development, Archives of the New York 
Philharmonic). 
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laws that would go on to mandate the modern governance structures of orchestras and 
most other performing arts organizations. Despite these developments, the Philharmonic 
has continuously maintained an active voting membership since 1912, making it unique 
among American orchestras.
199
 Today, members have the right to attend annual meetings 
and vote to elect the orchestra’s governing body; most decisions rendered by the board of 
directors, however, are not subject to the approval of the general membership.  
 The story of the Philharmonic’s transformation from a musicians’ cooperative to a 
board-governed institution reflects a broader shift in orchestral performance and its place 
in American cultural life. In an attempt to combat unfavorable economic conditions and 
ensure a future for the orchestra, supporters of the Philharmonic used new organizational 
forms and strategies to further professionalize the orchestra and foster a more polished 
artistic identity. The latter was accomplished both by cultivating higher performance 
standards and increasing engagement with the general public. The orchestra’s 
reorganization may not have manifested any drastic variations in programming or 
performance practices, but it did parallel a gradual shift in the way the ensemble was 
packaged and marketed. The Philharmonic and its concerts filled a contested space that 
mediated the values and expectations of New York’s cultural elite with the city’s broader 
population. This process—reconciling the commercially possible with the artistically 
desirable—unfolded through the actions of Mary Sheldon and the guarantors’ committee.  
 Perhaps more than anyone else, Sheldon was acutely aware of the role fiscal 
solvency played in cultivating artistic excellence: 
                                                 
199
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It has always been my intention and the intention of the committee 
working with me in taking hold of the Philharmonic Orchestra to provide 
an organization for New York and the entire country that would have as its 
ideal the giving of the best concerts that money could provide. Our idea 
was and is to have the organization on such a permanent basis that after I 
am dead, and all the men and women concerned now with the running of 
the orchestra have passed away, the organization will still continue and 
will develop its artistic ability still further…. You will understand then 





 Despite the purported artistic gains achieved after the Philharmonic’s reorganization, 
however, the urgency of its economic challenges did not wane. More concerts performed 
by better paid musicians meant more money lost. Sheldon herself recognized the 
paradox: “Whenever I hear of an orchestra making money I always wonder if it is not 
descending to the level of a circus, or something of that sort, because I know that an 
orchestra cannot, by any manner of means, produce an income great enough to pay 
expenses.”201  The evidence provided in this chapter suggests that, while it is difficult to 
reconcile artistic excellence with traditional definitions of financial success, it is not 
impossible. Yet focusing on economic measures alone fails to encapsulate the essence of 
orchestral performance and its real value to audiences past and present. Sheldon’s 
reflections on the subject are again worth quoting in full:   
America should be thoroughly awakened to the fact that money alone does 
not make a symphony orchestra…. What any symphony orchestra in New 
York or anywhere else needs [is] … an ideal. It needs a clear, definite, 





For the Philharmonic, this ideal is embodied in the orchestra’s legacy as one of the 
world’s most storied musical ensembles, an accomplishment that endures despite 
                                                 
200
 “Mrs. George Sheldon Tell of Philharmonic Orchestra’s Ideals,” Musical America 13, 4 February 1911, 
37. 
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 “Mrs. George Sheldon Tell of Philharmonic Orchestra’s Ideals,” Musical America, 13 (Feb. 4 1911), 37. 
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continued struggles to finance concerts and reach new audiences in New York and 
around the world.  
  136 
Chapter Three                                                                                                     
“Fighting the Good Fight”: The Louisville Orchestra New Music Project, 1948–58 
Introduction 
 The symphony orchestra has long struggled to define its relationship to newly 
composed music, both as patron and presenter. This is particularly true in America, where 
the proportion of programming dedicated to works by living composers had declined 
considerably by the turn of the twentieth century.
1
 More recently, contemporary scholars 
have suggested that the modern orchestra be embraced not for what it once was—a venue 
for music of the present—but for what it has increasingly become: a museum for great 
works of the past.
2
 Yet many of the most remarkable moments in the history of the 
American orchestra have coincided with active commissioning projects that brought new 
works to audiences.  
 This chapter documents one such story—the Louisville Orchestra New Music 
Project (NMP)—and contends that artistic creation is unavoidably shaped by the 
economic and structural realities facing the modern orchestra. Beginning in 1948 and 
lasting for more than a decade, the NMP served as an international incubator for new 
music, introducing audiences to newly-commissioned works at the unprecedented rate of 
one piece per subscription concert—or roughly 30% of the orchestra’s annual 
                                                 
1
 John H. Mueller, The American Symphony Orchestra: A Social History of Musical Taste (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1951). 
2
 J. Peter Burkholder, “The Twentieth Century and the Orchestra as Museum,” from The Orchestra: A 
Collection of 23 Essays on its Origins and Transformations, ed. by Joan Peyser (Milwaukee: Hal Leonard, 
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programming. The two men behind the project, politician Charles Farnsley and conductor 
Robert Whitney, worked tirelessly with patrons and funders to commission and premiere 
more than 100 new works—an accomplishment that dwarfed the efforts of even the most 
forward-thinking orchestras and commissioning projects, thrusting Louisville into the 
national spotlight. The program expanded in 1953 with a $400,000 grant from the 
Rockefeller Foundation and, starting the following year, the orchestra began recording 
each new work on its own independent label, First Edition.
3
 
 Whitney and Farnsley were concerned with more than just the performance of 
contemporary music, however. Their objective was to develop a product of lasting 
value—composers and their compositions—while transforming a resource-strapped 
regional orchestra into a financially stable ensemble of international stature.
4
 For 
Farnsley in particular, the composer not only symbolized “the forgotten man of music” 
but also embodied the orchestra’s opportunity to sell-out Carnegie Hall and, with any 
luck, achieve long-term stability. In some respects the strategy worked, as private 
foundations, individual patrons, and local government banded together to try and solve 
the problem of supporting new music. Yet upon closer inspection, the unique series of 
events outlined above affirm an inescapable tension between artistic experimentation and 
financial sustainability, exposing how structural and ideological barriers impact artistic 
choice—including programming decisions, composition styles, and public reception. 
While the NMP replaced expensive guest artists with new concert works that could be 
performed repeatedly, the orchestra continued to struggle financially, a struggle that 
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 And, by the end of the project, of international repute: see Joseph E. Potts, “Louisville Commissions,” 
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simply intensified as the program wore on. As Louisville grappled with the economic 
realities of supporting new music, the orchestra’s conservative traditions and weary 
audience proved to be stark barriers to widespread change. Despite a quickly growing 
presence on the national and international music scenes, the orchestra failed to garner the 
support of its own community. Just as the orchestra was experimenting with new music, 
so too was the audience, which at times felt alienated and ignored by the policies and 
practices of the NMP. Nevertheless, Whitney continued to commission new works and 
fought to inspire popular interest in contemporary orchestral music.   
 All of this suggests that, as with most untested innovations, the NMP encountered 
as many setbacks as it achieved victories, forcing the orchestra’s board to continuously 
alter its funding and marketing strategies in an effort to address ongoing structural 
challenges. My aim here is to identify these challenges and posit the New Music Project 
as a prolonged and ultimately futile attempt at solving them. Calling upon material mined 
from the University of Louisville archives and conversations with current and former 
members of the orchestra’s administration, I argue that the project’s demise can be 
understood as a consequence of the tenuous relationship between high art and 
commercial viability.
5
 This relationship, negotiated by orchestra and community leaders 
and mediated by the organization’s structure, will receive further explication below. By 
addressing these and other issues, this chapter sets straight the story surrounding the 
NMP, rendering it not as an inexplicable aberration but instead as a patchwork of artistic 
experiments that confront the fraught relationship between high art and commercial 
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success, new music and popular appeal.
6
 Such a stance reinforces the project’s 
remarkable vision and the perseverance of its foremost advocates, while highlighting the 
role played by organizational structure in shaping artistic practice and reception.  
Setting the Stage 
Despite its reputation as a small southern city known more for horse racing than 
civic pride in the arts, Louisville has long served as a breeding ground for some of the 
country’s most progressive social experiments, particularly in the realm of education. 
Patty Hill, a Louisville native best known for co-writing “Happy Birthday,” designed 
what would later become the template for American kindergarten, and by the late-
nineteenth century women’s clubs flourished alongside a burgeoning arts and culture 
scene that included active choral, dance, and theatre societies. According to a brief 
history penned by Whitney himself, the first iteration of the Louisville Philharmonic 
Society gave its premiere concert on 3 December 1866 under the baton of Louis Hast, a 
local organist.
7
 Although historians do not often mention Louisville alongside the larger 
city centers of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco, it was in 
many ways their cultural equal.  
Given Louisville’s genuinely progressive history, it was no accident that the New 
Music Project developed there in the years following World War II. Yet while the scope 
of the orchestra’s commitment to new music was remarkable, precedents did exist, both 
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in the form of other commissioning initiatives and through an emerging discourse 
concerning the relationship between art and society. Indeed, several of the cultural 
developments that took place in the first half of the twentieth century were instrumental 
in launching the NMP. By the 1930s, institutions had become increasingly aware of the 
correlation between aesthetic and function, as audiences voiced their dissatisfaction with 
some of the modernist trends that had come to the fore during the early part of the 
century. In 1934, composer, conductor, and writer Constant Lambert discussed the 
ensuing retreat of such “cerebral” or intellectual music. According to Lambert, 
“compared to the vertiginous ‘twenties,’ the ‘thirties’ [were] curiously static.”8 While 
such dichotomous comparisons are oversimplified, they represent a truism rooted in the 
contemporary perceptions of artists and critics. Even a slight move away from the 
complex experiments of the 1910s and 1920s might be seen as a reflection of the global 
economic and political climate, as well as a response to the “rapidly diminishing good 
will toward contemporary concert-hall composers on the part of the music-loving 
public.”9   
This emphasis on an accessible or proto-populist musical style was certainly 
apparent in the programming of most major American orchestras, with Arturo Toscanini 
and the NBC Symphony, Leopold Stokowski and the Philadelphia Orchestra, and Serge 
Koussevitzky and the Boston Symphony Orchestra all choosing to engage with only 
certain segments of the new music aesthetic.
10
 The latter’s connection to young 
                                                 
8
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composers and their music is particularly noteworthy, and is reflected through his 
connection to the Tanglewood Music Festival and the Koussevitzky Foundations, which 
provided institutional homes for the conductor’s dedication to new music. In his nearly 
thirty years with the BSO, Koussevitzky conducted over sixty premieres, fostering strong 
personal relationships with the composers he commissioned, the upstart conductors he 
mentored, and the growing audience he and the orchestra entertained. Through his two 
foundations designed “to encourage contemporary composers and provide them with 
opportunities to create new works,” Koussevitzky went even further, ensuring an 
endowment for the creation of contemporary music that continues to this day.
11
 Since 
their establishment in 1942, the foundations have served as one of the oldest and 
foremost commissioning initiatives in America, shaping a generation of symphonic music 
and inspiring other organizations—including the Louisville Orchestra—to support living 
composers.  
Any relationship between new music and the American public was further 
addressed by the adoption of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal policies during the 
Depression, which encouraged artists of all types to reassert their connections with a 
mass audience. The Works Progress Administration, inaugurated in 1935, launched an 
ambitious scheme of arts-based programs in cities across the nation, including the Federal 
Music Project (FMP).
12
 Under the leadership of Nikolai Sokoloff, former conductor of 
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the Cleveland Orchestra, the FMP dispensed tens of millions of dollars into the American 
music scene, provided jobs to unemployed musicians, and “lifted the country’s musical 
IQ” through a steady diet of classical warhorses and audience-pleasers.13 Indeed, the 
FMP hoped that if the general public regularly heard quality musical performances 
featuring American musicians, their patronage of the arts—especially those created and 
practiced in the United States—would increase after the Depression lifted. Such tactics 
continued to resonate into the 1950s as Cold War politics took root, and thus Louisville’s 
New Music Project might be understood more broadly as an effective channel for cultural 
diplomacy.  
Yet the work carried out under Roosevelt’s new cultural policies had an even 
more direct impact on the emergence of the NMP. By the mid-1930s, the Composer’s 
Forum Laboratory had become one of the FMP’s most impressive programs. In the words 
of director Ashley Pettis, the Forum was created to develop “a more definite 
understanding and relationship between the composer and the public”—a mission 
accomplished through the performance of over 6,500 new works by American 
composers.
14
 Although the Forum was centered in New York City, the impetus behind its 
establishment quickly permeated the country entire country. In Chicago, an upstart 
conductor was hired to be supervisor of the city’s FMP-related activities. His name was 
Robert Whitney, and as future music director of the Louisville Orchestra, he would soon 
become one of the country’s most persistent advocates for new music.  
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Robert Whitney and the Louisville Orchestra 
 Born in England but raised in America, Whitney honed his musical craft while a 
composition student of Leo Sowerby’s at the American Conservatory of Music in 
Chicago. Before long, he found that his compositional achievements were quickly 
surpassed by his other musical efforts—working as a conductor and administrator, 
serving as a radio announcer, managing his own family trio with sisters Grace and 
Noreen, and conducting the Chicago Civic Orchestra under the guidance of Frederick 
Stock. While supervising the Chicago branch of the Federal Music Project (1935–7), 
Whitney still found the time to conduct local and regional ensembles, and it was in this 
capacity that he was brought to the attention of Dann Byck, then president of the Civic 
Arts Association, Louisville’s flagship performing arts organization in the mid-1930s.15  
 In the summer of 1937, Byck reached out to Whitney to gauge his interest in 
helping to start a professional orchestra in Louisville, which had long struggled to 
maintain a culture of support for symphonic music.
16
 Whitney responded affirmatively, 
and invited representatives from the search committee to attend a concert featuring the 
Illinois Symphony Orchestra on 23 June 1937.
17
 He made such a favorable impression 
that after a short follow-up interview in Louisville, he was offered a $2,500 annual salary 
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to conduct both the Civic Arts Orchestra and at the local university, where he would be 
invited to teach music theory and composition. Although the workload and 
accompanying wage represented a step down from his FMP position, Whitney had tired 
of purely administrative work, and was looking forward to working directly with 
musicians on a regular basis.
18
  
 With eight weeks to prepare for his first subscription concert, Whitney quickly 
realized that his orchestra was anything but professional. While members of the ensemble 
included some thirty university faculty, many were not trained as professional musicians, 
and the remainder consisted of students from the university and local public schools. 
Only some of the players were unionized, though this quickly changed so as to achieve 
equal pay throughout the ensemble—a base rate of $7 per concert and $3 per rehearsal. 
The artistic quality of the orchestra mirrored its lack of professional pedigree.  In 
Whitney’s own words, 
There were no French horn players, there was only one oboe player, there 
were no bassoon players.  Of the players there were, there were very few 
of them of a quality necessary for presenting symphonic music.  I 
discovered that one reason for this was that we could not call upon all of 
those competent to play because there had been factional feuds going on in 





In the face of these difficulties, Whitney pressed on and conducted the orchestra’s first 
concert on 8 November 1937 to an audience of 600—the hall’s capacity numbered 2,350. 
                                                 
18
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Despite the dubious artistic merits of the performance and lackluster attendance, the 
performance was a step in the right direction and, for Whitney, an opportunity to build 
his mettle as a conductor.
20
 More than thirty years later, he would look back on the 
performance with astonishment:  “My experience as a conductor was most limited. The 
only thing I had going in my favor was that there was no orchestra either.  So we could 
learn together, and this is what happened…. I’m awfully glad we don’t have a tape 
recording of that first performance.”21   
 By the end of Whitney’s first year, the orchestra seemed to be doing better than 
expected, accruing a deficit of $660 on a budget of $8,442—about half of what the board 
of directors had projected at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless, the first ten years of 
the Civic Arts Orchestra—later named the Louisville Philharmonic Society (1942) and 
then the Louisville Orchestra (1949)—were marked by continuous financial shortfalls. 
Such an endemic deficit was by no means out of the ordinary for other orchestras around 
the country, as the costs associated with producing live concerts quickly outpaced any 
gains in ticket revenue. Nevertheless, prominent community members began to take 
notice of the orchestra’s improvement, and the University of Louisville even decided to 
offer Whitney an adjunct teaching position. In a letter to the editor of the local newspaper 
dated 18 May 1938, orchestra supporter Mrs. James Ross Todd noted that  
Other cities of the size of Louisville long ago realized that the furtherance 
of a fine orchestra is a vital civic enterprise, one to be sponsored and 
encouraged wholeheartedly. I have followed the growth of our orchestra 
under the able direction of Robert Whitney with keen satisfaction, glad at 
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last that we have an organization that can contribute importantly to the 




Whitney concurrently instigated a series of young peoples’ concerts for local students, 
taking time to give impromptu composition lessons and going so far as to invite the most 
promising students to submit their own compositions for performance with the orchestra. 
Led by J. Alexander Stewart, the orchestra’s board of directors also worked to forge 
connections between ensemble and community. A volunteer Women’s Association was 
formed in 1942, and by 1945 they were regularly inviting world-renowned soloists such 
as Isaac Stern and Benny Goodman to perform with the orchestra, offering reduced-price 
tickets to select companies for themed “Industrial Night” concerts, and producing a new 
series of pops concerts at Churchill Downs.
23
   
 Despite these creative strategies, however, the Louisville Orchestra continued to 
grapple with the financial challenges embedded in live orchestral performance and 
outlined in this dissertation’s introduction. Any artistic gains were severely constrained 
by the paltry salaries available to principal players in the ensemble. In 1947, the 
personnel expenses (as outlined by Whitney himself) included a base salary of $50 per 
week (or $1,150 per year, with a 23-week season; see Figure 3.1 for a handwritten matrix 
of musician salaries).
24
 To attract and retain better musical talent, Dean Dwight Anderson 
of the University of Louisville’s School of Music offered teaching positions to some of 
the orchestra’s musicians in the fall of 1944. Two years later, Louisville hired its first  
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Figure 3.1 A matrix of musician salaries for the 1947–48 season, handwritten by Whitney 
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full-time manager to help manage the orchestra’s season and reign in its finances, which 
continued to be marked by growing deficits ($31,000 by 1946, and $74,500 by 1948).
25
  
 In an attempt to balance the budget and raise local awareness of the orchestra’s 
activities, manager John G. Snowden organized a three-day Jubilee in late April of 1947 
to mark the group’s ten-year anniversary. The Jubilee registered as one of the largest 
musical events in Louisville’s history, and the program included Verdi’s Requiem 
along with a special performance by the New York Philharmonic under George Szell.
26
 
Despite the goodwill created by the program, however, the orchestra had a difficult time 
fundraising for the event, ultimately losing money on what was supposed to be a 
profitable venture.
27
 Later that year, the board of directors moved to form a Progress 
Fund aimed at erasing the orchestra’s debt and building a permanent endowment. Figure 
3.2 reproduces an internal letter to Fund committee members that provides fascinating 
details concerning the nascent fundraising process used by mid-century American 
orchestras. Thanks in large part to the work of Dann Byck, the Fund succeeded in 
reaching its goal, securing a future—albeit tenuous—for the Louisville Orchestra. 
Charles Farnsley and the New Music Project 
 By 1948, with a newly funded endowment in place, the Louisville Orchestra 
seemed to have hit its stride. To keep pace with the orchestra’s expanding operations, 
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Figure 3.2 Progress Fund Letter, 7 May 1947 (Box 62, Folder: Progress Fund, Louisville 
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John Woolford was hired to be the ensemble’s new business manager. Woolford, a 
product of Arthur Judson’s staff at the New York Philharmonic, appealed to Whitney and  
the board because he was “a man with wide business experience and many ideas that 
would be helpful in putting the organization on a more sound business basis … [a] man 
who could sell the business and industrial men of this town on our project.”28 Indeed, one 
of Woolford’s first tasks would be to build a renewable audience for orchestral music in 
Louisville, something that had as yet eluded Whitney and his orchestra. Some of the 
group’s local supporters recognized this, including A.W. Adams, a Sales Promotion 
Manager at Sears, Roebuck and Co. who lamented the following in a 31 December 1947 
letter: 
I’m talking in terms of “masses”—people—and people are customers—
and customers ring the cash registers—and money pays for the orchestra! 
It takes big money to support a symphony. Especially to half-filled houses. 
It’s noticeable, too, on the orchestra personnel. We all play better to big 




This admonition was echoed in the local press, which chalked up meager concert 
attendance with a desire for more popular programming—a condition that the orchestra 
would continue to struggle with for the foreseeable future.
30
 
                                                 
28
 According to a letter from Whitney to friend Hans Rosenwald written on 9 June 1948, Woolford was 
hired over musicologist Richard Kirchhoff due to his previous experience in marketing and managing an 
orchestra. Another unsuccessful candidate for the position, George Weigl, expressed the following advice 
upon learning that a “Judson man” had been hired: “Be stern and run the artistic side of your orchestra 
yourself. That is your duty to yourself and your friends, the committee, or the executive board. If you don’t, 
in a very short time your orchestra will lose its identity. Let your business manager take care of its business 
and that only” (Letter dated 24 June 1948, reproduced in Box 65: Correspondence, 1948, Folder: 
Applications (Manager), 1948, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville 
Archives). 
29
 Box 62: Correspondence, 1947, Folder: Miscellaneous, 1947, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–
017), University of Louisville Archives. 
30
 See Paul Hughes, “Inflation and Public Criticism Play ‘Moaning Low’ for L.P.O.,” Louisville Courier–
Journal, 18 January 1948. 
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 One member of the board—Charles Farnsley—knew all too well that, if the 
orchestra wished to attain a privileged position within the community, it would have to 
simultaneously reshape its artistic identity and revenue structure. Although Farnsley was 
relatively new to the orchestra, having joined its board in December 1947, he was a 
familiar face within the Louisville community. Born in 1907 to a powerful Kentucky 
family, Farnsley obtained a law degree from the University of Louisville (1930) and 
constructed an impressive political career. He served in the 38
th
 district of the Kentucky 
House of Representatives between 1938 and 1940, later going on to serve as mayor of 
Louisville (1948–53) and as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives (1965–67), 
where he helped to found the National Endowment for the Arts and continued to generate 
funding for performing arts organizations throughout the city of Louisville. 
 In early 1948, shortly before succeeding the recently deceased Leland Taylor as 
mayor, Farnsley was elected president of the orchestra’s board of directors. Although 
history has celebrated Farnsley’s visionary leadership of the orchestra, he never actually 
served in the capacity of president due to his unexpected ascension to the position of 
mayor that spring. Despite any inaccuracies attached to Farnsley’s formal relationship 
with the orchestra, however, one cannot contest the significance of his impact. Upon 
joining the board, Farnsley called Robert Whitney into his law offices for a private 
conference. Several decades later, Whitney recalled the contents of this meeting: 
Farnsley began by saying: “Look, you’re broke, you’ll always be broke 
the way you’re going, and I have an idea that I think could change all 
this.” He said, “Number one: you had Helen Traubel as a soloist here last 
month.  What did you pay her?” And I think as I recall that we paid her the 
rather extravagant sum of three thousand dollars.  And he said, “Well 
that’s fine and she’s a fine singer, but what have you got now?” … 
“Suppose you had taken the money that you spend for your guest artists 
this year and you had engaged the very best composers in the world that 
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you could find to write music for you and played this music for the first 
time anywhere, then you would be making a concrete contribution to the 
music.  And furthermore if we were lucky and happened to hit a 
masterpiece, you would be in the history books.” And I said, “Well 
Charlie, that’s fine, but how about the audience?”  “Oh,” he said, “don’t 
worry about the audience.  They want what’s good.”31 
 
To be sure, Farnsley’s proposition seemed far-fetched: replace famous guest artists with 
little-known composers who would write music for an orchestra that catered to a 
relatively conservative listening public. Yet his plan resonated with Whitney, who had 
experienced the commissioning process firsthand while running the Chicago Federal 
Music Project. 
The conductor did not take long to think about the potential outcomes of such an 
unorthodox endeavor. Despite his concerns regarding the public reception of new music, 
Whitney was convinced that initiating such a project would help the orchestra financially 
by replacing excessive guest artist costs with one-time commissioning fees. Farnsley’s 
letters to Whitney and others suggest that he considered the project both a form of 
advocacy on behalf of the modern composer and a means to distinguish Louisville from 
other orchestras around the country that were more talented, had access to more 
resources, and were linked to more prestigious historical roots.
32
 By thinking outside of 
the realm of perceived possibility, Farnsley and Whitney concocted a scheme that would 
attract a national audience while providing financial and artistic sustenance to the 
orchestra, or so they believed.  
Although Farnsley is often credited with the genesis of the NMP, extant records 
suggest that the board had already discussed at least some aspects of the project, 
                                                 
31
 Robert S. Whitney, Transcript of Tapes 29–32, pp.76-83, Series 1 (1970), Record Group 60, Oral History 
Collection, University of Louisville Archives. 
32
 See, for example, Robert Whitney Papers (1947), University of Louisville Archives. 
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including a move from their current concert hall, Memorial Auditorium, to the smaller 
Columbia Auditorium. The first formal articulation of the NMP likely occurred at a board 
meeting held on 20 February 1948. According to the secretary’s minutes, 
Mr. Farnsley felt that we should have composers instead of soloists—‘it 
cost no more to get top composers than guest artists—our press would be 
good on it and I have a definite feeling that soloists are making good 
money but creators are not.’ He said considerable money could be made 
from radio sponsors. He questioned whether or not our concerts be held in 





By the beginning of April, the “Farnsley Plan” had gained considerable momentum 
within the organization. Renovations to Columbia Auditorium were being discussed, as 
was the possibility of commissioning and recording new works from Paul Hindemith, 
Darius Milhaud, and William Walton.
34
 Moreover, the plan included a provision that 
would see the orchestra shrink from seventy to fifty paid members, invoking Farnsley’s 




 Before delving into the early years of the New Music Project, it is worth noting 
the surprising shortage of references pertaining to the NMP in any of the orchestra’s 
records prior to the fall of 1948. Upon closer reading, this suggests both that the 
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 Box 65: Correspondence, 1948, Folder: Board Meeting Minutes, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–
017), University of Louisville Archives. 
34
 Stated in a letter from James Bagby to Farnsley on 31 March 1948, Box 67: Correspondence, 1948–49, 
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35
 Although much has been made about the orchestra’s apparent contraction, Whitney saw it as an 
expansion of the group’s permanent membership. In a letter to artist manager Paul Stoes dated 22 June 
1948, he confessed that the orchestra was “taking some very drastic departures in procedure here. We are 
increasing our professional group of 43 players to 50 and dropping the additional part time members…. 
[and] realizing the futility of trying to compete with the caliber of “box office” Mr. Thurman and Mr. 
Meyer are bringing to Louisville next season we are commissioning six eminent composers to write short 
works for us” (Box 68: Correspondence, 1948–50, Folder: Plans for 1948–49 season, Louisville Orchestra 
Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville Archives). 
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commissioning project was seen as just one of the orchestra’s many initiatives, and that 
its initial planning phases were undertaken in private by Whitney (conductor), Woolford 
(manager), and Farnsley (patron). While we must infer many of the details leading up to 
the NMP’s launch in 1948, its subsequent success almost immediately transformed the 
orchestra into an internationally recognized ensemble. On 29 August of that year, the 
orchestra publicly announced its plan to “blaze a new trail” by concentrating on the 
presentation of newly-composed works by local and world-class composers, directing the 
Louisville music community down a path that few, if any, would have predicted.
36
 
The NMP’s Early Years, 1948–50 
 The 1948–49 season included six pairs of subscription concerts, all of which 
featured works commissioned by Whitney and the orchestra.
37
 The composers 
commissioned included Darius Milhaud, Virgil Thomson, Roy Harris, Joaquin Rodrigo, 
Gian-Francesco Malipiero, and Louisville’s own Claude Almand. The latter had in fact 
been a board member with the orchestra but chose to resign before accepting a 
commission from Whitney, so as to deter any anxiety over preferential treatment.
38
 
Extant archival documentation also suggests that the orchestra’s existing structure and its  
limitations played a substantive role in shaping the new musical works created. For 
example, in a letter to Roy Harris, John Woolford vents his frustration regarding the 
composer’s preferred orchestration: 
I am upset to learn from the scoring of Kentucky Spring that there are 
several extra parts which we do not have. If you will review our 
                                                 
36
 The commissioning project was first reported by Edward F. Devol, Jr., “Louisville’s Philharmonic 
Prepares to Blaze a New Trail,” Louisville Courier-Journal, 29 August 1948. 
37
 Birkhead incorrectly labels the first season of the commissioning project as 1947–48. 
38
 Discussed at a 6 August 1948 board meeting and reproduced in Box 65: Correspondence, 1948, Folder: 
Board Meeting Minutes, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville Archives. 
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correspondence … you will see we have no bass clarinet, no 3rd trumpet, 
bassoon, oboe, extra flute, nor harp…. I would point out that the extra 
players involved are not merely a question of additional costs but also the 
unavailability of the players themselves. The best instrumentalists in the 
vicinity of Louisville are already in the Orchestra, and other qualified 




The geographic identity of the orchestra also influenced several of the newly 
commissioned works. Both Harris and Milhaud drew on the orchestra’s home state for 
inspiration, titling their compositions Kentucky Spring and Kentuckiana, respectively. 
Milhaud’s work, which borrows material from no fewer than twenty Kentucky folk 
tunes,
40
 was especially well received, moving dean of the local conservatory and part-
time music critic Dwight Anderson to describe the work an “authentic rendering of the 
American south.”41  
 The logistics initially associated with the New Music Project were relatively 
straightforward, although records suggest that Woolford and Whitney were forced to 
learn how to court in-demand composers, design commissioning agreements, negotiate 
terms, and effectively delegate responsibility.
42
 Each composer was paid a 
commissioning fee of $1000 inclusive of all copying costs, which might explain the 
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 Box 143: Commissioning Project, Folder: Artists (1948–49 season): Roy Harris, Louisville Orchestra 
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relative brevity (five to eight minutes) of works composed for the Louisville Orchestra 
that year. Four of the six composers received an additional $500 to conduct the orchestra 
in concert. In stark contrast to past seasons, only three soloists were hired to perform with 
the orchestra, confirming the orchestra’s unique commitment to the composer and his or 
her music. Nevertheless, the power wielded by certain guest artists—including soprano 
Kathleen Ferrier, violinist Isaac Stern, and, as we will see, dancer Martha Graham—
continued to shape how the orchestra conducted the commissioning process.
43
 For 
instance, in 1951, Stern was asked to choose a composer who would write a new violin 
work that he in turn would perform with the orchestra. Stern’s response is worth quoting 
at length: 
I would like to have been able to recommend for your consideration and 
agreement an American composer in whom we might have confidence. 
Yet this has proved very difficult…. [Among] American composers I find 
that they all have great facility and interest, yet there is something lacking, 
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 On 29 October 1948, Andre Mertens of Mertens, Parmelee & Brown (a subsidiary of CAMI) contacted 
Woolford about the possibility of engaging the up-and-coming soprano Kathleen Ferrier. Woolford 
expressed interest, suggesting that she might sing a few newly commissioned songs by Benjamin Britten. A 
fee of $1000 for two concerts was agreed upon, along with a tentative date toward the end of the 1948–49 
season. Woolford was subsequently unable to obtain a positive response from Britten, prompting Mertens 
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January 6
th
 and arrange January 3 and 4 which would make it possible for you to have the pair.” 
Unforeseen conflicts would later force the concerts to the fall of 1950, at which point Woolford wrote 
Ralph Hawkes, Britten’s publisher, to extend a second commission offer. On 28 November 1949, Hawkes 
replied and noted that, while Britten would certainly be interested in writing a pair of songs for Ferrier, he 
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     At this point—almost two years since the beginning of the commissioning process—the board 
apparently discussed whether or not it would be worthwhile to simply present Ferrier unattached. 
According to minutes from a 7 October 1949 meeting, “Mr. Whitney expressed the opinion that we should 
go on with the composer policy and he thinks we should not retreat from the policy now … [and] we 
should not put her before the policy of the Society even though she is a brilliant artist.” This lengthy back-
and-forth speaks to the increasing complexity of the commissioning process, something all the more 
extraordinary considering Britten never wrote a new work for the orchestra. Similar correspondences exist 
with other composers, including Poulenc and Copland, who was not able to accept the invitation until 1954, 
five years after he was first approached by Whitney (Box 68: Correspondence, 1948–50, Folder: Artists, 
1949–50 Season, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville Archives). 
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a strength, a clearly defined direction and individuality that would prevent 




 Stern eventually nominated Paul Hindemith to write a violin concerto, only later to 
suggest Leonard Bernstein for the job. In the end, neither wrote a work for Stern, 
although Hindemith did write several other works for the orchestra over the lifespan of 
the NMP. Despite the complexity of the commissioning process, however, the resulting 
performances quickly received national attention, thanks in part to Virgil Thomson’s 
position as an eminent critic and the relative lack of precedent among American 
orchestras.
45
 Press coverage in the Louisville Times and Courier-Journal—an early 
financial supporter of the orchestra—was augmented by reports in the New York Herald 
Tribune, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Hartford Times, Rochester (NY) 
Democrat, Anderson (IN) Herald, Oklahoma City Oklahoman, Portland (Maine) 
Telegram, and Christian Science Monitor.
46
  
 By the end of the season, however, it became clear that commissioning new 
works was not saving the orchestra money. Instead it was costing them more, aggravating 
the group’s already fragile financial position and counteracting any artistic progress. 
Between 1943 and 1949 the orchestra’s expenses increased nearly twenty-fold, due 
mostly to increases in musicians’ salaries (from $4,000 to $78,000) and the expansion of 
the concert season.
47
 According to at least one board member, however, the orchestra was 
                                                 
44
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 According to Sandra Fralin’s study of the New Music Project, during the 1947–48 season, only sixty-two 
orchestral works were commissioned and premiered nationwide (Fralin, “The Role of the Louisville 
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46
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still being run “on a hit-or-miss method.”48 In a letter to his former boss at the New York 
Philharmonic, Woolford confided to Bruno Zirato that 
The situation with the Orchestra is good all except the fact that we need 
dough in the worst way. The Orchestra had jogged along for 11 seasons 
making steady but very slow progress. It is not for me to brag that this 
year a tremendous amount of interest has been aroused, but the fact 
remains that it has. The new auditorium into which we moved this season 
is a gem accoustically [sic]…. The Orchestra technically began this season 
to show the results of 12 years of slow, plodding, heartbreaking work and 
training, and sounds very creditably…. It has been a terrific shot in the 
arm for the people here to see their Orchestra mentioned in Time, the NY 
Times and Tribune, and various other newspapers…. In any case the 
building of a season around the composer has proved intriguing enough 
both here and outside of Louisville that there is every intention of 




Financial records for the years surrounding the project’s realization show a shrinking 
deficit, and a surplus by 1950, but this is due not to the NMP but rather the significant 
monies provided by the Louisville Fund, a local  “treasure chest for the arts” set up in 
1923 and still active today. Figure 3.3 provides a breakdown of these figures, showing 
how contributions from the Louisville Fund helped to hide significant losses in ticket 
revenue.  
Although no longer a regular presence at board meetings, Charles Farnsley 
remained a driving force behind the NMP, and thus it was he who brokered an eleventh-
hour deal between the Fund and the orchestra. Under the terms of the agreement, the  
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 Quoting a Mr. Willis from the minutes of a 11 March 1949 board meeting. Willis and two other board 
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Figure 3.3 Financial Data, 1948–51 
       1948–49     1949–50     1950–51 
Earned Income (ticket sales) $49,741.93  $42,923.88  $34,490.05  
Contributed Income $97,342.70  $70,649.30  $68,588.14  
(Louisville Fund)      ~$40,000 $49,430.60  $47,228.90  
Total Income $147,084.63  $113,573.18  $103,078.19  
        
Expenses $124,426.69  $111,175.34  $101,450.20  
        
Annual surplus/deficit  $22,657.94  $2,397.84  $1,881.99  
Surplus/deficit at beginning of year  –$24,418.31   –$1,760.37 $637.47  
Total surplus/deficit   –$1,760.37 $637.47  $2,519.46  
 
 
orchestra was to receive $40,000 contingent on the following conditions: strengthen its 
Board of Directors, plan and implement a professional fundraising drive, and secure 
greater public support.
50
 These tenets were outlined in a public letter that was published 
in the Louisville Courier-Journal on 4 February 1949, providing unique insight into the 
tension between the commissioning project and the diverging interests of the general  
public—a tension that the Louisville Fund tried to resolve. With renewed support from 
the city’s primary cultural foundation, the orchestra’s board agreed to continue the 
commissioning project on an ad-hoc basis; in no way was it guaranteed that the initiative 
would continue beyond 1950.  
 The second season of the project featured commissioned works by Paul 
Hindemith, William Schuman, David Diamond, Robert Russell Bennett, and, once again, 
Claude Almand. The opening concert was nearly sold- out, and was attended by the 
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 Records in the University of Louisville archives show that the Louisville Fund, which continues to 
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country’s leading orchestra manager, Arthur Judson.51 But Louisville audiences were yet 
to be convinced of the project’s artistic merits. In a 1949 Times editorial, Dwight 
Anderson lamented that “the [commissioning] venture was a blast in the face of 
provincial tradition which, at least in this community, declines to be impressed by new 
music until it has enjoyed a period of acceptance elsewhere.”52 A year earlier, William 
Mootz noticed the same phenomenon, remarking in print that “the impression made on 
Louisville concert-goers [by the new music] was negligible.”53 Even the orchestra’s own 
board of directors remained split regarding the artistic and organizational value of the 
commissioning project, with some members voicing concern that “six [new] works is too 
much for one season.”54 
 These observations ran counter to the perceptions held by national commentators, 
one of whom ventured to guess that the commissioned works would attract as much or 
more attention than the Kentucky Derby.
55
 For those outside the community, “the wide 
civic participation developed in Louisville derives, one must believe, from a policy that 
seems to be purely local.”56 At an April 1949 conference for the Association of Women’s 
Committees for Symphony Orchestras, board member Louise Kain confirmed this 
opinion, insisting that while  
It [was] true that many of our subscribers shied at the announcement of 
our contemporary composer policy…. Most of them … have come to find 
that not only was there little or no basis to their fear of modern music, but 
that they actually enjoyed the new works. The few remaining 
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irreconcilables have come to take the resigned attitude that they can stand 
anything for ten minutes, particularly since the rest of the programs were 




This account conflicts with much of the public and private commentary cited above. 
Indeed, Whitney resented the martyrdom of Louisville’s audiences, proclaiming 
passionately at a board meeting the true value of the commissioning project, for both the 
orchestra and the city.
58
 Nevertheless, then-president of the board Lisle Baker, together 
with Louisville Fund president Alexander Booth, approached Whitney in late December 
and told him that the next concert would be the last of the NMP. 
William Schuman’s Judith (1950) 
Unbeknownst to Whitney and the board, the unprecedented success of that last 
1949 commission—William Schuman’s Judith: A Choreographic Poem—would shock 
Louisville audience into at least temporary acceptance and cement the New Music 
Project’s existence for another eight years. Originally conceived for dancer Martha 
Graham, Judith was first proposed by Kain, who believed commissioning a “dance 
concerto” would appeal to both audiences and critics.59 Graham chose Schuman to 
compose the music for her choreography, with each getting equal billing and Graham 
receiving $1000 to Schuman’s $500. Although Graham was hesitant at first to comply 
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with Whitney’s request for a solo dance work that could be performed onstage alongside 
the orchestra, she eventually acquiesced, drafting a “graph of the emotional line which 
she felt the dance should take” and sending it to Schuman, who composed the music 
before ever seeing extended components of the dance itself.
60
  
Graham chose to loosely base her choreography on the ancient tale of Judith, with 
its vivid imagery of a Jewish widow who beheads a tyrannical general, although evidence 
from Schuman’s autograph manuscript suggests that the plot choice came after the music 
had been composed.
61
 Neither the music nor the dance adheres strictly to the plot’s 
structure. Instead, Judith abstractly conveys the anxiety and turmoil experienced by the 
story’s protagonist. As one might expect, the music is evocative and disjunct, opening 
with pulsating strings that are repeatedly interrupted by the brass and percussion. The 
brooding introduction is followed by a scherzo-like middle section, which moves 
between sections of the orchestra in concerto-like fashion. Along with Schuman’s own 
stylistic traits, one can hear the influence of Graham, whose modernist bent is more 
evident in this work than, say, Copland’s Ballet for Martha (1943). The autograph score 
also contains several notes concerning orchestration that once again suggest a substantive 
interaction between composer and orchestra (as well as choreographer and set, costume, 
and lighting designers) that shaped the final artistic product.
62
 Figure 3.4 reproduces the 
title page of the work, which is at once modest and austere.  
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 For the full program note, see Box 197: Programs, 1937–75, Folder: 1949/50, Louisville Orchestra 
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 The title page of the holograph score for Judith, finished on 28 August 1949 and housed in the Library 
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Schuman Papers, Music Division, Library of Congress). 
62
 For the premiere performance of Judith, Graham collaborated with Isamu Noguchi (set design), 
Alexander Calder (costumes), and Jean Rosenthal (lighting). On the bottom of the manuscript’s title page, 
Schuman includes a note that “Bass Cl. And C.Bsn. may be considered optional instruments. If necessary 
  163 
Figure 3.4 Title Page of Schuman and Graham’s Judith (Library of Congress) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
two rather than three players may be used for Picc, FI & II and similarly for Ob. I & II and E.H.” In an 
appended document dated 12 January 1950, only a week after Judith’s premiere, Schuman chose to cut a 
12-bar passage in the winds (originally mm. 144–156), perhaps due to that section’s difficulty and the 
limited ability of the orchestra’s personnel (Ibid.). 
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Due to the untenable financial state of the orchestra prior to Judith’s premiere, 
Whitney addressed the players and asked that they play on despite the very real 
possibility that they would not be paid for their services. Although evidence suggests that 
the import given to Judith for resurrecting the orchestra has been exaggerated, its 
success—and the continued support of both Graham and Schuman—surely helped the 
NMP’s cause.63 Premiered on 4 January 1950 to a sold-out audience, Judith transformed 
“a symphony orchestra program into a contemporary theater dance production” and 
secured the orchestra’s first invitation to Carnegie Hall.64 Three weeks later, Judith was 
broadcast around the country on NBC’s “Pioneers of Music” series, and by March 
Schuman had arranged to have the work commercially recorded and performed in New 
York.  
As president of the Juilliard School, the composer had connected Woolford and 
Whitney to David Hall, friend and Music Director at Mercury Records, with the hope that 
the orchestra might record Judith alongside another one of his works.
65
 Up until this 
point, Whitney had “warded off the Board’s plea for recording because, even if one of the 
big record companies could be interested in [them], he wasn’t satisfied with the technical 
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they are recording my Third symphony next year with Ormandy and the Philadelphia Orchestra” (from a 
letter dated 15 February 1950, reproduced in Box 168: Recording Project Correspondence, Folder: 
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proficiency of the Orchestra. This season, however, … he feels we might really have 
something to offer the record buying public.”66 Schuman agreed, but the orchestra soon 
realized that the costs associated with producing a professional recording were 
prohibitive. In another letter to Schuman, Woolford expressed his concerns: 
I have gone into the costs of a recording session quite exhaustively and 
find that the expenses involved … would be between $3,000 and $4,000. 
To be very frank we are operating on a prayer these days…. We have 
talked with a number of our main fundraisers and they have all agreed that 
the recording would be a wonderful thing. However they are fearful that if 
we go to a number of our big backers now for recording funds, it would 
jeopardize our appeal for the funds we have to secure in order to have an 
orchestra next season. I will tell you confidentially that we have had to cut 
our budget for next season by some $40,000…. For once we are going to 
try to operate on the funds we actually have and not on those we hope to 
get…. In short, an expenditure of $3,000 or $4,000 is out of the question 




Recognizing a tremendous opportunity and refusing to let it slip away, Schuman 
suggested arranging the recording session around a special concert at Carnegie Hall.
68
 
Indeed, Schuman saw the recording as “the most important opportunity for the future of 
[the] orchestra,” and one that should not be ignored.69 
 Despite no clear source of funding for either project, planning for both the 
Carnegie Hall concert and the commercial recording commenced immediately. A team of 
recording engineers traveled to Louisville on 19 and 20 November 1950 to capture 
performances of Judith (conducted by Whitney) and Undertow (conducted by Schuman), 
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 Quoted from a letter written by Woolford to Schuman, dated 11 February 1950 (Ibid.). 
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 Letter dated 14 March 1950, Ibid. 
68
 Schuman was certainly wary that such a large undertaking could also sink the orchestra, noting to 
Woolford that while the concert “might help your budget problem … it might make it worse. That is the 
fun of trying to combine music and business” (letter dated 27 February 1950, Ibid.). 
69
 Schuman’s full telegram to Woolford displays an almost-fatherly concern for the orchestra: “My opinion 
recording most important opportunity for future of orchestra … Gave permission for you to record my 
works after serious consideration … Very disturbed by what seems to me capricious indecision … Have 
worked hard and spent time for your organization and will continue to do so but in all candor my say 
vacillation on recording difficult to accept” (Ibid.). 
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but the orchestra was only able to afford eighty minutes of recording time for over fifty 
minutes of music. Although the recording of Undertow proved adequate, Schuman and 
Hall found the orchestra’s rendition of Judith to be unacceptable for wide release.70 
Mercury offered to record a patch session free of charge during the orchestra’s scheduled 
trip to New York, but the administration would need to find more than $2000 in an 
already depleted budget to pay musicians for their time.
71
 Despite widespread skepticism, 
the orchestra was able to piece together the necessary funds, in part due to the continued 
and selfless support of Schuman and Whitney. Upon learning of the orchestra’s 
predicament, the composer offered to return his conducting fee and insisted on 
purchasing his own tickets to the Carnegie Hall concert.
72
 Whitney did the same, and as I 
will discuss shortly, the Mercury recording was the first of many albums produced under 
the auspices of the NMP. 
 The pursuant concert at Carnegie Hall, scheduled for 29 December 1950, 
presented no less of a challenge to the orchestra, which worked closely with Charles E.  
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 In a telegram dated 28 November 1950, Schuman and Hall disclosed the bad news: “We have spent 
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 As stated in a 30 November 1950 telegram (Ibid.). 
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Figure 3.5 Ad for Carnegie Hall Concert (notice the misspelling of “Claude Almand”)73 
 
 
New York Philharmonic or another national-level orchestra could have repremiered 
Judith, but Schuman and Martha Graham agreed that the Louisville Orchestra must travel 
to New York to perform the work. The composer wrote in the Courier-Journal that, 
although the Louisville Orchestra “never can sound as strong and full as some of the 
mightier Eastern Orchestras, … I’ve never had my works better performed than in 
Louisville. This orchestra gives more study, more real understanding of the works, and if 
you’ll pardon the expression, they give more love to them.”74 Schuman even made sure to 
prepare audiences in New York for the orchestra’s visit, writing in the Christmas Eve 
edition of The New York Times that “there is no question in the minds of those who guide 
the destiny of this orchestra that the health of an art demands continuing nourishment at 
the course—which means creation.”75 This praise was echoed by none other than Charles 
Farnsley, who was invited by The New York Herald-Tribune’s Virgil Thomson to write a 
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 Reproduced in Ibid. 
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 William Schuman, Louisville Courier-Journal, 20 September 1950. 
75
 William Schuman,  “Louisville Policy: Orchestra Has Made Habit of Commissioning Works,” The New 
York Times, 24 December 1950: 47. 
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special piece outlining the orchestra’s unique philosophy and operating principles.76 Thus 
it was no surprise when the orchestra traveled to New York and impressed critics with 
their tenacity, if not their artistry. The concert, which paired Judith with other recent 
commissions by Thomson, Claude Almand, David Diamond, Vincent Persichetti, and 
Bohuslav Martinu,
77
 was deemed a rousing success, prompting critics to shower praise on 
the orchestra’s commitment to new music, which put New York’s own “to shame.”78 
Schuman later wrote a glowing review for Time Magazine, reinforcing his belief that the 




 The unforeseen success of Judith brought unexpected consequences, including 
interest from the U.S. State Department, which began to broadcast the orchestra’s 
performances as a means of combating communist propaganda, which depicted the 
American hinterland “as an uncouth, uncultured, barbaric technocracy.”80 Although the 
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 Charles Farnsley, Article in The New York Herald-Tribune, 24 December 1950. 
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 The full program featured Claude Almand’s John Gilbert: A Steamboat Overture, David Diamond’s 
Timon of Athens—A Symphonic Portrait after Shakespeare, Bohuslav Martinu’s Intermezzo (world 
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appeared in The New York Herald Tribune and The New York Times. 
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 Schuman sent an unabridged version of the article to board president Mary Helen Byck, as editors of the 
magazine shortened the review out of space considerations. To read the full letter, see Box 71: 
Correspondence, 1944–51, Folder: Mrs. Byck (Campaign Committee, 1950–51), Louisville Orchestra 
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 An untitled editorial in the Louisville Courier-Journal dated 30 January 1953 discusses the perhaps 
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America [program], wants the Louisville Orchestra to help combat Communist propaganda abroad. As the 
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(reproduced in Box 141: Commissioning Project, File: State Department—United States Information 
Agency (1951–54), Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville Archives). 
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work itself was never intended as a political statement, its subsequent politicization by 
the federal government indicates the cultural heft afforded to orchestral repertoire and 
institutions in the mid-twentieth century. Yet while audiences abroad were singing the 
orchestra’s praises, local patrons sang a different tune. Despite the fact that newly 
commissioned music took up only one-fifth of most concert programs—a detail 
stipulated in the commissioning contracts—Louisvillians found it difficult to accept new 
music in such concentrated doses. Although standard orchestral repertoire was still 
performed on most concerts, with the lack of another professional ensemble in town and 
the limited number of concerts given by the Louisville Orchestra, conservative audience 
members found themselves trapped. According to one anonymous patron,  
For several years now, the Louisville Orchestra and contemporary 
composers have had a very pleasant working relationship…. We have 
never questioned the validity of the Louisville Orchestra playing 
contemporary music…. We do maintain, however, that it is time for 
Robert Whitney and his cohort to re-examine the orchestra’s responsibility 
to its audience…. Let Robert Whitney and his board of directors be 
warned.  The first result of such a loss of faith will be a withdrawal of 





A local music critic echoed these sentiments, remarking that “despite its international 
fame, the Louisville Orchestra is in much the same predicament as the prophet not  
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 Anonymous Letter to the Editor, Louisville Courier-Journal, 13 February 1952. This letter was likely 
written in response to another anonymous letter published less than a week earlier, which defended the 
orchestra’s support of new music, arguing that “very few people limit their reading to classical literature.  If 
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appreciation?”  Given the language used, the author was very likely Whitney himself (Louisville Courier-
Journal, 8 February 1952). 
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without honor save in his own country.”82 
 The orchestra’s own administration was once again split on how best to combat 
the local apathy surrounding the commissioning project. Richard H. Wangerin, who had 
replaced Woolford as the orchestra’s manager in 1952, noted that “in contrast to other 
cities, [our audiences] do not complain about the programming of a contemporary work 
but rather advance their opinion of the work itself and its appeal or lack of appeal.”83 
Indeed, Whitney and his supporters saw the NMP as both an artistic and civic 
achievement that helped to shape the country’s taste for new music. With Farnsley’s 
continued guidance, they hoped to leverage recent developments in sound recording 
technology to attract new audiences, create sustainable revenue streams, and place the 
orchestra on stable organizational footing once and for all. Other members of the board 
insisted that the NMP—and the orchestra more generally—could not truly succeed 
without substantial support from within its own community. Indeed, more than one board 
member believed that the orchestra “should be able to sell 1000 tickets in Louisville … or 
else quit.”84 If the orchestra’s commitment to new music was to continue, it would first 
have to reconcile its vision, as laid out by Whitney and Farnsley, with the practical 
realities of the symphonic world.  
The Rockefeller Foundation Pledges its Support, 1953–58 
 Although the remarkable success of Judith helped to raise the Louisville 
Orchestra’s reputation among the country’s musical elite, financial insolvency continued 
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 William Mootz. “First Year of Rockefeller Commission Series Has Put Louisville Orchestra on World 
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to plague its day-to-day operations. Only a year after its greatest triumph, the orchestra 
“was having money troubles again. [We] barely squeaked through the office payroll on 
the 15
th…. His Honor [Charles Farnsley] is out now trying to squeeze funds out of 
various firms and individuals. It certainly seems like old times.”85 One of the firms 
Farnsley approached was the Rockefeller Foundation, which had expressed interest in the 
NMP as early as September 1952. In November of that year, the orchestra presented 
some new program ideas to John Marshall, associate director of the Foundation’s 
Humanities Division, and by February they were invited to submit a formal funding 
proposal.
86
 That proposal, drafted by Farnsley and vetted by Marshall, Virgil Thomson, 
and others, was as unprecedented as it was audacious, asking for $400,356 to drastically 
expand the scope of the NMP and fund an extensive recording project with Columbia 
Records. The most recent arts-related grant bestowed by the Rockefeller Foundation had 
come in 1939 for Serge Koussevitzky’s Berkshire Music Festival, and amounted only to 
$60,000—less than a sixth of amount requested by Louisville. Thomson, who was of 
course an early proponent of the commissioning project, opined that the orchestra’s 
proposal 
Seems to [be] most intelligently conceived, and certainly Mayor Farnsley 
is capable of making it work. I can find no flaw in it. It seems to me 
designed to strengthen the weakest element in the contemporary music 
scene … and also to strengthen the symphony orchestra at its weakest 
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 Excerpted from a 16 February 1951 letter from Woolford to board president Mary Helen Byck (Box 71: 
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On 3 April 1953, after months of behind-the-scenes negotiations, Farnsley was once 
again able to accomplish what no one else could, securing the future of the New Music 
Project with a groundbreaking $400,000 gift from the Rockefeller Foundation.
88
  
 The massive grant, to be used over a four-year period, led to a 300% growth in the 
orchestra’s annual budget, allowing musician salaries to skyrocket and inspiring a marked 
improvement in artistic quality.
89
 The grant proposal itself suggests that those in charge 
of managing the orchestra and the commissioning project had taken a great deal of care in 
thinking about how best to sell the project to funders and audiences. In Farnsley’s own 
words, 
The purpose of the project [was] to foster the creation of musical works by 
contemporary composers; to stimulate interest in the creative aspects of 
music; to add to the library of existing music; to insure commissioned 
music the repeated hearings necessary for the proper assimilation of new 
compositions; to make such new music available for enjoyment by the free 
world, and to inform the free world of progressive action in America in the 
music field.
90
   
 
Indeed, the document makes an insightful argument for self-sufficiency, outlining how 
the orchestra planned to make the project financially and artistically sustainable over 
time. 
 According to the proposal, up to forty-six works would be commissioned each 
year by a small committee consisting of Whitney, Dwight Anderson, and Gerhard Herz, a 
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musicologist from the University of Louisville. Minutes from the committee’s informal 
meetings provide a fascinating lens into how decisions were made and why certain 
composers were chosen over others (see Figure 3.6). Once completed, each new 
commission would be rehearsed and performed four times over the course of a month on 
weekly Saturday matinee concerts, increasing both potential ticket sales and audience 
familiarity with the new works while providing gainful employment to orchestra 
musicians for an expanded 46-week season.
91
 Each matinee concert would consist of 
three recently commissioned works and a new world premiere, ensuring four public 
readings of every commission and “thereby ensuring each new work the repeated 
hearings so necessary for … proper assimilation.”92 Twelve of the forty-six works were 
to be composed by students, and a third of the remaining commissions were to be written 
by non-U.S.-based composers. Each composer would continue to be paid $1000 per 
commission ($500 for students), though the Rockefeller funds allowed for an additional 
$200 to prepare orchestra parts.
93
 After receiving at least four performances, newly 
commissioned works would then be recorded by Columbia Records and distributed to 
audiences around the world.   
 
 
                                                 
91
 The practice of offering multiple performances of new works, while novel, was rooted in an earlier 
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Financial success hinged largely on the recording component of the project, which 
aimed to sell one thousand recording subscriptions at $65 apiece (nearly $525 in 2010 
dollars) and served as an implicit strategies to overcome the economic challenges 
associated with such an expansive program.
95
 Farnsley estimated that record 
subscriptions would grow from 1000 to 4000 between 1954 and 1958, and the revenue 
produced—over $260,000— would be augmented by a yearly “Best Of” disc that would 
be marketed on Columbia’s national label, selling upwards of 10,000 copies. The overall 
financial plan purported to transform the project into a self-sustaining venture, aiming to 
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shrink contributions from the Rockefeller Foundation and other supporters by $180,000 
over the course of four years by increasing revenue through record sales.
97
 These 
speculations were based on a widely held assumption that “An over-supply or exhaustion 
of the classical repertoire can never happen … [and] the field of modern music hasn’t 
been touched. New talent in coming as well as in performing [is] constantly coming up. 
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All these mean ever-fresh markets.”98 As I discuss later in this chapter, however, these 
projections were not only idealistic but grossly inaccurate, resulting in an unenviable 
financial shortfall that the Rockefeller Foundation had internally predicted.
99
  
 Nevertheless, the sheer quantity of new artistic work produced under the auspices 
of the NMP is staggering. During the ten-year lifespan of the project, 137 works were 
commissioned and premiered by the orchestra, and no fewer than 111 were recorded (see 
Figure 6.1 and 6.2 in the Appendix for a full list of commissioned and recorded 
works).
100
 It is important to note that only 59 of the commissions were funded by the 
Rockefeller Foundation grant; the rest were commissioned independently, and thus were 
featured on the orchestra’s evening subscription series. Figure 3.8 provides a breakdown 
of how the orchestra’s programming strategies changed over the course of the New 
Music Project (please note that only subscription programming is considered here, and 
thus data from the Rockefeller-funded matinee series is not incorporated). The orchestra’s 
first full season (1937–38) is represented in the table, as is the last season before the 
NMP (1947–48), the first season of the project (1948–49), and the years surrounding the 
project’s eventual decline in 1958. I have also included relevant data from the orchestra’s 
2009–10 season, as well as the national averages computed by orchestra historian John  
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Figure 3.8 Breakdown of Louisville Orchestra Subscription Concert Programming 
  1937-38 1947-48 1948–49 1957–58 1958–59 1959–60 2009–10 
U.S. Average 
(1945) 
Period                 
Baroque 1 (3%) 3 (9%) 2 (8%) 2 (9%) 2 (10%) 3 (13%)     
Classical 4 (14%) 2 (6%) 2 (8%) 1 (4%) 2 (10%) 2 (9%) 4 (13.8%)   
Romantic 16 (55%) 19 (56%)  13 (50%) 12 (52%) 8 (40%) 10 (43%) 9 (31.0%)   
Twentieth Century 8 (28%) 10 (29%) 3 (12%) 2 (9%) 1 (5%) 2 (9%) 15 (51.7%)              ~15%  
Commission/Premiere     6 (22%) 6 (26%) 6 (30%)     
Previous Commission         1 (5%) 6 (26%) 1 (3.4%)    
                  
Composer 
Nationality                 
Austro-German 14 (48%) 21 (64%) 10 (35%) 11 (52%) 10 (50%) 8 (36%) 11 (37.9%) 52% 
Russian 2 (7%) 3 (9%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 3 (15%)   3 (10.3%) 15% 
French 5 (18%)   1 (4%) 2 (9%)   4 (17%) 2 (6.9%) 13% 
Italian 3 (10%)   5 (19%)   3 (15%) 4 (17%) 3 (10.3%) 9% 
American 4 (14%) 4 (12%) 4 (15%) 5 (22%) 2 (10%) 5 (22%) 5 (17.2%) 5% 
English   2 (6%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%)   1 (4%)  2% 
Other 1 (3%) 3 (9%) 5 (19%) 2 (9%) 2 (10%) 1 (4%) 5 (17.2%) 4% 
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Mueller in 1945.
101
 Besides the obvious increase in newly commissioned works, it is 
difficult to decipher any other major shifts in the orchestra’s programming. Perhaps most 
interestingly, the newly commissioned compositions did not detract from the 
performance of nineteenth-century masterworks, but instead replaced performances of 
earlier twentieth-century works by Stravinsky, Bartók, and others. And, while the NMP 
reached its peak in the 1950s during the height of American composers’ fascination with 
serialism, the works commissioned represented a diverse array of styles and traditions, 
and many were composed in a neo-tonal vein.
102
 In a letter to Dutch composer Henk 
Badings regarding the desired aesthetic of commissioned works, Whitney insisted that, 
“though we do have some experimental pieces, [we] are not deliberately searching for 
them. Since the recording of your work will make it available, we hope, to a large 
audience, it would seem to me that fact might be borne in mind.”103 
 The NMP might thus be understood as a reflection of the tension enacted between 
new music and the functional realities of the American orchestra, which was not exempt 
from the basic laws of supply and demand determined by concertgoers. Yet despite 
continued pushback from listeners, several NMP commissions went on to garner critical 
and popular appeal. Audiences cheered Aaron Copland’s Orchestral Variations (1957, 
based on his 1930 Piano Variations) and applauded the dissonant premiere of Lukas 
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Foss’ A Parable of Death, although it took two back-to-back performances to convince 
listeners of the work’s merit.104 More than a few prominent composers—including 
Samuel Barber, Leonard Bernstein, Ernest Bloch, Benjamin Britten, Howard Hanson, 
Carl Orff, Francis Poulenc, and Igor Stravinsky—expressed interest in the project but 
declined commissions due to scheduling conflicts.
105
 Conductors also recognized the 
extraordinary achievements of Whitney and his orchestra. Dimitri Mitropoulos of the 
New York Philharmonic wrote to congratulate the orchestra on its “unique achievements 
in Louisville … which have had repercussions all over the world,”106 and in a letter dated 
21 January 1953, Whitney remarked to his coconspirator Charles Farnsley that “our new 
works are no longer accepted in the spirit of tolerant resignation but with a marked 
degree of anticipation and in many cases real enthusiasm.”107 This shift was paralleled by 
a significant uptick in the orchestra’s artistic profile, prompting Down Beat magazine to 
name Louisville the “Best Minor Orchestra in America.”108  
First Edition and the End of the NMP 
 Despite these impressive accomplishments, the NMP proved too expansive and 
radical to last. The orchestra was confronted with an overextended operating model that 
was ill equipped to reconcile the significant costs associated with commissioning and 
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wrote that, “Between you, me and the lamppost, I know that the offer is not attractive enough for him. I 
tried to do my best, but I failed completely. He is not interested in coming to Louisville”  (Box 141: 
Commissioning Project Records, Folder: Commissions Refused, 1948–58, Louisville Orchestra Collection 
(#76–017), University of Louisville). 
106
 Undated letter in Robert Whitney’s papers, University of Louisville Archives. 
107
 January 1953, Robert Whitney papers, University of Louisville Archives. 
108
 According to the poll, the “Best Major Orchestras” were Philadelphia, Boston, and NBC (in that order), 
while the “Best Minor Orchestras” consisted of Louisville, Houston, and Pittsburgh.  Thanks to Nathan 
Platte for bringing this reference to my attention (“Classics Poll,” Down Beat Magazine, 3 June 1953). 
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recording new works. The economic realities of the NMP were magnified by the 
orchestra’s nonprofit structure, which relied on a relatively stagnant donor base to cover 
the ever-increasing costs associated with live performance. Less than a year after the 
Rockefeller Foundation grant was initiated, it became clear that, even with marginal 
increases in patron satisfaction, the costs associated with commissioning and recording 
new works continued to be prohibitive.  
 Despite reports to the contrary, attendance at the orchestra’s Saturday matinee 
series hovered between 100 and 200 audience members—less than one fifth the number 
predicted in Farnsley’s Rockefeller proposal.109 Figure 3.9 displays a sales report from a 
typical matinee concert, reporting only $30.30 in ticket sales from 67 patrons. The 
revenue stream provided by the orchestra’s recording series was just as disappointing, 
producing less than $800 in royalties during the first half of 1954.
110
 As of October 12, 
the orchestra had only sold 91 subscriptions, prompting the board to admit that “the 
results … have been so disappointing as to seriously imperil the series and in less than 
four years it could die of its own weight.”111 The paucity of local support was especially 
 
                                                 
109
 Farnsley predicted attendance would rise from 300 to 900 over the course of the Rockefeller 
Foundation grant period (Box 207: Correspondence with the Rockefeller Foundation, 1952–66, Folder: 
Rockefeller Foundation Proposal (Appendix D), Louisville Orchestra Collection (#80–113), University of 
Louisville Archives). Actual attendance numbers were variously reported in the popular media (see, for 
example, William Nootz. “First Year of Rockefeller Commission Series Has Put Louisville Orchestra on 
World Music Map,” The Louisville Courier-Journal, 26 December 1954). These statistics were often 
exaggerated, with one local advocate going so far as to suggest that “more persons paid to hear the 
Louisville Orchestra’s music this year than paid to see the University of Louisville’s basketball team” 
(Richard Harwood, undated Louisville Times clipping from 1954–55, in Robert Whitney’s papers, 
University of Louisville Archives). 
110
 Announced at a 10 September 1954 board meeting (Box 81 Correspondence, 1954-55, Folder: Board 
Minutes, 1954, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville Archives). 
111
 Concerns voiced at a 12 October 1954 board meeting (Ibid.). 
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astounding, with only ten records purchased by Louisville residents.
113
 By early 1955, 
less than twelve months into the Rockefeller grant period, it had become clear that the 
allotted funds would cover only two years of the project’s operating costs. 
                                                 
112
 Reproduced in Box 142: Commissioning Project, Folder: Ticket Reports, Saturday Series (Jan. 2, 1954–
Dec. 15, 1956), Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville. 
113
 This figure does not include the fourteen orders received from orchestra board members, staff, and 
musicians (Ibid.). 
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 Despite inspiring new artistic accomplishments and positive press, the NMP was 
once again at a crossroads. Whitney feared the organizational consequences of a potential 
collapse: 
The termination of the project will cause the orchestra and it’s [sic] 
performances to suffer materially. If we go back to 5 pair of concerts a 
year we will lose some of our better players. One important aspect of the 
project is that by playing and recording this much music we do have a 




The project’s termination would endanger more than just the artistic wellbeing of the 
orchestra, however. Farnsley and other members of the board believed that they benefited 
from the government’s use of Louisville recordings as a political tool. Indeed, if the 
project was to end, they feared it would “give the communists a most potent anti-U.S. 
propaganda weapon.”115 National security concerns aside, many observers remained 
invested in the successful continuation of the NMP.  
 By mid-March, Charles Fahs of the Rockefeller Foundation voiced his own 
concerns regarding the project’s sustainability in a letter to Richard Wangerin: 
I do not wish to add to your problems, but I think I should say that at some 
time before your next budget is submitted to us we should appreciate 
having some sort of summary statement from you as to where you think 
you stand with regard to the four-year project. The accounting is 
complicated, and I realize that some of the anticipated income is deferred. 
My general impression, however, is that your income has been far from 
coming up to expectations and despite very real effort at your end, the 
deficits are running at a level which raises some question as to your ability 
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 Taken from the minutes of a 15 February 1955 board meeting (Box 84 Correspondence, 1955–56, 
Folder: Board Minutes, 1955, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville 
Archives). 
115
 Minutes from 15 March 1955 board meeting (Ibid.). 
116
 Letter dated 14 March 1955, reproduced in Box 207: Correspondence with the Rockefeller Foundation, 
1952–66, Folder: Correspondence w/Rockefeller Fndn., April 1953–Sept. 1955, Louisville Orchestra 
Collection (#80–113), University of Louisville Archives. 
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Wangerin’s response confirmed Fahs’ anxiety; with more than two-and-a-half years left 
in the original grant cycle, the orchestra had spent nearly $325,000 in Rockefeller 
funds.
117
 As it had done countless times before, the orchestra’s board approached “the 
only person who [could] make the project succeed.”118 Charles Farnsley had continued to 
cast a long shadow over the orchestra and the NMP in particular, but the board felt that 
his day-to-day leadership was necessary if the orchestra was to survive its current crisis. 
Although he at first refused their request to become board president, Farnsley eventually 




 First, he dissolved the orchestra’s partnership with Columbia, choosing instead to 
record commissioned works on an independent label cleverly titled First Edition. The 
orchestra had for some time been “receiving a number of complaints about the quality of 
the records,”120 and faithful subscribers alleged that Louisville was being “victimized by 
some of Columbia’s usual poor mixture or pressing techniques.”121 To launch First 
                                                 
117
 Wangerin went on to insist that, “although it may sound premature, … we already feel that the results 
have demonstrated very graphically that the project was a worthy one and the money, time and effort 
expended definitely worthwhile” (from a letter dated 24 March 1955, Ibid.). 
118
 Quoted from the minutes of a 11 April 1955 board meeting (Box 84: Correspondence, 1955-56, Folder: 
Board Minutes (1955), Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville Archives. 
119
 In an unprecedented step, the board “declined to accept the statement of Mr. Charles P. Farnsley, that 
he is unable to serve as President of the Society; that the Board of Directors hereby go on record as 
earnestly urging Mr. Farnsley to reconsider; and that a Committee be appointed to wait on Mr. Farnsley and 
impress upon him these desires of the Board that he accept this nomination as President.” Unfortunately for 
the orchestra, Farnsley resigned on 11 November 1955, soon after he had secured a second grant from the 
Rockefeller Foundation (Ibid.). 
120
 Quoting a letter (dated 1 April 1955) from Wangerin to Elinor Adler, secretary at Columbia (Box 83: 
Correspondence, 1954–55, Folder: Columbia Records, 1954–55, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–
017), University of Louisville Archives). 
121
 Taken from a letter written by Michael H. Levy of New York on 19 July 1955 (reproduced in Box 84: 
Correspondence, 1955–56, Folder: Columbia Records, 1955–56, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–
017), University of Louisville Archives). 
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Edition and continue commissioning new works, Farnsley was convinced that the 
orchestra needed the Rockefeller Foundation’s continued support. By his own estimation, 
The original plan contained two mistakes in judgment or miscalculations, 
namely a) the time factor was not accurately understood, with the result 
that expenditures have preceded anticipated income by about a one year 
period … [and] b) The system of selling may have been a stumbling block 
to the making of more sales. A resistance has been shown by the buying 
public to either paying $65.00 for the set or making a commitment for 12 




In a supplementary proposal to the Foundation, Farnsley requested an additional 
$100,000 to continue the project on a reduced scale, producing six instead of twelve 
records per year and commissioning twenty-three new works each of the next two 
seasons.
123
 The Foundation obliged, and the grant was announced at a 1955 Music Critics 
Workshop that was held in Louisville and included a lengthy consideration of the 
problems, successes, and failures of the commissioning project.
124
 En masse, the half 
million dollars provided by Rockefeller included $25,000 for advertising, $94,000 for 
commissioning, $166,000 for musician salaries, $190,000 for recording, and $25,000 for 
other expenses associated with the NMP.
125
  
 Despite such significant levels of support, however, the final Rockefeller grant 
served as much as an admission of failure as a vote of confidence in the orchestra’s 
vision. We can see this through a series of letters between Farnsley and the grant 
administrators at Rockefeller, which suggest through their tone, if not their content, that 
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 Excerpted from the orchestra’s second proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation (reproduced in Box 207: 
Correspondence with the Rockefeller Foundation, 1952–66, Folder: Correspondence w/Rockefeller Fndn., 




 Harold C. Schonberg, “Louisville Group Gets $100,00 Gift,” The New York Times, 8 October 1955: 13.   
125
 Final Report to the Rockefeller Foundation (1959), Louisville Orchestra Collection, University of 
Louisville Archives. It should be noted that these funds did little to cover the orchestra’s normal operating 
costs.  In fact, activities associated with the Rockefeller grant were represented in a separate audit from 
1954 until 1962, suggesting an ideological as well as a practical division between the New Music Project 
and the orchestra itself. 
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the foundation was losing faith in the NMP as it was initially conceived. After a meeting 
in New York between Farnsley, board member B. Hudson Milner, and the Rockefeller 
Foundation staff, the following telegram was sent to those waiting in Louisville: “No 
question arose as to a commitment that we would not approach the Foundation again.  
However I must admit that the atmosphere led me to believe that the Humanities Division 
was expecting to look elsewhere for places to put available moneys after this potential 
grant.”126 The orchestra’s most substantial supporters gradually came to the same 
conclusion that the Louisville public had reached long ago: the NMP was an 
unsustainable venture, and despite their best efforts, Whitney and the board could “only 
sell the orchestra and its reputation for playing modern music and not the music itself.”127  
 Starting in 1960–61, the orchestra discontinued the practice of recording newly 
commissioned works, choosing instead to focus on previously-written contemporary 
music that had never been commercially recorded. This expanded the possible repertoire 
immediately available to the orchestra while maintaining the project’s connection with 
new music, leading to acclaimed recordings of Benjamin Britten’s Violin Concerto no. 1, 
William Schuman’s orchestration of Ives’ Variations on America, and the First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eight symphonies of Walter Piston.
 
Yet for all of the diversity represented 
throughout the recording project, certain marginalized communities continued to be 
woefully underrepresented. For instance, out of the 400-plus works recorded by the 
orchestra, only a few were composed by women, including Priscilla McLean and Joyce 
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 Facsimile of telegram located in Box 207: Correspondence with the Rockefeller Foundation, 1952–66, 
Folder: Correspondence w/Rockefeller Fndn., April 1953–Sept. 1955, Louisville Orchestra Collection 
(#80–113), University of Louisville Archives). 
127
 Quoting Mr. Burke from a 9 December 1955 board meeting (Box 84: Correspondence, 1955–56, 
Folder: Board Minutes (1955), Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville 
Archives). 
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McKeel. In 1972, the recordings were produced in stereo for the first time, and in 1999, 
five decades after the original recording project had begun, Louisville remastered and 
released select First Edition recordings on compact disc.   
 Upon an aural examination of Louisville’s recording catalogue, one can hear the 
orchestra’s steady artistic improvement. Few if any ensembles could boast the extensive 
contemporary repertoire that Whitney and his orchestra had accumulated, and such 
concentrated exposure to new music kept players flexible and attentive.
128
 Even with the 
appointment of concertmaster Sydney Harth as assistant conductor, Whitney continued to 
conduct the majority of commissioned works, learning literally hundreds of new scores 
and earning the reputation of new music specialist.
129
 Whitney’s passion for 
contemporary compositions extended well beyond the technical, however. He continued 
to advocate on behalf of the NMP and its intrinsic value, pointing out that 
There [is] no one in the community qualified to pass judgment on a work 
of music from the score. A musical work … must be heard if it is to be 
accepted or not, just as a painting must be seen or a book read to be 
judged. This creates a musical adventure for the audience. The critical 
opinion of the musical fraternity of the world is highly complementary of 
our commissioned works. Only Louisville criticizes. We have been 





Yet no matter how unflinchingly Whitney fought to secure the legacy of the 
commissioning project, local critics and audiences accustomed to more traditional fare. 
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 According to minutes from an 11 November 1955 board meeting, “While we are criticized for playing 
so much modern music, this is the factor that has made the Orchestra so much better. Dr. [Paul Henry] 
Lang of the New York Herald Tribune told Mr. Whitney that he had just returned from Europe and only 
one orchestra [there] plays contemporary music as well as the Louisville Orchestra” (Ibid.). 
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 One can get a unique perspective into Whitney’s preparation process by perusing his conducting scores, 
which carry remarkably little annotation (see Boxes 1–14, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#86–4–2>5), 
University of Louisville Archives). 
130
 Box 89: Correspondence, 1957–58, Folder: Board Minutes (1957), Louisville Orchestra Collection 
(#76–017), University of Louisville Archives. 
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forced the orchestra to scale back its commitment to contemporary music and revisit 
traditional programming.
132
 Private philanthropy, coupled with the perseverance of a few 
exceptional individuals, allowed the orchestra to experiment in its search for a new 
artistic model, but they did not guarantee a solution to the challenges embedded in the 
structure of the modern symphony orchestra. Thus in 1958, Louisville stopped actively 
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 Published in the Washington Times–Herald, 26 December 1953. 
132
 This issue was addressed explicitly at a 10 June 1957 board meeting, when an article by William Mootz 
concerning the orchestra’s “obsession” with new music was discussed: “It was felt that while the general 
tone of the article was too critical of the commissioning project, certain suggestions were valid and should 
be given consideration…. A general discussion was held … concerning the possibility of adding a third 
concert on Friday to the regular Wednesday evening and Thursday matinee series. This concert would be 
identical in program with the two preceding ones except that the commissioned work would be omitted 
from the Friday evening concert and a standard work would be substituted” (Ibid.). 
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commissioning new works, and by the early 1960s the last of the Rockefeller grant had 
been exhausted (Figure 3.11 shows the “arc” of the commissioning project’s history).133 
Ten years after the NMP had been hatched by Charles Farnsley in an innocuous meeting 
with Robert Whitney, it faded away not with a bang but with a whimper; not even the 
local newspaper covered its demise.  
Legacies and Lessons Learned  
In an article dated 15 October 1955, Harold Schonberg, eminent critic for the The 
New York Times, summed up the strengths and weaknesses of the New Music Project: 
Louisville has a problem. Any sales representative of a major record 
company would have laughed out loud at the mere possibility of selling 
enough sets of modern music, at $65 a set, to begin to approach the sum of 
money desired.  To say that the Louisville officials were a little naïve 
would be the understatement of the year…. On the other hand—and when 
discussing modern music there always is another hand—the actual merit 
of the music in question is less important than the fact that the composer 
has had a forum…. Whatever the final result, Louisville can glory in a 
stand well taken.  Those responsible for the idea have fought the good 





Schonberg was not alone in his support of Louisville’s “fight” for artistic 
progress.
135
 Indeed, the legacy of the NMP is two-fold. While the most obvious  
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 A financial audit by Escott, Grogan & Co. shows that, by 1958, the orchestra’s reported income 
($42,382.53 earned, $88,760.00) had been reduced to levels below the first year of the commissioning 
project (see Figure 3.3) (Box 1: Audits 1934–66, Folder: Audit: March 31, 1958, Louisville Orchestra 
Archives (#76–017), University of Louisville Archives). 
134
 Harold C. Schonberg, “Noble Effort: Louisville Does its Best for Modern Music,” The New York Times, 
15 October 1955: x9. 
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 In a remarkable piece that likely served as an explicit “answer” to Schonberg’s article the day prior, 
musicologist Paul Henry Lang wrote: “It is clear that when led by able musicians and civic-minded 
administrators, our public is remarkably responsive, but its responsiveness must not be overtaxed.  As long 
as most of the youth of the country receives a musical education that all but ignores the march of time, any 
music that is more or less beyond the experience of adult concertgoers must be introduced with 
considerable care; the amount of dosage becomes an important factor…. Perhaps on the basis of the 
excellent results obtained, a new policy could be inaugurated by which several orchestra in the country 
would share in the grant to boost their activities in this field. The commissioned works should be played on 
the regular concerts and not to special audiences” (Paul Henry Lang, “Experiment in Kentucky,” New York 
Herald Tribune, 16 October 1955). 
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Figure 3.11 Louisville Orchestra Premieres (not including student works)
136
 
Season # of Premieres American European Other 
1948–49 6 3 3 0 
1949–50 5 4 1 0 
1950–51 5 3 2 0 
1951–52 5 4 0 1 
1952–53 3 2 0 1 
1953–54 27 16 7 4 
1954–55 30 12 14 4 
1955–56 15 6 6 3 
1956–57 7 5 1 1 
1957–58 7 4 1 2 
1958–59 6 1 3 2 
          
TOTAL: 116 60 38 18 
    51.70% 32.80% 15.50% 
 
 
lesson learned may be that the patronage of new music by a small, regional orchestra is 
futile, the story presented above also suggests the inherent value embedded in the work of 
the Louisville Orchestra, which provided a distinct kind of social good to local and 
international communities of listeners. By supporting contemporary composers, the 
orchestra helped to generate a significant anthology of new music while urging audiences 
to stretch their ears, even if they did not want to.  
 The contested relationship between contemporary music and the symphony 
orchestra is reflected throughout this history, and was addressed by Richard Wangerin in 
the following letter to a patron who had previously expressed disillusionment with the 
orchestra’s experimental practices:  
It is a curious thing to me that the concert hall represents vitually [sic] the 
only place where the contemporary is actively opposed. We demand the 
contemporary in theater…. We buy current literature…. But in music so 
many of us want only the old masters. I suspect it stems at least in part 
                                                 
136
 This table shows that the commissioning project reached its zenith in the mid-1950s and never achieved 
its proposed goal of 34 non-student (46 total) works each year. Contrary to popular belief, the project was 
not intended to focus solely on American composers, a fact that is born out in the data presented above. 
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from our lack of real knowledge of music and our fear of displaying 





We cannot know for sure whether Whitney, Farnsley, and the rest of the architects of the 
NMP viewed the project as a means of institutionalizing new music or rather as an 
experiment in the artistic re-branding of what was otherwise a typical regional 
performing arts ensemble. Whatever the intention, it seems clear that the orchestra’s 
complexity as both a cultural and political entity made it difficult, if not impossible, to 
navigate a new artistic identity within the economic and organizational realities of mid-
century America. 
 This paradox concerning the impact of the NMP continues today. Wayne Brown, 
who served as executive director for the orchestra in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
points out that, independent of any tension with audiences, the NMP “has been a great 
resource for other orchestras and conductors. Kurt Masur used [the orchestra’s] library 
while he was in New York; the recordings themselves were more about documentation. 
The Louisville Orchestra served as a laboratory for the industry.”138 This was apparent as 
early as the 1960s, by which time over seventy orchestras in the U.S. and forty orchestras 
abroad had performed at least one Louisville commission; many performed more, with 
the New York Philharmonic presenting fifteen NMP compositions by February 1961.
139
 
Yet as the economic conditions necessary to try and preserve a meaningful presence in 
the community could no longer be based on new music, the orchestra required a vision 
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 From an undated letter to Nat Baron, a subscriber to the orchestra’s record series (reproduced in Box 
201: Records Relating to the Philharmonic Society, 1937–68, Folder: Louisville Philharmonic Society 
Correspondence, 1959–64, Louisville Orchestra Collection (#76–017), University of Louisville Archives). 
138
 Excerpt from a phone interview with Wayne Brown, current Program Director for the National 
Endowment for the Arts, 11 March 2010. 
139
 Data from a list compiled on 1 February 1961, presumably for internal purposes (Robert Whitney 
Papers, University of Louisville Archives). 
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that attracted broader community support. There is considerable evidence that suggests 
orchestral audiences have a historical aversion to new music, no matter what type of 
engagement strategies are used. Any exceptions to this rule are remarkable indeed, and 
deserve further study. 
The orchestra’s current administration has attempted to embrace and celebrate the 
legacy of the NMP while moving in a new direction to understand and connect with the 
Louisville community.
140
 In March of 2010, an article detailing the rediscovery of the 
First Edition masters appeared in the Louisville Courier-Journal,
141
 and later that year, an 
independent documentary titled Music Makes a City was released at select theatres, 
sharing the remarkable success of the NMP and its cache of composers with a new 
generation of listeners.
142
 How this story speaks to the challenges of twenty-first century 
orchestras is particularly interesting, considering the unprecedented turmoil surrounding 
Louisville’s recent bankruptcy filing and musician lockout.143 
 To conclude, I would like to revisit the multifaceted legacy of the commissioning 
project as it pertains to the broader history of the symphony orchestra. Although the NMP 
has traditionally been described as an inexplicable aberration that achieved unequivocal 
success, it might instead be thought of as a collage of several overlapping projects. What 
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 According to CEO Robert Birman, “the success of the commissioning project ended in the mid 1960s.  
It was going downhill quickly. The sales of recordings were declining, and shortly after Robert Whitney 
left, people were sick of new music.  When Jorge Mester came, he recorded new works, but never 
presented them to audiences” (phone interview with Robert Birman, 12 February 2010).   
141
 The masters were found in the basement of famed music producer Andrew Kazdin, who had been 
keeping them since the 1970s (Andrew Adler, “The Memory Keeper: Orchestra Gets Back its Recorded 
History,” Louisville Courier-Journal, 22 March 2010). 
142
 For a review of the film, see Rick Schultz, “Music Makes a City: A Film About a Little Orchestra That 




 For a detailed discussion of the Louisville Orchestra’s most recent attempt at organizational change, 
which includes recruiting non-union musicians to replace those on strike, see chapter 5. 
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began as a self-funded experiment in commissioning new music later developed into a 
recording initiative that aided fundraising, improved working conditions, and raised the 
artistic and organizational reputation of the Louisville Orchestra, ultimately serving as a 
prototype for other performing arts organizations including the American Composers 
Orchestra, Naxos, and countless independent ensembles. Indeed, the work of Robert 
Whitney and Charles Farnsley challenged the function of orchestras and their relationship 
to new music and proved that through leadership and imagination, energy and 
persistence, something remarkable can be achieved.  
 Yet in the face of a growing international reputation, the NMP began to ostracize 
and alienate its own community, ignoring local tastes in favor of international press. The 
orchestra attempted to skirt the economic challenges it encountered by implementing a 
project that valued high visibility and foundation funding over audience support. In the 
face of declining ticket sales, the Rockefeller grants allowed the orchestra to grow 
artistically and organizationally, transforming a struggling regional orchestra into a 
vibrant producer of new music —a solution that proved unsustainable. Ultimately, this 
story highlights a tension surrounding the orchestra’s dual function as a cultural 
institution: shaping taste through artistic innovation and responding to taste in an effort to 
appease audiences. The implications of these findings reach beyond the history of one 
orchestra, and shed light on how musical patronage, repertoire, and artistic reputation are 
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Chapter Four                                                                                                              
Music For Whose Good?: El Sistema in America 
Introduction 
 In the summer and fall of 2007, an orchestra consisting of nearly 200 Venezuelan 
youth traveled across the western world and back again, performing to sold out houses in 
London (BBC Proms, Royal Albert Hall), New York (Carnegie Hall), Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Boston, and Berlin, Germany. Led by charismatic conductor and ensemble 
alumnus Gustavo Dudamel, the Simón Bolivar Youth Orchestra took the classical music 
world by storm, receiving unending praise for its uncanny ability to move and sound as a 
“single inspired body.”1 In stark contrast to the somber and often predictable 
performances orchestra audiences have come to expect, these young people danced, 
smiled, and waved, bending traditional definitions of artistic excellence through a sense 
of joy and community that is rarely present in contemporary practice. Moreover, the 
group boasted an impressive degree of artistic maturity that rivaled some of the top 
professional orchestras in America. The following scene was recounted by one New York 
critic: 
At the conclusion of the first concert, the players changed into bright 
jackets in the colors of the Venezuelan flag and launched into a trio of 
Latin-American themed pieces…. Trumpets were raised to the sky, cellists 
twirled their instruments, and whole sections stood and danced while 
playing—all without missing a beat. The audience went wild.2  
                                                 
1
 Heidi Waleson, “Southern Youthquake,” in Symphony Magazine 59, No. 2 (March–April, 2008): 27–33. 
2
 Ibid., 27. 
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Audiences around the world voiced similar reactions, surrendering to “the sheer 
expressive potency and exuberant physicality of the performance.”3 
Yet the meteoric rise of these Venezuelan musicians was not as sudden or 
unexpected as some news reports suggested. The orchestra and its parent program—El 
Sistema, or simply “the system”—had been chronicled in a feature length documentary 
(Tocar y Luchar, 2006) and championed by symphonic superstars such as Claudio 
Abbado and Simon Rattle since at least 2000. What’s more, the flagship Simón Bolivar 
Youth Orchestra is only one of over 125 ensembles operating throughout Venezuela, 
reflecting a radical initiative that redefines the tenets of music education through the lens 
of social justice. Originally conceived as a means of social reformation for the nation’s 
poorest youth, El Sistema (known more formally as Fundación del Estado para el 
Sistema Nacional de las Orquestas Juveniles e Infantiles de Venezuela, or FESNOJIV) 
has since become a global phenomenon that offers new evaluative measures for 
orchestral performance. The program’s success, both artistically and socially, continues 
to garner praise from music educators, administrators, and arts lovers who recognize the 
tremendous impact the program’s alumni are having in concert halls and classrooms 
around the globe. Dudamel, who currently leads both the Gothenburg Symphony 
(Principal Conductor) and Los Angeles Philharmonic (Music Director), is just one of the 
El Sistema’s remarkable musical exports; 17 year-old double bassist Edicson Ruiz 
became the youngest-ever member of the Berlin Philharmonic in 2007, and violinist 
Alexis Cárdenas has gone on to an international career as a soloist.  
                                                 
3
 Jeremy Eichler, “Catching the Upbeat to a New Movement.” The Boston Globe, 25 June 2010. 
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 One could argue, however, that El Sistema’s impact on Venezuelan culture has 
been even more significant, enriching the lives of over 300,000 children since the 
program’s inception in 1975. The vast network of youth orchestras has served as a 
powerful nationalist symbol, proving to a generation of impoverished youth that social 
mobility is indeed possible. For the country’s children and their families and 
communities, the program represents not an inflexible system but an all-encompassing 
philosophy rooted in a series of best practices that were born from years of 
experimentation. Yet despite El Sistema’s ascent to the top of the classical music world, 
little is known about the movement’s complex history.4 Although several scholars have 
published on the topic, none has addressed the link between the movement’s social and 
musical function and the symphony orchestra.
5
 In addition to providing a historical 
overview of El Sistema in its original context, this chapter explores how organizations in 
other nations—especially the U.S.—have begun to adapt various aspects of the program 
for their own purposes. The objective here is two-fold: to problematize the use of 
classical music as a universal vehicle for social action, and to interrogate who exactly is 
benefiting from this work in its American context—underserved youth or the ailing 
orchestra industry itself. 
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 According to Stephanie Scherpf, former Managing Director of El Sistema USA, “When the [American 
student] fellows were visiting with Dr. Abreu last year, and he was introducing El Sistema, he explained 
the irony of the name “El Sistema,” since the original name was much longer. He launched into his whole 
talk about how it is not a system at all…. It may not be a system, but certain things start to repeat 
themselves, and with a lot of study, you can begin to see the throughlines of practical applications. We have 
materials that the fellows brought back from Venezuela last year, but there’s really no guidebook. From 
what I’ve been told, no one ever wants to write anything done, because then it becomes obsolete. And 
that’s really the spirit of El Sistema, the constant evolution and aspiring toward best practices” (Interview 
with Stephanie Scherpf, 28 February 2011). 
5
 For previous scholarship pertaining to El Sistema, see Jennifer Diana Mei-Lynn Chang, “Orchestrating an 
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Although the choice of European classical music as a driver for social change 
highlights Venezuela’s complex relationship with its own colonialist history, the values 
and rhetoric employed through El Sistema have made it an attractive tool for ambitious 
music educators and arts administrators. In the U.S., the project’s socialist mantra of 
artistic excellence through communal action has been transformed into a battle cry for 
fundraisers and managers looking to redefine the role of classical music in contemporary 
society. El Sistema-inspired initiatives that have developed here include YOLA (Youth 
Orchestra Los Angeles, a program of the LA Philharmonic), OrchKids (a program of the 
Baltimore Symphony Orchestra), and El Sistema USA, which was founded as an arm of 
the New England Conservatory’s Preparatory Division in 2009. All of these initiatives 
represent a radical departure from both traditional music education programs and 
accepted symphonic practice.  
Yet the original vision for El Sistema, rooted in the selfless dedication of student, 
family, and community, does not easily map onto the practices of contemporary Western 
culture. The routines and priorities embedded in American orchestral life often conflict 
with the philosophy embodied by El Sistema, which emphasizes social responsibility and 
communal experience over artistic genius and technical perfection. Such innovations 
signify a fundamental shift in ideology that, if adopted, would not only alter performance 
routines, but transform what it means to be an orchestra. This chapter explodes the notion 
of structure to explore the broader logics that shape institutional identities and influence 
artistic practice. Due to the lack of documentary evidence addressing the movement’s 
history and its relatively recent adoption by orchestras in the U.S., my argument is based 
primarily on conversations and interviews with various music educators, administrators, 
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and musicians who are a part of the El Sistema movement in America. This data is 
supplemented by my observations of three El Sistema-inspired programs during the 
spring and summer of 2011. Together these findings highlight the tension between the 
program’s grassroots, community-based structure and the more traditional, top-down 
management practices employed by most professional performing arts organizations.  
Connecting what was first envisioned as a social movement to the bureaucratic 
setting of the symphony orchestra leads to a number of interesting questions regarding 
organizational structure, identity, and artistic excellence. One might argue that certain 
orchestra managers see El Sistema as “just another educational program,” while others 
interpret the movement and its international cache as an opportunity to develop new 
audiences and reinvent the fundamental role of the professional orchestra. Repositioning 
what it means to be an orchestra, however, requires questioning long held cultural values 
and traditions that are deeply embedded in the way these organizations operate. The 
challenges that arise from these questions become especially acute when one considers 
the artistic and ideological dissonance between the fields of professionalized music 
performance and music education, a dissonance further exacerbated by the orchestra’s 
elitist roots described in this dissertation’s introduction. The present chapter does not 
intend to provide a comprehensive history of El Sistema, nor does it detail the 
movement’s recent implementation in countries like Colombia, England, or Germany. 
Instead, it explores for the first time how American orchestras are exploiting the El 
Sistema model to overcome some of the challenges that they have endured for so long. 
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Juan Bautista Plaza, José Antonio Abreu, and the Birth of El Sistema 
 While the El Sistema movement itself is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
Venezuela boasts a long history of using music education and performance as a means of 
empowering youth on a national scale. Indeed, antecedents of El Sistema—both socio-
political and musical—can be found in the work of composer Juan Bautista Plaza (1898-
1965), who served as the driving force behind the institutionalization of westernized 
music education in twentieth-century Venezuela. As Marie Elizabeth Labonville points 
out in her biography of Plaza, systematized music education was unheard of in most of 
South America until the 1920s and 30s.
6
 Western art music, however, had long been 
available to Venezuelans, and was not restricted to the elite classes, although they were 
more likely to patronize concerts and other artistic productions in the country’s capital of 
Caracas.  
 Imported across the Atlantic by Spanish colonizers after their arrival in 1522, 
European musical traditions quickly became a part of everyday life for many 
Venezuelans. Although the country achieved independence in 1821, Western art music 
continued to be one of the most prevalent traditions in practice, thanks in large part to the 
strong cultural presence of the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, the music performed by 
military bands, traveling Italian opera troupes, and church musicians represented an 
authentic national pastime for generations of Venezuelans, and lingering perceptions of 
cultural colonialism were rarely voiced in public. Nevertheless, the cultivation and 
performance of classical music were obfuscated during the dictatorial reign of Juan 
Vicente Gomez (1908–35), who for the most part was uninterested in fostering artistic 
                                                 
6
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culture of any sort.
7
  It was not until 1930, when Juan Bautista Plaza founded the 
Orquesta Sinfonica Venezuela, that the country’s cultural production began to flourish on 
any sort of replicable scale. 
 Although Western-style orchestras had existed previously in Venezuela (Plaza 
had founded the Union Filharmonica eight years earlier), the Orquesta Sinfonica 
Venezuela was the first such ensemble to be founded and operated by non-Europeans. 
Although two-thirds of the orchestra consisted of European émigrés who had been trained 
overseas, and the repertoire performed was for the most part Germanic in origin, the 
organization’s very existence was seen as a watershed moment in Venezuela’s musical 
history.
8
  The orchestra owed much of its success to Plaza, who served not only as 
founder but part-time conductor, composer-in-residence, music critic, and ensemble 
cheerleader. Indeed, Plaza was an ardent supporter and believer in the power of music, 
and Western classical music in particular, to unite and empower a nation. Although he 
began his career as Kapellmeister of Caracas’ largest cathedral after several years of 
study in Rome, Plaza soon became synonymous with an emergent Venezuelan nationalist 
movement and the role music education played in it. In a very real sense, Plaza’s work 
served as an ideological prototype for El Sistema, cultivating the belief that classical 
music was not averse to mass appeal while working to bring great music to all categories 
of the social spectrum.
9
 
 Plaza’s rise as the statesman of Venezuelan musical culture paralleled a 
pronounced nationalist movement in the late 1930s and ‘40s, during which time he and 
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9
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others began studying, disseminating, and lobbying on behalf of indigenous musical 
traditions. While this development might suggest a move away from the overtly 
European tradition that had dominated the official musical landscape for over a century, it 
instead gave rise to a new but familiar nationalist aesthetic couched in nineteenth-century 
Romanticism. For a generation of Venezuelan composers, the movement and the values it 
supported signaled musical legitimacy by transposing the Western to the local, reflecting 
the cultural consequence of colonial politics. For Plaza, it was part of a dynamic and 
well-defined strategy to elevate the country’s musical reputation and impress European 
audiences and critics. He advanced three explanations as to why Latin American 
composers (and their music) were “inferior” to their European counterparts: 
First, the newness of our nations which implies a national consciousness 
still poorly defined as far as artistic manifestations are concerned…. 
Second, the natural disorientation produced by the jumbled and 
heterogeneous mixture of the different ethnic elements that have come 
together on our continent…. And third, the underdeveloped and 





Thus the sustained presence of Western art music and its culture might be understood as a 
homogenizing force that brought coherence to an otherwise disparate collection of 
musical influences and styles. While this explanation glosses over the imperialist stain 
associated with such rapid acceptance of an allegedly “superior” form of (implicitly 
Western) culture, it sheds light on the prevailing perceptions of art music in mid-century 
Venezuela.   
 Plaza’s interest in the social powers of music education continued to mature 
throughout the 1940s, prompting several trips to the United States and Europe to observe 
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the most innovative strategies being employed by educators from around the world.  A 
1942 trip to New York included a special presentation at the Music Educators National 
Conference (MENC), as well as individual meetings with the music faculty at Eastman 
and Yale.
11
  By 1944, Plaza had been appointed the Director of Culture in the Ministry of 
National Education, an official department of the Venezuelan government charged with 
the planning and implementation of curricula for literature, music, and dance.  Although 
he resigned from the post in 1946, Plaza accomplished a great deal during his time in 
office, including the introduction of music appreciation courses into public schools and 
the formation of a competitive, government-funded Preparatory School of Music. Ten 
years later, he helped to establish an independent musical education program aimed at 
“increasing in young people the taste for music.”12 Even in his old age, long after the 
rhetoric of Venezuela’s nationalist movement had waned, Plaza urged that “the culture of 
the country could gain more by having educators less prepared technically, but more 
sensitive and with more innate vocation to forge the souls of children.”13 
 The values voiced by Plaza—emotional security, spiritual fulfillment, and 
communal musicality—served as founding principles for José Antonio Abreu, who 
would incite the El Sistema movement several decades later. Although no sources link 
Abreu with Plaza, it seems likely that the former would have been aware of his 
predecessor’s reputation and legacy. Born in 1939, Abreu received a PhD in economics 
(1961) and degrees in composition and organ performance from the National 
Conservatory (1964), quickly rising to a position of prominence within the government 
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due to his expertise in socioeconomic development. After working as the country’s 
Minister of Culture and the President of its National Council for Culture, Abreu set out to 
solve Venezuela’s long-standing poverty issues by blending his expertise in music and 
social reform. The corrupt national oil industry had resulted in vast inequalities among 
the country’s population, which in turn led to limited opportunity for social mobility. 
This stark division of power existed within the orchestra world, as well. In 1975, the 
capital city of Caracas housed two symphony orchestras that employed only European-
trained musicians, making it difficult, if not impossible, for the young Venezuelan 
musicians trained at the city’s conservatory to get steady work.  
 This reality was made all too clear to Abreu, a lifelong aficionado of classical 
music, when he allegedly witnessed a young bassoonist set fire to his instrument in 
protest.
14
 At once inspired and appalled, Abreu called together eleven local musicians and 
promised to finance a truly “Venezuelan” orchestra, provided that they each implement 
orchestral training programs in their respective neighborhoods. According to Stanford 
Thompson, an Abreu disciple and the leader of an El Sistema-inspired program in 
Philadelphia,  
Oil companies came in, brought orchestral music, built concert halls, 
essentially constructing an upper-class activity [in Venezuela]…. Abreu 
wouldn’t have it, and said these orchestras aren’t impacting their 
communities at all. His first mission was not social development; he 
wanted to make classical music relevant. But he realized that in order to 
make this happen, the money was in social reform. You put 350 people on 
the stage, and people will come and support you—not just to hear great 




To be sure, Abreu saw orchestral music as a tool for social mobility, empowering the 
poor through musical expression with the hope of building an “affluence of spirit” that 
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had been absent for far too long.
16
 This sociological orientation to music education was 
likely influenced not only by Plaza’s work in Venezuela but also several other 
precedents, including the mass choral programs cultivated by Getúlio Vargas and Heitor 
Villa-Lobos in 1930s Brazil. Abreu, however, emphasized socioeconomic development 
instead of elite European culture, using a decidedly utilitarian argument in efforts to build 
awareness around classical music and symphony orchestras in particular. Sponsored by 
the Venezuelan Ministry of Health and Social Development and announced via national 
headlines in early February 1976, El Sistema was designed first and foremost to 
positively impact at-risk children through immersion in orchestral performance.
17
 Music 
thus served a sociological and psychological function, offering children a new degree of 
status and recognition through communal performance. Abreu considered classical music 
to be an especially appropriate tool for this kind of social work, due in part to its inherent 
complexity, which requires a substantial time investment from both listener and 
performer. 
 El Sistema’s preferred teaching methods embody a community-based approach 
and leverage an intensive curriculum.
18
 Beginning at age 4 or 5, children take part in 
basic musicianship courses that teach rhythm and solfège. Once students choose an 
instrument (a process that usually takes about three months), they begin orchestral 
training almost immediately. Indeed, taking part in group lessons and ensemble 
rehearsals from the earliest stages serves helps to build teamwork and a sense of cohesion 
through group ownership and responsibility. Orchestra membership is based largely on 
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the students’ age, although several umbrella orchestras with more competitive standards 
have been instituted over time, including the Simon Bolivar and the Teresa Carreno 
Orchestras. En masse, El Sistema has helped to found thirty professional or semi-
professional orchestras in Venezuela, cultivating an enviable culture of appreciation for 
classical music in general.
19
 Initially, the programming adopted by these orchestras was 
remarkably homogenous, focusing on nineteenth-century masterworks by Beethoven, 
Tchaikovsky, and Mahler. This apparent conservatism was born out of necessity, taking 
advantage of the limited musical resources available while allowing for crosspollination 
among the country’s growing núcleo network.20 Joint concerts became a regular feature 
of the program, and it was not unusual to have over two hundred children at different 
phases of their musical development on stage during a performance. Students learned to 
live, play, and work as a cohesive unit, blending social reformation tactics with music 
education in new and effective ways.   
Today, Abreu’s grand vision has developed into a $25 million per-year program 
that includes over 180 núcleos, or neighborhood centers, throughout Venezuela. El 
Sistema’s success—defined here via its positive impact on hundreds of thousands of 
children, its role in bringing Venezuelan orchestral culture to life, and its ability to 
capture the spirit of a nation— has also driven the creation of other social programs 
throughout Venezuela, including a number of agricultural and reading-based initiatives. 
In 2004, nearly $4 billion of the country’s oil profits were spent on these programs 
alone.
21
 Despite a tumultuous political environment, El Sistema has continued to grow 
and mature, thanks in large part to Abreu’s steadfast leadership. For his efforts, he has 
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been awarded UNESCO’s International Prize of Music (1993–1995) and the designation 
“Ambassador of Peace” (1998), the Right Livelihood Award (2001), and the 2009 TED 
Prize, which provided him with resources to help spread program’s message around the 
world. 
Definitions and Best Practices 
 Before explicating the development of various El Sistema initiatives in the U.S., it 
is important to understand how exactly the movement has been defined, designed, and 
implemented. According to Erik Holmgren, director of the Abreu Fellows program, “If 
you go around and ask what is El Sistema, you don’t really get a lot of clear answers…. 
You get that it’s a program for poor kids in Venezuela, which it is not…. The narrative 
has really yet to reveal itself.”22 The uniqueness of El Sistema has become an especially 
important rhetorical point as proponents of the movement attempt to distinguish it from 
other music education or social service initiatives. What makes a program truly “El 
Sistema-inspired”? Is such a designation signified simply by the intention of the 
program’s founders, or are there agreed upon guidelines that specify the content and 
structure of each lesson plan?  
 While no consensus has been reached, it seems as though the program’s 
exceptional characteristics come not from specific pedagogical tactics, but instead from 
some relatively abstract guiding principles. Words like “philosophy,” “ideology,” and 
“core beliefs” are used by El Sistema veterans to describe the program’s essence, which 
is understood not as an imitable structure but instead as a starting point or set of best 
practices. Dan Trahey, Director of OrchKids and a vocal supporter of Abreu’s 
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philosophies, supports this assertion. For him, El Sistema “Is absolutely not a system, 
there’s no doubt about that. It’s definitely [more of] an inspiration center.”23 The program 
might thus be understood as a bundle of tools or principles, fueled by a central budget, 
that can be used flexibly in their adaptation to a specific community context. Another 
Abreu disciple points out that  
Even he [Abreu] refers to [El Sistema] as a “non-system.” Every núcleo is 
sort of an invention of the community. Each community finds ways and 
adaptations in their own community to achieve this common goal to start 
their own orchestra. There are of course similarities, but as we began 
implementing it here, we actually realized that it feels more like a 




Early adopters of the El Sistema “philosophy” tend to emphasize between three and nine 
tenets, or core principles, that guide their work, including social change, access, intensity, 
connection, and ensemble.
25
 Although several of these characteristics, such as access and 
intensity, may be self-evident in practice, others are not. The notion of “social change” 
refers here to the youth development portion of the program, which aims to build a sense 
of confidence and responsibility in young student musicians. “Connection” signifies the 
intention to build a network of mutually inspired teachers, families, and communities that 
will support and nourish the students enrolled in these programs. Finally, the term 
“ensemble” reflects the group-based learning model employed through El Sistema’s 
programs. For many, this is the key marker that distinguishes El Sistema from other, 
more traditional modes of music education. Daniel Berkowitz has experienced both 
types, first as a trombone student at Northwestern University and then as a participant in 
El Sistema USA’s Abreu Fellows program. Now manager of the Los Angeles 
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Philharmonic’s YOLA initiative, Berkowitz recalls that, “When [I] grew up, you 
practiced as an individual, and worked really hard, and if you’re lucky you get to play for 
an orchestra. In El Sistema, the orchestra is there from the beginning, and you’re always 
striving as a collective to achieve success.”26 
 Because the program consciously shuns a systemic approach and elicits flexible 
interpretations, it is difficult to identify which initiatives are legitimate derivatives of the 
Venezuelan “model.” Using the core principles outlined above as a point of departure, 
one can begin to construct a loose formula for Abreu’s philosophy and its subsequent 
implementation. His philosophy, as articulated on the movement’s official website, 
consists of: early exposure to classical music through individual and group instruction, 
totaling at least 20 hours per week; a loving but competitive ensemble environment that 
builds a student’s sense of self-worth; a committed group of teachers, nearly all of whom 
are former students; a nested approach to community that emphasizes family, ensemble, 
and núcleo; and a commitment to great music making.
27
 These beliefs are encapsulated in 
the program’s motto, “Tocar y Luchar,” or “to play and to fight,” a maxim that is 
unpacked in a 2006 Spanish-language documentary by the same name.
28
 The director of 
the film, Alberto Arvelo, studied at one of El Sistema’s núcleos as a child, and thus his 
work reflects the program’s relentless pursuit of excellence through collective experience 
and perseverance. To be sure, artistic excellence is a trope found throughout the El 
Sistema network, from the youngest beginner to the most advanced student. Those 
granted entry to higher-level ensembles, such as the Simón Bolivar Orchestra, receive 




 For more on the underlying principles of the El Sistema model, see http://fesnojiv.gob.ve/ and 
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government stipends that honor their accomplishments and place real economic value on 
their musical talent. Although El Sistema’s curriculum is loosely organized and poorly 
documented, it has produced scores of talented students who have gone on to achieve 
international success.  
 The ideology espoused through El Sistema has positively impacted not only the 
individuals who take part in the program, but also Venezuela’s classical music culture. 
By the middle of the twentieth century, most of the country’s citizens perceived Western 
art music as fundamentally elitist, much as it is perceived today in the United States and 
Europe. Over time, however, El Sistema has challenged this assessment. Cultural leaders 
in Venezuela now declare that classical music has become “more popular than fútbol,” 
and the level of artistry reached by the program’s top ensembles is objectively 
comparable to some professional orchestras in America and Europe. Orchestral culture 
has become legitimately popular due in part to the social benefits associated with the 
program and, by proxy, with symphony orchestras and orchestral repertoire. Such a stark 
transformation in the way Venezuelan audiences engage with classical music suggests 
that a unique ideological shift has occurred. Mark Churchill, former Dean of Continuing 
Education at the New England Conservatory and founder of El Sistema USA, points out 
that “culture tends to be owned by the elite…. What’s so fascinating is that in Venezuela, 
they are doing it the other way around. The culture is being introduced from the lower 
economic strata.”29 It should come as no surprise that many of the program’s núcleos 
continue to be operated by alumni, creating a culture of continuity and personal 
investment that is lacking from most Western nations.   
                                                 
29
 Quoted in Heidi Waleson, “Southern Youthquake,” in Symphony Magazine 59, No. 2 (March–April, 
2008): 28–29. 
  209 
 Yet while El Sistema’s history implies that it has operated as a subaltern 
movement that unites and empowers disenfranchised communities, one must remember 
that the initiative was in fact founded by a wealthy politician and is funded by official 
channels from within the national government. Although some have argued that El 
Sistema has “resisted politicization,” it is impossible to separate the program’s message 
of social reform through orchestral performance from various sociopolitical and cultural 
agendas.
30
 The broader implications of using Western art music to unite young people has 
received considerable scholarly attention, and reveals long-standing power dynamics that 
shine a critical light on El Sistema’s altruistic façade.31 Both in Venezuela and elsewhere, 
the program reflects the vision of a political and cultural elite. The ensuing tension 
between privileged individuals—or, as we will see later in this chapter, bureaucratic 
institutions—and the underserved majority is too often masked by the universalist 
rhetoric associated with nineteenth-century orchestral music.
32
 I do not mean to suggest 
that the administrators of El Sistema have explicitly forwarded this conception of 
orchestral culture or the class conflict it conceals. Instead, I raise these issues to highlight 
classical music’s role in both building and bridging class divides. Such a critical 
interpretation shapes how El Sistema is used and viewed by orchestras and their 
audiences around the world. 
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El Sistema Comes to America 
 Despite these concerns, El Sistema’s global success has captured the attention of 
prominent figures from across the musical spectrum. Supplementing the support voiced 
by Wynton Marsalis, Simon Rattle, Claudio Abbado, and others, CEO of the League of 
American Orchestras Jesse Rosen sees the movement as “a wake-up call to what is 
possible in orchestral performance at a professional level. As audience members … you 
can’t escape the power of 200 people on stage who are deeply engaged in music-
making.”33 Perhaps this message resonates most strongly in the U.S., where the 
struggling orchestra industry and faltering public school music system have led to an 
especially receptive environment for widespread change. Those traditionalists that prefer 
more conservative modes of performance have yet to push back against El Sistema’s 
entre into the orchestral world, perhaps due to its reputation as a youth development 
program. Many of the most prominent leaders in music education and orchestral 
administration view El Sistema as a means of introducing classical music to a broader 
community of listeners in new and substantive ways. 
 Ironically, the relationship between present-day American culture and classical 
music is not unlike the situation in Venezuela some thirty-five years ago, when orchestral 
performance was perceived as elitist by a majority of the population. One might argue, 
however, that the degree of poverty and crime in the United States is not nearly as 
ubiquitous or severe as it is in Venezuela, and thus the traction for such programs is not 
as great. There are also some fundamental differences concerning the underlying 
motivations for music education, especially in the context of the professional orchestra 
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industry. Here, the goal is to increase music literacy and develop future audiences; in 
Venezuela, classical music serves a means of achieving real social change.
34
  How, then, 
does one create widespread interest in and appreciation for classical music if the same 
social needs and national support are not present? 
 To answer this question, José Antonio Abreu has worked with Mark Churchill 
and a host of others to bring El Sistema to America, with the implicit hope that the 
program will help address the limited social relevance of orchestras in contemporary 
American culture. In his 2009 TED keynote address, Abreu described the orchestra as 
“much more than an artistic structure; it is an example and school of life, because to play 
together means to intimately coexist toward perfection and excellence, following a strict 
discipline of organization and coordination.”35 A performance of Shostakovich’s Tenth 
Symphony (second movement) and Arturo Márquez’s Danzón No. 2 followed Abreu’s 
talk, featuring Gustavo Dudamel and the Simón Bolivar Orchestra.
36
 This brief 
performance provides some clues regarding El Sistema’s predictable programming 
practices, which usually pair large, energetic, and relatively familiar compositions with 
the occasional “nationalist” work, often written by a Latin American artist but composed 
in the lush musical style of nineteenth-century German Romanticism.
37
  
 More remarkable than the predictability of the repertoire, however, is the visceral 
togetherness and coordination that distinguishes Venezuela’s orchestras from America’s 
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top ensembles. This phenomenon conflicts with modern performance practice, which 
arguably favors technical mastery and homogeneity over musicality, and has thus 
attracted the attention of several prominent music educators and administrators. Mark 
Churchill, for one, has become an ardent proponent of El Sistema’s application in a 
variety of new contexts. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that Churchill’s 
relationship with Abreu served as the basis of the program’s recent surge in the United 
States. His story is one worth telling in full. In his own words, 
I became aware of El Sistema in the 1990s through a documentary that 
was done in Boston called “Orchestra Dreams”, by WGBH. It was a 
series, a Hispanic series or show, [and] they had done a wonderful half 
hour documentary. That was shown a lot in the Boston area, and then there 
was the first 60 Minutes piece, which was really well done. I was putting 
together the Orchestra of the Americas, and we reached out to Dr. Abreu, 
and he became very active and vital to the project. The orchestra took its 
first trip to Venezuela in 2001, and through meeting Dr. Abreu and going 
down there, and seeing a concert with what is now the Simón Bolivar 
Orchestra, there was a lot of mutual recognition, bonding, and it led to the 
development of a very deep relationship. The [New England 
Conservatory] gave Dr. Abreu an honorary doctorate in 2000, at my 




Churchill was frustrated that El Sistema, which had received considerable recognition in 
Europe thanks to Simon Rattle and the Berlin Philharmonic, had not yet taken hold in the 
U.S. That changed in 2007, when the Simón Bolivar Orchestra presented concerts in Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and Boston with Gustavo Dudamel. Following their 
tour, Churchill helped to organize a series of symposia designed to introduce the 
program’s philosophy to an audience of music educators and administrators. With Abreu 
in attendance, the conference sparked a national dialogue concerning what El Sistema 
might look like if it were adapted to an American context.  
                                                 
38
 Interview with Mark Churchill, founder of El Sistema USA, 26 May 2011. 
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Churchill continued to cultivate his relationship with Abreu at a major arts 
conference in late 2007, deciding then that it was time to organize and streamline what 
had been an otherwise diffuse developmental process. He recognized two pressing needs: 
We needed to know more about what was going on, and we needed to be 
connected to people thinking about this and build some kind of solidarity, 
start a movement with the sense of energy and hope around it. There was 
also a need for leadership. It was those conversations that grew the idea of 





The fellows program was officially implemented as part of Abreu’s 2009 TED wish, and 
quickly became the flagship initiative of El Sistema USA, a new professional 
organization devoted to social reform through orchestral performance and education. 
With Churchill serving as the primary catalyst, NEC president Tony Woodcock agreed to 
fund the program for five years following a visit to Venezuela with a group of board 
trustees, politicians, and administrators.  
While the initiative’s $500,000 price tag is not covered by public subsidies, the 
national scope of the project, along with the curriculum’s familiar emphasis on access, 
excellence, and community, mirrors Abreu’s original vision for El Sistema. Starting in 
2009, NEC began training ten postgraduate musicians each year with the intention of 
proliferating El Sistema-inspired organizations around the country. Each fellow is 
steeped in the ideology and methodology associated with the movement, learning 
practical skills such as fundraising, behavioral management, and organizational 
development alongside teacher training and immersion in the program’s history and 
culture. After spending two months observing the music education centers in Venezuela 
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 Ibid. 
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and another ten months in Boston, fellows are encouraged to design their own curriculum 
and open núcelos in regions exhibiting need across the U.S. According to Erik Holmgren, 
What we are doing with El Sistema in the United States is building a 
movement…. We have a violinist from the Cleveland Orchestra; we have 
fellows from Panama, Spain, Haiti, Venezuela. Fellows come to learn how 
to build these programs in the U.S. We take who they are as performers, 
then develop them into educators and turn them into non-profit leaders 
who can create the space for music to happen. They are fellows for a year, 
and then they are expected to work on behalf of the El Sistema movement 




The initial success achieved by El Sistema USA and its offshoots is reflected by renewed 
national interest in music education and its role in building promising futures for both 
America’s youth and the ailing orchestra industry. 
 With the first class of fellows having graduated in 2010, we can begin to assess 
the impact their efforts have had on the American musical landscape. To be sure, the 
diffusion of El Sistema’s philosophy has resulted in a variety of organizational and 
artistic settings that are newly dedicated to Abreu’s vision. While these programs include 
sites across North America and Europe, the remainder of this chapter focuses on El 
Sistema’s application in the United States, so that we can more accurately compare cases 
and draw legitimate conclusions. Figure 4.1 lists forty-one programs throughout the U.S. 
that identify themselves as “El Sistema inspired.”41 Programs in boldfaced type were 
started by Abreu Fellows, while those listed above the row of asterisks aligned 
themselves with Abreu’s philosophy only after the founding of El Sistema USA in 2009. 
As this list suggests, there is no clear structure or form associated with these derivative 
programs. To reap the benefits of being an “officially” recognized El Sistema affiliate, a  
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 Interview with Erik Holmgren. 
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 This list is constructed using El Sistema USA’s website, and includes only those organizations that have 





Figure 4.1 El Sistema-Inspired Programs in the United States 
Program Program Type City, State Founded 
Metropolitan Youth Orchestra Indianapolis Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra Indianapolis, IN 1995 
Community MusicWorks Independent Providence, RI 1997 
Seattle Music Partners After School (Public) Seattle, WA 2000 
Harmony Program After School New York NY 2003 
CityMusic Kids After School Cleveland, OH 2006 
Music New Haven After School  New Haven, CN 2006 
MusiConnects In and After School (Public) Boston, MA 2007 
Scrollworks Youth Orchestra of Central Alabama Birmingham, AL 2007 
************************************ ****************************** ******************  ******* 
YOLA Los Angeles Philharmonic Los Angeles, CA 2007 
OrchKids Baltimore Symphony Orchestra Baltimore, MD 2008 
People's Music School YOURS Project After School Chicago, IL 2008 
Youth Orchestras of San Antonio After School San Antonio, TX 2008 
El Sistema USA Support Organization Boston, MA 2009 
Soundscapes Virginia Symphony Orchestra Newport News, VA 2009 
Verdugo Young Musicians Association After School Pasadena, CA 2009 
Inner City Youth Orchestra of Los Angeles Independent Los Angeles, CA 2009 
Latino Arts LA After School (Public) Los Angeles, CA 2009 
First Notes In and After School Avon, CO 2009 
Orchestrating Diversity In and After School (Private) St. Louis, MO 2009 
UpBeat NYC Independent Brooklyn, NY 2009 
Rhode Island Fiddle Project Independent Pawtucket, RI 2009 
Boston Conservatory Lab Charter School After School  Brighton, MA 2010 





Tune Up Philly After School (Parochial) Philadelphia, PA 2010 
Juneau, Alaska Music Matters In-School (Public) Juneau, AK 2010 
Atlanta Music Project Atlanta Symphony Orchestra Atlanta, GA 2010 
Corona Youth Music Project Independent Queens, NY 2010 
Community Opus Project San Diego Youth Symphony  San Diego, CA 2010 
The Goff Family Foundation After School Fort Worth, TX 2010 
Alta Vista Charter Schools In School (charter) Kansas City, MO 2010 
Imagine Syracuse After School (Private) Syracuse, NY 2011 
Harmony Grows After School (Public) Santa Rosa, CA 2011 
Kalikolehua (El Sistema Hawaii) After School Honolulu, HI 2011 
Kids In Concert After School Bainbridge Island, WA 2011 
Harmony Stockton Stockton Symphony Stockton, CA 2011 
Foundation to Assist Young Musicians (FAYM) After School Las Vegas, NV 2011 
Planet Orchestra South Bay Youth Orchestra  Lawndale, CA 2011 
The Music Makers After School Denver, CO 2011 
El Sistema at Carroll University After School Waukesha, WI 2011 
Bravo Waterbury! Waterbury Symphony Orchestra Waterbury, CN 2011 
El Sistema NYC at Northern Manhattan Church/Community Center New York, NY 2011 
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program need only acknowledge a philosophical affinity toward Abreu’s model. No core 
curriculum or certification is required. Indeed, each case is unique, suggesting that the 
adoption process is in reality one of adaptation, where administrators customize and 
reconfigure certain aspects of the program to fit the social, political, and musical 
resources of a specific environment.
42
 Katie Wyatt, former Abreu Fellow and executive 
director of KidzNotes in Durham, North Carolina, voiced this lack of uniformity in an 
article published by Symphony Magazine. In it, she wondered, “What are the rules? Is 
there a fixed model…? Should we be building a franchise? .... El Sistema-inspired 
organizations must be able to reflect the uniqueness of their communities, despite sharing 
a set of values and goals.”43 
Without the federal support available in Venezuela and Europe, U.S. cities have 
had to be flexible in their appropriation of the El Sistema philosophy.
44
 Support from 
local governments is more likely to have a direct impact on the production and education 
of music than broader national initiatives, but the inconsistent and oftentimes ad hoc 
approach taken by individual communities makes it particularly difficult to compare 
programs and generalize findings. Indeed, there is a diverse array of operating models 
that address the unique challenges associated with each community or partner 
                                                 
42
 For more on the diffusion and variation of practices across organizational environments, see Shahzad 
Ashari, Peer C. Foss, and Edward J. Zajac, “Made to Fit: How Practices Vary As They Diffuse,” Academy 
of Management Review 35, No. 1 (2010): 67–92. 
43
 Kathryn Wyatt, with Rebecca Levi, “On the Road to El Sistema, Part I” Symphony Magazine, (Jan.–Feb. 
2010): 78–83.  
44
 The Canadian government has also supported the El Sistema movement, promising nearly $2 million to 
the New Brunswick Youth Orchestra on 18 August 2010 so that the group could cultivate its own program 
(Jonathan Govia, “Canada: All Things Sistema,” La Scena Musicale (May 2011): 29). 
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organization.
45
 To quote former El Sistema USA Managing Director Stephanie Scherpf, 
these models include: 
The public school model, the charter school model, the university model, 
the service organization model, the symphony organization model—that 
diversity really fits the American landscape. There is no one–size-fits-all, 
there is no toolkit. It’s about finding a values-based and philosophical 
approach, and striving, adapting, never being fixed in order to suit the 
needs of students and communities. We’re just at the very beginning of the 





Orchestras as a field have an especially complex relationship with El Sistema given the 
program’s potential to serve multiple organizational objectives, including education, 
audience development, and even public relations. Of the forty-one organizations listed in 
Figure 4.1, only ten are administered as subsidiaries of professional orchestras, but the 
two largest and most influential programs—YOLA and OrchKids—are managed by the 
Los Angeles Philharmonic and Baltimore Symphony Orchestra, respectively. Below, I 
introduce new findings about these two programs as well as Tune Up Philly, an initiative 
based out of West Philadelphia that has managed to succeed despite its strained 
association with the Philadelphia Orchestra. While these three programs exhibit different 
relationships with their parent institutions, they all provide rich ethnographic data that 
demonstrate some of the challenges orchestras face when attempting to appropriate El 
Sistema for their own purposes.  
                                                 
45
 According to Dan Trahey of OrchKids, “The biggest thing to realize was that we weren’t going to create 
something that looked like what was going on in Venezuela. Understanding that concept makes it a lot 
easier to adapt the thing. The first time I was down there I was like “Dang, this isn’t going to work in 
America.” It actually turns out that it works very well, it just looks different in different places. Even in 
Baltimore, my different núcleos look different from each other. Looking at different sites in Venezuela, 
they’re so different from each other. In Caracas, you have a super intense youth orchestra system, but 
you’re not going to have those in the Andes Mountains” (Interview with Daniel Trahey). 
46
 Interview with Stephanie Scherpf, former Managing Director of El Sistema USA, 28 February 2011.  
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Youth Orchestra LA 
 Nearly two years before El Sistema USA’s official launch, Deborah Borda and 
the Los Angeles Philharmonic unveiled Youth Orchestra LA, or YOLA, the first and 
most expansive El Sistema-inspired program in the country. The reasons such a project 
succeeded first in Los Angeles are not surprising, considering the appointment of 
Gustavo Dudamel as the orchestra’s music director and the city’s strong ties to Latino 
culture in general. Borda, who serves as CEO and president of the Philharmonic, was in 
the process of courting Dudamel when YOLA was first introduced in October 2007. 
Although his contract would not begin until the start of the 2009-10 season, Dudamel’s 
rising reputation and presence at various YOLA functions quickly garnered attention 
from communities that the Philharmonic had not traditionally served.
47
  
Today, the Philharmonic boasts two distinct initiatives rooted in Abreu’s 
philosophy, providing intensive music education services to more than 500 children 
across the city of Los Angeles. YOLA manager Dan Berkowitz described the genesis of 
these programs in a lengthy interview.
48
 The first program, YOLA@EXPO, started at the 
end of 2007. Today, it services nearly 300 students, boasts two full orchestras, and 
operates seven days per week. The program is organized as a three-way partnership that 
is co-managed by the Los Angeles Philharmonic, the Harmony Project (a preexisting 
music education initiative for underserved communities), and the EXPO Center—a 
public facility administered by the city. All costs incurred are split between the 
Philharmonic’s education department and the Harmony Project, while the EXPO Center 
                                                 
47
 According to Dan Berkowitz, Dudamel “comes to the site several times each year, and he remembers the 
kids really well, and he always talks about YOLA and the program when he’s traveling, it’s always on his 
mind” (Interview with Daniel Berkowitz, 8 July 2011). 
48
Ibid. 
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provides facilities for lessons and rehearsals. Similarly, the Philharmonic’s second 
program, YOLA@HOLA, is a partnership between the orchestra and Heart of Los 
Angeles, a privately-funded community center that provides services for students in the 
Rampart district. Launched in the Fall of 2010, this initiative provides fifteen hours of 
instruction each week for over one hundred students in the first and fourth grades. 
According to Berkowitz, 
The first grade students are on strings, the fourth graders on winds and 
brass, which is something we learned from Venezuela: if they have adult 
teeth, put them on winds and brass; if they don’t, put them on strings. We 
also wanted to build in peer mentorship, so that three-year age gap was 
conducive. It’s also great for siblings, where a family might be more 




Both YOLA@ EXPO and HOLA are managed by independent site directors with strong 
ties to the community, but they receive constant guidance and support from the 
Philharmonic’s education department and senior administration. This collaborative model 
allows the programs to be “focused on the community…. It’s not the LA Phil coming in 
trying to give something to the community, but instead it’s being born out of the 
community, and thus is more digestible than it might otherwise be.”50  
 YOLA costs the Philharmonic less than one percent of its $100 million annual 
budget, yet according to Berkowitz, “the value that it adds to the organization publicly, to 
the perception of what this organization does, is [huge], giving kids from these 
communities opportunities … they wouldn’t otherwise have…. It heightens the visibility 
of what we do without a huge financial burden.” The program clearly holds public value 
for underserved communities, allowing the Philharmonic to raise awareness and funds 
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through sources that they would not otherwise have access to.
51
 The way in which the 
Philharmonic talks about this, however, suggests an inherent conflict between the 
organization’s goals as a concert producer and an educational services provider. 
Berkowitz discussed how the board of directors tackled this issue early on in YOLA’s 
history: 
A big scare that our board had at the beginning is how do you create this 
program and then take it away from a community if it fails? You can’t, so 
when you create something like this you need to make sure that it is going 
to happen forever. So the initial plan was to invest heavily in the first five 
years of the program and then scale back, and let the community take 
over. At some point … the board shifted direction and said this is 
something we need to support and have as core of part of what we do. If 
we were to back out, it wouldn’t feel right…. There’s no endowment for 
this, but we’ve invested in the program through funding from the 




Unlike traditional subscription concerts, this type of work is one-hundred-percent 
nonprofit in nature. The orchestra provides subsidized educational services with no 




 Although there may not be any explicit expectations of a “return on investment” 
voiced by Philharmonic administrators—a circumstance that is reinforced by the lofty 
status attributed to educational work in general—there are ways in which the orchestra 
benefits from this work, as well. The publicity produced by YOLA undoubtedly 
strengthens the Philharmonic’s reputation, but one could also argue that the orchestra 
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 For more on YOLA’s public value, see Mina Yang, “El Sistema, L.A.-Style: Music Education and 
Social Activism in the Twenty-first Century,” Conference paper given at the Annual Meeting of the Society 
for Ethnomusicology, 2010. 
52
 Interview with Daniel Berkowitz. 
53
 Unlike more traditional educational programming, which often involves outreach concerts that reach 
thousands of students each year, YOLA provides intensely focused instruction for 500 students. This “less 
is more” approach allows teachers to work closely with students and adapt their teaching methods to meet 
individual student needs. 
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hopes the program well help to develop a new audience for classical music in Los 
Angeles and, more broadly, across the U.S. Whether or not YOLA is, to quote Gustavo 
Dudamel, “sustaining classical music” is up for debate, but it seems likely that the 
Philharmonic’s administration thinks of YOLA in strategic terms, using the program and 
the good will it generates as a tool to forward its primary objective: to produce and 
present high art for a paying audience. This is not to say that the social work achieved 
through YOLA is undesired, but the program’s structure clearly demarcates the 
boundaries between performance and education. While a small group of Philharmonic 
musicians take part in various aspects of YOLA, most do not. The teaching artists 
employed through the program are usually local freelancers who have a passion and 
training for educational work, not full-time orchestra musicians. So while the 
Philharmonic lends its administrative heft and artistic reputation to the program, it 
remains otherwise absent—a paradox discussed later in this chapter.54 
 Nevertheless, the success achieved through YOLA—both socially and 
educationally— is impressive. The program’s impact extends well beyond Los Angeles, 
as the organization has become an epicenter of the El Sistema movement, particularly in 
southern California. The Philharmonic has proactively cultivated a growing network of 
stakeholders that it regularly convenes, including the city and county of Los Angeles, 
universities, school districts, community music schools, nonprofit music organizations, 
music educations, community centers, and funders. Moreover, in October of 2011 the 
Philharmonic announced a new partnership with Bard College and Longy School of 
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 According to Erik Holmgren, director of the Abreu Fellows Program, YOLA “is not really run by the LA 
Philharmonic directly, there isn’t a lot of connection between the orchestra and the program on the ground. 
[But when Dudamel] walks in the room, there are cameras and there is lots of press (interview with Erik 
Holmgren, 28 June 2011). 
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Music called “Take a Stand,” which will serve as a counterpoint to El Sistema USA and 
offer master’s degrees in El Sistema teaching methods.55  From Berkowitz’s perspective, 
the Philharmonic is “catalyzing a movement, so that this can happen all over the country 
and for it to become sustainable…. If it doesn’t work in LA, it’s not going to work 
anywhere, simply because of the support and resources we have behind it.”56  In 2008, 
the orchestra leveraged these resources to contract the National Center for Research on 
Evaluation, Standards, and Student Testing at UCLA (CRESST) to collect and analyze 
data measuring YOLA’s impact, and advise the development of future outcomes and 
objectives for the program.
57
 Although the study’s findings are uniformly positive, the 
underlying narrative suggests a tale of two aspirations: better student achievement, both 
at home and in the classroom, and higher organizational performance for the Los Angeles 
Philharmonic and its partners.
58
 Whether or not these two goals are at odds with one 
another is a question to which I will return in this chapter’s conclusion. 
OrchKids and the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra 
Aside from YOLA, OrchKids is the most well established El Sistema-inspired 
program in the United States.  Loosely structured as an arm of the Baltimore Symphony 
Orchestra’s (BSO) education department, the program is in fact the result of an 
unexpected collaboration between conductor Marin Alsop and Daniel Trahey, who now 
serves as the program’s executive director. OrchKids mission makes clear the dichotomy 
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between orchestra and community suggested above, articulating it through the following 
three objectives: 
1) Use music as a vehicle to provide Baltimore City children with mentoring, 
encouragement and vision for a promising future. 
2) Create an after-school program devoted to music appreciation, academics, 
citizenship, community awareness, family and health (emotional, social and 
physical). 





In the summer of 2011, I traveled to Baltimore to visit with Trahey and his staff.
60
 The 
opportunity to observe and speak with the teachers, administrators, and students involved 
in the program made the distinction between OrchKids and the BSO’s traditional concert 
offerings all the more palpable. Below, I offer a brief history and description of OrchKids 
in action, followed by a critique of the program’s relationship to the BSO through the 
insights of Trahey himself. 
Founded with a $100,000 gift from Alsop, OrchKids began operating out of 
Harriet Tubman Elementary School in 2008 with a cohort of thirty students.
61
 Trahey, 
who had previously worked for the Hartford Symphony in Connecticut, contacted Alsop 
after traveling to Venezuela and visiting with José Antonio Abreu, who inspired him to 
transpose the philosophy of El Sistema and build a program of his own. Since then, 
OrchKids has become one of the country’s premiere music education initiatives. When 
setting out to recruit new students, Trahey took a “propagandistic approach,” continually 
communicating the unique benefits associated with his program to anyone that would 
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 As stated on the program’s website, http://www.bsomusic.org/main.taf?p=10. 
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 During my visit, I attended a special workshop offered by Trahey for other El Sistema administrators 
across the country, titled “Community Engagement Through Music Education Summer Institute” (13 July 
2011). 
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 As music director of the BSO and a recent MacArthur Foundation “Genius” grant recipient, Alsop 
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listen—especially parents, teachers, and school administrators. Akin to the tenets 
espoused by other El Sistema-inspired programs, OrchKids strives to help students 
“overcome material poverty through spiritual affluence,” using intense, daily musical 
instruction to strengthen students’ sense of self-worth, academic performance, and their 
relationship with family and community. Artistic excellence is important, and Trahey 
places a premium on hiring the best teachers he can find, but the program is not designed 
to produce the next Gustavo Dudamel with any sort of predictability. Instead, Trahey sees 
OrchKids as a tool to help students learn discipline, graduate high school, and become 
productive members of society.
62
 His is an ethical model, rooted in an attempt to heal a 
child’s soul through ensemble performance.  
Today, OrchKids works with over 240 students across three underserved schools. 
In 2010-11, Lockerman Bundy Elementary School acted as the primary OrchKids’ site 
(Harriet Tubman had closed several years before). Located deep in West Baltimore, 
Lockerman Bundy had a long history of student absenteeism, misconduct, and 
underperformance, but according to parents and teachers, the program has “completely 
transformed” the school. Much of the credit goes to site director Nick Skinner and his 
stable of teaching artists, who constitute a near-constant presence in the school’s 
hallways and classrooms. Children start the program in pre-k or kindergarten, and then 
have a choice to continue when they move on to first grade. To date, over 85% of 
students have opted to remain in the program, helping to augment the monotony of 
primary and secondary education with collaborative artistic expression. Lockerman 
Bundy has gone so far as to afford music-related activities the same import as primary  
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March 2011. 
  226 
Figure 4.2 Mural painted by OrchKids students at Lockerman Bundy Elementary School 
 
Figure 4.3 OrchKids’ schedule at Lockerman Bundy Elementary School 
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subject material, such as math and science. Program highlights include full orchestra 
rehearsals (which here refer to any ensemble, “exploding the definition of what an 
orchestra can be”), frequent “rallies” or concerts, and the cacophonous bucket band—a 
student favorite that provides an outlet for excess energy or aggression through rhythmic 
ensemble drumming. All of this work has led to discernible gains in student achievement, 
but according to Alsop, it also represents “a musically valid extension of what the BSO 
does,” extending the orchestra’s reach into every segment of the Baltimore community.63 
Students involved in the program have the opportunity to play on mainstage 
subscription concerts for ticket buyers, playing a fundamental role in rethinking the 
relationship between orchestras and their (traditional) audiences. According to Trahey, 
I think the impact we’ve had on the community has been telling, and I 
think people are very frustrated with these ideas of these one-offs concerts. 
I mean jeez, everyone in Baltimore sees the orchestra perform, that’s 
almost doing the kids a disservice, since they’ll never have a chance to 
play in anything close to that. What we’re doing is infiltrating these kids’ 
lives with music….64 
 
Despite OrchKids’ resounding successes, however, the program continues to face 
numerous challenges, particularly with regard to prevailing orchestral culture. Trahey 
recognize that the students and parents they work with have had limited exposure to 
classical music, a reality that is exacerbated by a perceived sense of superiority and 
entitlement among traditional audiences. For this reason, he trains his teachers to be 
“cheerleaders, not only pedagogues and artists.” Recruiting the right teaching artists 
presents a considerable challenge, as traditional conservatory education methods do not 
adequately emphasize the skill set needed for this type of work. Fortunately, former 
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 Quoting Marin Alsop in Ibid. 
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 Interview with Daniel Trahey, director of OrchKids, 12 July 2011. 
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students often return to teach in and administer these programs, satisfying a cyclical 
process that provides continuity and cultivates community.  
Like YOLA and the LA Philharmonic, Trahey sees OrchKids as an inspiration—
not a model—for other organizations interested in implementing El Sistema-inspired 
programming. Indeed, the only reason OrchKids continues to operate under the auspices 
of the BSO is Alsop’s personal commitment to the program and its message.65 Without 
that commitment and the cache attached to the city’s largest arts nonprofit, it would be 
“very difficult to navigate the bureaucracy of the orchestra,” not to mention the snobbism 
associated with symphonic culture.
66
 Without significant institutional support or musician 
participation (only one member of the BSO is involved in the program), OrchKids exists 
as an almost completely separate entity. Trahey reports directly to Alsop and manages his 
own staff of teachers and site directors, and as the program matures, its diffuse structure 
has slowly evolved into one that could be funded and operated without the aid of a major 
orchestra.
67
 I argue that such organizational divisions reflect the ideological, political, and 
cultural gaps separating the symphony orchestra (in its current conception) and El 
Sistema. This point is articulated succinctly by Tony Woodcock, president of NEC and 
an early adapter of Abreu’s philosophy: “[OrchKids] is not part of the central engine of 
the orchestra. For me, it’s not serious.”68 Whether or not the program is serious, the 
BSO’s failure to integrate OrchKids into its day-to-day operations highlights a lack of fit 
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 According to Trahey, housing OrchKids as a subsidiary of the BSO “was ideal because I had the support 
of the musical leader of the city. Marin was hired here because of that. I would almost say that she was 
hired first because of her musical ambassadorship. That aligned very well with what I was thinking. But if I 
was doing this in another city, I might not go to the orchestra, I might go to a Christian services 




 During an informal conversation with Nick Skinner, he discussed the possibility of reorganizing as a 
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 Interview with Tony Woodcock, President of the New England Conservatory, 17 June 2011. 
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that has motivated other El Sistema-inspired programs to look outside the orchestra world 
when courting potential organizational partners. 
Tune Up Philly 
Although both YOLA and OrchKids are designed at least partially as in-house 
education programs for professional orchestras, other organizational possibilities exist. 
One of the most established alternatives is Tune Up Philly, an initiative started in 2009 by 
Curtis Institute of Music graduate Stanford Thompson.
69
 A member of the Abreu 
Fellows’ inaugural class, Thompson oversees a $300,000 grassroots initiative that 
provides year-round instruction to approximately eighty students at St. Francis de Sales 
parochial school in West Philadelphia. Located approximately one mile from the 
University of Pennsylvania’s campus, the site has become a local anomaly thanks to its 
intense dedication to music education.  
While Tune Up Philly is now grouped among the country’s premiere El Sistema 
offshoots, it took time to build the momentum and trust needed to succeed in one of 
Philadelphia’s most precarious communities. According to Thompson,  
We talked to the public schools, realizing that the structure was already 
there. The facilities, network, resources, infrastructure were all there, but 
they weren’t being utilized. There was too much red tape, and there were 
no really effective partnerships or collaborations going on…. Charter 
schools were much more receptive, but we got shut down by a new 
principal, who told me that [the] student’s couldn’t do math, or read or 




Despite these and other setbacks, Thompson has expertly navigated a bureaucracy of city 
leaders to cultivate what no one else has been able to: a music education initiative that is 
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 According to an online report distributed through El Sistema USA on 20 September 2011, “Tune Up 
Philly” has officially changed its name to “Play On, Philly.” 
70
 Interview with Stanford Thompson, director of Tune Up Philly, 14 March 2011. 
  230 
palatable and even attractive to students, parents, and administrators in Philadelphia’s 
cash-strapped school system. The result, a self-sustaining program that garners enough 
funding to practically eliminate participation fees and boasts a wait list of over 300 
students, has attracted widespread attention in the popular media.
71
 Peter Dobrin of The 
Philadelphia Inquirer has been an outspoken advocate for the program from the very 
beginning, predicting that “if Tune Up Philly follows the trajectory of its impressive first 
three months, it won't be long before Philadelphia achieves Thompson's wonderfully 
economical articulation of the program's grand vision: "Orchestras everywhere.”72 
 I visited St. Frances de Sales in the summer of 2011, when Thompson was busy 
piloting a summer version of the program. During the academic year, children meet 
fifteen hours each week, creating a culture of continuity and intensity that distinguishes 
the program from other initiatives. The schedule is freer in the summer, but no less 
intense. Enrolled students congregate for a general “creativity class” at 8:30 each 
morning, where they learn what it means to “be a musician” and perform music as 
members of an ensemble. The teacher I observed led the class by improvising on his 
instrument, sliding between orchestral excerpts and jazz standards while discussing the 
commonalities between music making and imagination.
73
 The basics of music theory and 
instrumental technique are taught alongside more philosophical and psychological topics, 
such as the role of music in building social relationships. This creativity class is followed  
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Figure 4.4 Students Rehearsing at St. Francis de Sales Parochial School in Philadelphia 




by group lessons (organized by instrument) and sectional rehearsals. Each day ends with 
a full orchestra rehearsal, which tends to be short and additive, lasting only thirty or 
forty-five minutes to account for younger students’ limited attention span. Yet the 
interactions during rehearsals are purposeful, transcending the strictly musical to instill 
confidence, curiosity, and respect in each young musician. What’s more, Thompson has 
worked closely with school officials to monitor trends in student behavior, attendance, 
and achievement, drawing positive comparisons to those not enrolled in the program. 
Supporters wish to see Tune Up Philly implemented across the city, providing “an 
utterly democratic, broad-based music education … that keeps at-risk youth out of 
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trouble—a social program disguised as music lessons.”74 As the title of Dobrin’s article 
suggests, however, the program provides hope for more than just the students involved. 
Indeed, when one considers that the majority of the city’s population has no substantive 
connection to the symphonic repertoire, professional ensembles such as the Philadelphia 
Orchestra stand to benefit from the work being done by Tune Up Philly. In Thompson’s 
words, “American orchestras export their art to outside their communities, but if you can 
prove that the music is uplifting the community, then you get funding from gang and 
violence prevention agencies, from everyone who is involved in education and youth 
development.”75 This linkage could be especially valuable in Philadelphia, where the 
orchestra’s education department is woefully understaffed and community need is at an 
all-time high.
76
 Yet from the very beginning, Tune Up Philly has navigated a strained 
relationship with the city’s flagship arts organization. Although Thompson had originally 
intended Tune Up Philly to be a training arm of the Philadelphia Youth Orchestra (PYO), 
certain officials viewed it instead as a cash cow that could accumulate considerable 
administrative fees, reflecting divergent priorities that have forced Thompson to 
reconsider his role with the organization.
77
 At the Philadelphia Orchestra, senior 
managers expressed little interest at the possibility of partnering, despite Thompson’s 
attempts to approach the group’s board of directors and discuss mutual fundraising 
opportunities. Ironically, it was a Philadelphia Orchestra board member who helped 
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launch Thompson’s program with a $500,000 pledge, prompting him to wonder what the 
orchestra’s administrators were thinking:  
It’s an embarrassment to the Philadelphia Orchestra that we’re able to tap 
into the minority community, and that we have a more successful music 
education program. [Now] they’re calling to talk about partnering, but at 
the beginning, they wouldn’t let me talk to their board members about 
fundraising…. Tune Up Philly could have been sponsored by the 
Philadelphia Orchestra, but it’s not.78 
 
Despite the seemingly symbiotic partnerships cultivated by YOLA and OrchKids, 
Thompson prefers to operate outside the boundaries of a major professional orchestra. In 
his view, Tune Up Philly has little to gain from such an association, particularly if one 
assumes that the orchestra’s musicians would not participate in the program without 
additional compensation. 
 In fact, the hiring model employed by Tune Up Philly—working with lower 
profile musicians who are known locally for their inspired teaching methods—follows a 
trend that is at odds with the values embedded in traditional conservatory training. And 
despite the absence of “star” musicians, programs like Tune Up Philly attract 
development opportunities that arguably exceed those of a major orchestra. This is 
particularly true if one can provide measurable evidence linking participation in 
orchestral performance and improvements in academic and social behavior. Thompson 
concedes that it would take $20,000–$30,000 to sponsor a student for the entirety of his 
or her childhood, but while this cost exceeds the cost of traditional music education, its 
potential consequences make for a worthwhile investment. For instance, in Pennsylvania, 
it costs $35,000 annually to house one prison inmate, and if researchers can prove that 
participation in programs like Tune Up Philly help to decrease an individual’s proclivity 
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toward criminal activity, El Sistema’s stock will continue to rise. While such causational 
relationships have not been proven, Thompson continues to extoll the benefits of José 
Antonio Abreu’s vision. In the coming year, he hopes to transplant his program to other 
local schools and form a chamber orchestra of teaching artists that would perform free 
concerts in the communities they serve, thereby strengthening relationships with 
students’ families while  increasing the program’s visibility and artistic legitimacy.   
Reconciling Symphonic Culture with El Sistema 
Considering the three programs introduced above and the more than forty other 
núcleos across the country, one could say that the El Sistema movement has successfully 
penetrated the American soundscape. Its contagious philosophy, intuitive simplicity, and 
impressive results, both artistic and social, defy contestation. El Sistema’s ascension to 
“buzzword” status is confirmed by the unprecedented attention it has received from 
influential orchestra commentators and professional organizations.
79
 Yet a dissonance 
between Abreu’s philosophy and the prevailing practices of American orchestras bubbles 
beneath the surface, calling into question the industry’s motivations while threatening to 
subvert the important work accomplished through these programs. Indeed, traditional 
conceptions of artistic excellence and a history of elitism in orchestras conflict with the 
program’s populist message. The nature of this conflict warrants further consideration. 
To determine whether these El Sistema programs meet the assumptions and 
expectations intrinsic to the American orchestra music education systems, let us first 
consider the differences between them. As has already been discussed, El Sistema’s 
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philosophy is rooted in considerable commitment by both student and teacher. The fifteen 
or more hours spent each week on lessons and rehearsals dwarf the three to four hours 
dedicated to music education in most American public schools.
80
 Tony Woodcock sees 
more substantive differences between systems as well: 
What I experienced [in Venezuela] was music making in a very different 
way than in the so-called developed world, both in terms of energy and 
resources. What I witnessed in rehearsal was preparation and teaching at a 
very high and uniform level, not necessarily training orchestral musicians 
of the highest caliber, which I do not mean in a derogatory way 
whatsoever, but producing a technical competence informed by passion 
for the music. In the so-called developed world, we’ve done it the other 
way around. We look at technical competence, and if you have to bring in 
musical passion at the end of the day, all well and good, but people are not 
necessarily judged on that. 
 
Their philosophy is very different, and as a result of that their music 
making is at a different level than what we hear from American orchestras 
these days. If I were to characterize American orchestras now, compared 
to recordings of the past, is a homogeneity in style of performance today, 
where it’s very difficult, at least to my ears, to distinguish orchestras from 
one another. I think if we’re just looking at performance, I would say 
we’re in a place now that focuses on an adherence to refinement, and so 
when you here what’s happening in Venezuela, it’s as if you’ve been hit 




To be sure, moving away from an “adherence to refinement” represents a fundamental 
shift in the way performers and audiences interact with the musical experience. Erik 
Holmgren notes that, “when you go to Venezuela, people are crying as they watch the 
[orchestras] rehearse,” suggesting a heightened degree of emotional engagement that 
contrasts the utilitarian goals of music education in America.
82
 Here, the primary 
objective is to attain musical literacy, or, in the case of orchestras, “to develop a love of 
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symphonic music and build future audiences.”83 In Venezuela, the goal is social change. 
Despite its intense emphasis on artistic quality and a steadfast interest in cultivating 
appreciation for classical music, El Sistema is, to quote Churchill, “a social change 
program that uses music, rather than a music program using social change.”84  
To reconcile these differences, some of the leading voices from the El Sistema 
movement have pushed for a more flexible integration of new techniques and programs 
into the current educational landscape. Stephanie Scherpf, formerly of El Sistema USA 
points out that “we can’t ignore all of the great work that has been done in music 
education up to this point. [We] really have to be part of this larger ecosystem… This is 
not about reinventing the wheel, [it] is about best practices and good teaching.”85 
Although administrators and teachers are working hard to design new programs that are 
complementary rather than competitive, there are still other differences that make 
assimilation more difficult, including disparate conceptions of musical excellence. 
Educator and author Tricia Tunstall believes that, 
To be successful with an El Sistema initiative, we in the U.S. would have 
to challenge some really deep and long-held assumptions associated with 
music and music education. First regarding the absolute priority of 
musical excellence above all else, and second regarding the reality that we 
pursue music as an individual endeavor. Orchestras are a collection of 
individuals, who have each pursued their education individually, until 
finally after graduating from conservatory and achieving the highest level 
of success on an individual level, then people get collected into orchestras. 
Somehow that’s the model here, and that’s supposed to make up musical 
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Similar challenges confronted José Antonio Abreu during his crusade to create a new 
cultural appreciation for western classical music in Venezuela. But the practices he 
sought to change were not as deeply entrenched as they are in the U.S.
87
 Part of the 
challenge in translating Abreu’s philosophy to an American context is the inherent value 
system embedded in classical music culture. In Venezuela, Abreu developed a system 
that “gives music and opportunity to every child…. It doesn’t measure success in ticket 
sales, it measures success in children. Our task … is to reimagine over 100 years of 
musical culture with a new sense of possibility.”88 This underlying ideological conflict is 
exacerbated by the heterogeneity of our organizational populations, which defy one-size-
fits-all solutions and rarely yield consensus. 
 The division between these two archetypes extends from the ideological to the 
aesthetic, encompassing not only cultural concerns but also repertoire, which plays a 
critical role in the successful translation of a program to new environmental contexts. The 
political and cultural agenda ascribed to the orchestral canon highlights a conflict 
between universalist and elitist ideologies, but Mina Yang and others have argued that 
such repertoire can serve as an effective community building tool.
89
 This phenomenon 
has been exploited especially well in Venezuela, but in the U.S., programming strategies 
are less ubiquitous. For example, in Los Angeles ensembles mix the traditional with the 
relevant, as teachers introduce arrangements of Michael Jackson’s “Beat It” alongside 
Beethoven and Brahms so that students are exposed to a more diverse (albeit somewhat 
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artificial) assortment of musical traditions.
90
 Several observers have suggested, however, 
that the importance of repertoire is superseded simply by the ensemble environment. In 
Tunstall’s experience, 
The ensemble piece is obviously the lynchpin. The advantage of western 
symphonic music is that it presents a complexity, an artistic complexity, 
and a level of ensemble beauty that is fairly unmatched in the repertories 
of the world….. So that is a standard to work towards, an amazing 
mechanism for achieving musical excellence in an ensemble, because 
you’re working toward such a high standard, and in an arena of such 
complexity….91  
  
To be sure, the high standards and collective virtuosity of Venezuela’s ensembles are 
why El Sistema has grown into a global brand. Yet while the media has focused on the 
program’s top ensembles like the Simón Bolivar Orchestra, many of the 300,000 students 
do not exhibit substantial musical talent, and most do not pursue a career in music. In the 
U.S, however, orchestras continue to view the program as an opportunity “to train elite 
musicians” and “develop [the] great performing groups of the future.”92 El Sistema’s 
proto-populist characteristics present a threat to traditional conservatory training, which 
emphasizes solo musical performance and thus validates exclusivity.  
In Baltimore, Dan Trahey employs only one orchestra musician on his growing 
staff of teaching artists. For him, “what the [BSO] brings to the table is the highest 
possible artistry that you can find…. I don’t want these players teach for me unless they 
want to and are skilled. What I do want is them to inspire these kids through their 
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artistry.”93 This division between performers and teachers is reflected in the narrow focus 
of most postsecondary music education programs. NEC’s Tony Woodcock expressed 
dismay upon learning that OrchKids and YOLA rarely employ their own musicians: 
“You’ve got this huge resource pool of an orchestra, paid exceptionally well … but 
instead of using that huge, wonderful, magical resource, they bring in teaching artists, 
which for me is simply obfuscating the resources that you’ve already got.”94 This 
exclusion stems as much from the musicians themselves as it does from managers 
interested in hiring trained teaching artists, however. Due to the limited professional 
engagements allowed under most collective bargaining agreements, many unionized 
orchestra members cannot accept additional work, even when it is categorized as 
“community engagement.” For example, in San Antonio, director of youth orchestras 
Steve Payne attempted to engage San Antonio Symphony musicians in an El Sistema-
inspired partnership, but negotiations quickly broke down when the players refused to 
take on additional non-performing responsibilities.  
Tunstall believes that this division stems from the predominance of a decidedly 
performer-centric definition of musical excellence: 
The question of musical excellence versus social action as opposing goals 
seems to surface very soon [here]…. In Venezuela, they just don’t see 
those things as opposing goals. They have an absolutely passionate and I 
think self-reinforcing idea that musical excellence and social action can be 
intimately connected…. They are insistent on not considering those goals 
as mutually exclusive. You can even put social action first, and if you do it 
the right way musical excellence will occur. That’s very difficult for any 
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Dan Berkowitz and YOLA have had some success engaging musicians from the Los 
Angeles Philharmonic, but he understands why most prefer not to be involved with the 
program. In his words,  
The musicians that have [participated] have been incredibly inspired. Most 
of them grew up with conservatory training, and they come into this 
saying “wait a minute, I’m not happy with this.” When they come to meet 
these students, it brings a useful presence back to their lives, a new energy 
that reminds them why they played music in the first place. [But] many of 
them are uncomfortable teaching such young kids. I think maybe when 
they’re at a higher level, players might want to do something in a 
masterclass type setting, do something they’re more comfortable with….96 
 
Taken collectively, these reflections—provided by a group of El Sistema’s most 
influential administrators and practitioners across the U.S.—confirm that the movement 
offers a powerful argument supporting the orchestra’s broader social value.  
Nevertheless, the cultural politics discussed above undergird tensions that seem 
antithetical to the ethos of El Sistema. It remains to be seen who wields the power in this 
debate: orchestras, educators, or the mass public and youth best served by these 
programs. Mark Churchill is certainly not the first to argue that the bottom-up insurgence 
of culture in Venezuela conflicts with the top-down practices employed in the U.S. and 
European orchestra fields.
97
 What’s more, the public resources necessary to support a 
cohesive and sustained movement like the one in Venezuela do not currently exist in the 
U.S.  Richard Kessler, executive director of the Center for Arts Education in New York 
City, has recently suggested that it is not possible for El Sistema to gain the same kind of 
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programs little more than reinforced youth orchestras.
98
 Other skeptics exist, but one 
must search to find them. By and large, El Sistema continues to be praised for its 
rehabilitative capacities, despite the program’s elitist origins and imperialistic 
undercurrents. 
Music for Whose Good? 
To conclude, I would like to discuss the various ways in which orchestras might 
benefit from El Sistema’s recent transplantation to the U.S., and why they face an uphill 
climb if they choose to integrate these types of program into their current operating 
model. At a special 2008 meeting hosted by the League of American Orchestras, it 
quickly became apparent that, although El Sistema offered significant value to 
constituents, “most orchestras had more pressing issues, especially considering [their 
mission] is not quite aligned with El Sistema’s core philosophy.”99 Several major 
ensembles—including the orchestras of Chicago, Detroit, and Boston—later turned down 
opportunities to launch their own El Sistema initiatives.
100
 Even in Los Angeles and 
Baltimore, where two of the most successful programs exist, institutional investment 
remains relatively marginal. Indeed, if orchestras wish to fully integrate the ideals and 
practices of El Sistema, they must first implement major strategic changes, “turning 
everything upside down” to refocus their mission around community need.101 
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It is not yet clear if this will happen on an industry-wide scale, or if such wide-
reaching changes are even possible. Tony Woodcock believes that “orchestras are 
opportunistic, … not strategic.” 102  For them, El Sistema represents an opportunity that 
seems too good to ignore. But if they are to reap any of the organizational benefits 
offered by these programs, orchestras and musicians must reconsider what their 
contributions to society should be, and what structures and programs best deliver their 
value. For Stephanie Scherpf and many of the people interviewed for this chapter, El 
Sistema represents a possible solution, but “only if orchestras are … authentically 
engaged in this work.”103 Woodcock is even more forceful in this assertion, insisting that 
“you cannot associate the traditional orchestral mindset with El Sistema, because it will 
distort and destroy.”104 In other words, the old way of doing things—designing one-off 
educational concerts to increase visibility and boost ticket and fundraising revenue—
cannot be sustained. “The orchestra needs to be rebuilt, [and this] represents a better way 
to do it.”105  
Some administrators remain unconvinced of, or uninterested in, El Sistema’s 
power to reinvent the orchestra and drive large scale organizational change. Dan Trahey 
embraces the fact that audience development and organizational reinvention are not on 
OrchKids’ “to do” list, preferring instead to focus on the program’s student-centered 
mission and the mundane but important tasks his teachers face on a daily basis. He 
believes that using El Sistema as a tool for rebuilding orchestras is misguided: “There 
have been studies done that show people who don’t study music attend just as many 
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concerts as those that do…. So I have a really hard time believing that we’re building a 
generation of ticket buyers.”106 For Trahey, El Sistema is farmer’s work, and getting your 
hands dirty is the only way to enact real social change.   
Nevertheless, Trahey has joined other leaders from across the country to build a 
network of stakeholders dedicated to the continued diaspora of El Sistema, in all of its 
guises. Tricia Tunstall concedes that “it will never happen here the way it happened in 
Venezuela…. But in my moments of optimism, I hope that the sheer force of so many 
people moving in the same direction, even in their different ways, [can] create a real 
alternative here, a sense of a movement.”107 Whether or not professional orchestras play a 
major role in cultivating this movement remains to be seen. Tunstall would love to see 
orchestras embrace the idea, although she realizes the challenges associated with 
transforming a complex organization with deeply embedded traditions and cultural 
practices. She remains hopeful that orchestras like Baltimore and Los Angeles will 
continue to recognize the value of music education—and El Sistema in particular—for 
audiences and the organizations themselves: “In a way, they don’t really have much to 
lose… Taking on a challenge of that magnitude—a challenge of changing enough to put a 
community mission closer to the center of their identity—would be a great thing to aspire 
towards.”108 For Tony Woodcock, a former orchestra manager himself, the outlook is less 
rosy: 
The culture is just too strong, and for whatever reason, the level of 
suspicion to change, and the level of bad relationships that is endemic in 
the industry … can never be reversed. I think we need to create a new 
model of good practice [that allows] the musicians to take charge of their 
own destinies. In this country and culture I think we have a tendency to 
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overthink. Instead, we should come up with a new R&D model, and after 
3 or 5 years say to all the orchestras about to go out of business, this is 




Much of the resistance to such fundamental change stems from the American Federation 
of Musicians, whose rules and contracts for professional orchestra musicians severely 
limit the possibilities of community work. Nevertheless, Woodcock’s proposal is an 
interesting one, and makes a compelling argument for the sort of structural changes that 
could positively impact how orchestra’s operate in and engage with the contemporary 
environment.  
 The future of El Sistema in America may indeed be bright, but it is difficult to 
predict what that future will look like, or how desirable its outcomes will be. On 14 
March 2011, the New England Conservatory published a press release announcing plans 
to discontinue its association with Mark Churchill and El Sistema USA.
110
 NEC will 
continue to sponsor the Abreu Fellows program through at least 2015, but the initiative’s 
advocacy and research arm will be operated and funded independently.
111
 In point of fact, 
El Sistema USA had recently hired an education consultant who suggested that the 
initiative should increase its annual budget from $125,000 to a $400,000 to provide the 
depth of service necessary to spread the movement’s message.112 One staff member 
confided that the split “is a symptom of poorly managed expectations, a lack of vision 
and clarity of what is happening and where it needs to go.” Despite the program’s 
success, NEC felt it could not support such drastic growth, concentrating instead on 
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teacher and administrator training through the Abreu Fellows program while allowing 
Churchill to design a national support organization that will serve as a hub for research, 
development, and networking resources.  
 How the future of American orchestras intersects with this story will depend on 
how ensembles position themselves and their mission in the years ahead. Eric Booth, an 
arts consultant and senior advisor to El Sistema USA, believes that Abreu’s vision can 
effectively be used to transform the way in which our culture values classical music. In 
the following excerpt, Booth beautifully articulates how that vision is directly applicable 
to the crisis orchestras face: 
[The movement’s] truly radical promise … is that it invites a rediscovery 
of the purposes and processes of classical music. As our field in the U.S. 
struggles to find the relevance of classical music to more than the small 
“arts club” percentage of our populace, El Sistema proposes answers that 
can change not only the life trajectories of our at-risk children, but the 




Accomplishing both of these objectives simultaneously is easier said than done, however. 
While El Sistema’s philosophy can have tremendous impact, some larger orchestras have 
decided that it does not fit their core mission or resource profile.
114
 Others see it as a 
chance to redefine what it means to be an orchestra and a musician, inspiring a new 
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model rooted in community engagement and civic responsibility.
115
 One thing is for 
certain: If things do not change, orchestras run the risk of building “new structures on old 
foundations, foundations that have proven to have serious limitations that El Sistema has 
surmounted.”116 
As orchestras enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, conversations 
regarding relevancy and legitimacy abound, prompting El Sistema supporters to join the 
conversation and offer a more compelling and sustainable vision for the future.
117
 One 
could argue that a comparison of El Sistema and the American orchestra is a study in 
contrasts: flexible vs. intransigent, passionate vs. precise, all-encompassing vs. exclusive. 
Recent history indicates, however, that these two entities can successfully engage in 
meaningful partnerships and increase their respective values. El Sistema can help 
orchestras “compose change” by questioning some of the fundamental tenets embedded 
in orchestral culture, including, of course, for whom this music is practiced and 
performed.
118
 The challenges orchestras face in adapting El Sistema mirror the tension 
between the everyday practice of mass culture and the institutionalization of high art.  
The programs introduced earlier in this chapter—or at least the educational and 
social tenets associated with them—can be understood collectively as a means of 
alleviating that tension. El Sistema’s flexible, community-specific approach makes it 
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particularly difficult to adopt or translate elements of the program en masse. This 
ambiguity is reflected in the present chapter’s analytic stance, which redefines structure 
as a symbolic set of norms that are refracted through artistic and organizational practice. 
Unlike New York and Louisville, whose respective organizational frameworks were 
relatively well-defined, El Sistema’s structure is more symbolic and diffuse, making it 
difficult to generalize organizational characteristics and draw material connections. This 
difficulty is exacerbated by El Sistema’s movement-like properties, which constantly 
transform to address local environmental pressures. Despite these challenges, El Sistema 
offers orchestras a plausible, if nebulous, recourse for change. It is too early to tell how 
this story will end, but Abreu’s philosophy suggests that if orchestras break out of their 
cultural silos and reconcile their organizational agendas with the needs of their 
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Chapter Five  
The Twenty-First Century Orchestra 
Introduction 
It should be clear by now that the orchestra is not simply a passive mechanism for 
artistic performance. Instead, orchestras are complex institutions that reflect their broader 
cultural environment, struggling to reconcile artistic ideals with the realities of twenty-
first century life. The adaptive process accompanying this struggle—one of incremental 
change—is historically contingent, shaped by over a century of normative (and often 
conservative) practices that have determined what is legitimate and what is not. Yet 
history is not the only determinant of these challenges. Throughout this dissertation, I 
have argued that the modern symphony orchestra cannot be understood, artistically or 
otherwise, without consideration of its broader organizational structure. Simply put, 
structure matters: it defines channels of communication, determines distributions of 
power, and influences programming decisions.  
As elaborated in the preceding chapters, organizational structure has played a 
decisive though often ignored role in shaping artistic practice and reception. In turn-of-
the-century New York, the Philharmonic adopted a new form of organizing to subsidize 
increasingly expensive performances, but the rise of a new philanthropic elite had 
unanticipated consequences that fundamentally changed how the orchestra produced 
concerts. The Louisville Orchestra attempted a bold experiment in new music to 
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differentiate itself from larger competitors, only to find that limited financial resources 
and the conservative tastes of local audiences made long-term success impossible. More 
recently, the adaptation of El Sistema by American orchestras has highlighted deep-
seated tensions between the goals of community engagement, social responsibility, and 
musical excellence. But what do these findings mean for the twenty-first century 
orchestra? What lessons can be learned from the successes and failures of past ensembles, 
and what sort of agency do these organizations—including their musicians, managers, 
board members, and audiences—have to enact change in such a normative environment? 
Although it is problematic to distill the dissertation’s analytical insights into a 
finite list of actionable solutions, one can certainly extrapolate what factors have 
inhibited change and innovation within the orchestra field. For example, the 
transformation explicated in Chapter 2 shows how the emergence of a new governance 
structure and competing logics voiced by musicians and philanthropists produced 
longstanding contention. Chapter 3’s analysis suggests that, while repertoire plays an 
important role in organizational performance, it cannot compensate for structural 
deficiencies or consumer indifference. Even when technology is used to reach new 
markets, the absence of a connection with one’s local community engenders new 
challenges. Finally, Chapter 4 highlights a broader tension regarding what the orchestra 
should be and for whom: a purveyor of great art for an elite few, or a conduit for public 
education and self-betterment? Although these competing visions may coexist, latent 
conflict is exacerbated by the orchestra’s conservative ideology, hierarchical structure, 
and hand-to-mouth existence. 
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Upon reflection, a basic typology of challenges and opportunities for change can 
help us understand how orchestras might overcome the recurrent “crises” they face, not 
with a single, catch-all solution but through a diversity of answers that are context-
specific. Some experts have argued that the rhetoric of crisis conceals orchestras’ 
unwillingness to make “tough decisions,” but this phenomenon represents a crisis of its 
own sort, exacerbated by inefficiencies embedded in the orchestra’s operating model.119 
The degree to which an industry is in crisis may ebb and flow with the broader economic 
and artistic environment, but orchestras confront many of the same issues that have been 
haunting them since 1900. A recent editorial published by The New York Times blames 
finicky contributors, poor management, and disinterested audiences for “killing” the 
orchestra, but these are merely symptoms of a larger problem that is structural in 
nature.
120
 Orchestras suffer no only from an inefficient operating model, but also 
entrenched ideological conflicts that breed divisiveness within and between orchestras 
and their publics.  
Why such inefficiencies and contention have persisted for so long is unclear. 
Orchestras adopted their current form and practices in pursuit of legitimacy, but the 
research presented in this dissertation suggests that what was once deemed legitimate 
may be no longer. Pierre Boulez pointed out more than thirty years ago that “the 
orchestra’s organization is based on routines and contacts that are completely irrelevant 
to life as it is today,” but little has changed since then.121 Organizational theorist and 
orchestral consultant Paul Boulian has recently argued that we “must move from 
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interventions in which each symphony orchestra organization viewed as unique to its 
community … to a set of institutionalized approaches that can be adapted to the specific 
needs of an individual orchestra.”122  Boulian concentrates on the demand-based issues of 
retention and subscription, but there are other factors internal to the organization that 
deserve further study. In her study of the 1996 Atlanta Symphony Orchestra strike, Mary 
Ann Glynn found that a difference in perceived resource needs lead to subsequent labor 
disputes.
123
 According to her research, musicians identify principally with artistic quality, 
leveraging reputational resources to project an image of excellence, while board and staff 
members develop a more corporatized mentality in their search for financial resources. 
To be sure, “given the differences that exist structurally and symbolically in the 
orchestra, conflict between ideological elements in the organization’s identity seems 
almost inevitable.”124 
In an attempt to address these differences, the Mellon Foundation organized and 
supported a multi-year meeting for a variety of orchestra constituents from around the 
country.  Convened in early 1998, the Orchestra Forum sought to illuminate and 
articulate the organizational challenges faced by the industry, hiring consultants (Richard 
Evans and John McCann) and academics (Paul DiMaggio and J. Richard Hackman) to 
moderate a conversation between musicians, managers, conductors, and trustees. Based 
on these conversations, Mellon produced a report that outlined some of the critical issues 
confronting the field: deteriorated institutional and artistic leadership, inadequate 
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musician oversight, shifting community expectations, and conservative programming.
125
 
They found that, as internal and external measurements of success began to diverge, 
orchestras struggled to meet the distinct demands of musicians, traditional donors, and a 
broader audience. Following the Forum’s first meeting, the Rockefeller Foundation 
initiated a long-term grant program to help orchestras strengthen their strategies, 
leadership, and artistic values. Whether or not the program was a success remains to be 
seen, but it seems that, with a few exceptions, no truly innovative or new models of 
organizing have emerged. 
Nevertheless, one could certainly argue that orchestras are in no worse a place 
than they were one hundred years ago, and that their future is as secure as it has ever 
been. After all, more orchestras are producing more music at a higher level than ever 
before. Responding to a blog post written by NEC president Tony Woodcock and 
provocatively titled “American Orchestras: Yes, It’s a Crisis,” musician Nathan Kahn 
denounces such inflammatory rhetoric: 
Is it a crisis? As far as musicians and audiences, no. As far as incompetent 
and lazy managers and do nothing boards, yes. Here in Colorado Springs, 
and most recently in Honolulu, new orchestra organizations were formed 
that included board members who were and are passionate about classical 
music, and were not just sitting on a board to enhance their social/business 
prestige. So…a message to these kinds of managers and boards: The 
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 Nathan Kahn, in response to blog post by Tony Woodcock, published 5 May 2011 (see 
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From my perspective, the crisis facing orchestras is real, and although many of the 
institutions mentioned in this dissertation have survived, and even thrived, in past 
environments, recent history suggests that this may not be the case for long. In times of 
economic volatility, the structural deficiencies inherent to orchestral organizations 
become more pronounced, squeezing their already limited resources and pushing some to 
the brink of collapse.  
Familiar Challenges, Unprecedented Turmoil  
While orchestras have long struggled to balance their budgets without donor 
contributions, volatile markets combined with stagnant ticket sales and declining 
corporate support have made for an especially arduous environment in recent years. Since 
2009, no fewer than five orchestras have filed for bankruptcy, and several others have 
experienced lengthy labor disputes or work stoppages. The Honolulu Symphony filed for 
chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2009, forcing the organization to liquidate all of its assets due to 
mounting debts and waning local support.
127
  The orchestras of New Mexico (2011) and 
Syracuse (2011) have recently met similar fates, suggesting a trend that requires 
explication. The dismal state of the global economy only partially explains the acute 
difficulties facing American orchestras. One could argue that they have grown too big to 
sustain themselves in lean times, becoming increasingly dependent on contributed and 
endowment-related income. There is also mounting evidence that administrators are 
exploiting these difficulties as an excuse to reinvent what it means to be an orchestra, 
both artistically and organizationally. Such transformative rhetoric has been met with stiff 
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resistance from the musicians’ union, leading to increasingly corrosive labor relations 
that have grabbed national headlines and adversely affected some of the country’s largest 
orchestras. 
Perhaps the most prominent example is the Detroit Symphony Orchestra (DSO), 
which experienced a 26-week strike during their 2010-11 season. Although this was not 
the longest labor-induced work stoppage in American orchestral history, it was certainly 
the most contentious. The strike stemmed from proposed wage concessions of over 30 % 
and newly required community engagement activities, but reflected a growing divide 
been the orchestra’s musicians and upper-level administrators. Musicians saw the 
proposed contract as an attempt by management to overreach its artistic purview and 
redefine the role of the orchestral musician, while management insisted it was simply 
trying to put the orchestra on firmer footing for the future. Although the musicians 
continued to perform as a separate entity during the strike, the DSO’s regular subscription 
concerts in Orchestra Hall were uniformly canceled, while musicians and management 
worked to dismantle each other’s credibility. Claims of ineptitude quickly entered the 
mainstream press, and a growing group of board members began to waver in their 
support of the orchestra’s CEO and executive director, Anne Parsons.128  Dissension 
among musicians quickly spread to other orchestras across the country, leading to 
publically-contested negotiations that ended with a new base salary of $79,000, down 
from nearly $105,000 the previous year.  
Although the DSO’s musicians eventually settled for a reduced contract, such a 
dramatic pay cut prompted concerns that Detroit would no longer be able to compete with 
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other top orchestras from around the country. Indeed, several principal players, including 
the orchestra’s concertmistress and the entire percussion section, left the orchestra for 
other opportunities. Yet apart from a handful of supporters from the city’s wealthiest 
suburbs, much of Detroit remained unaffected when the orchestra stopped presenting 
concerts. Despite all of the publicity created by the strike, most people seemed to be more 
concerned with other issues more relevant to their daily lives. Every orchestra would like 
to say that it is an irreplaceable cultural asset, but what if its concerts reach only five 
percent—or less—of the population?  The DSO’s management recognizes this disconnect 
between institution and community, and is working with other local organizations to 
reinvigorate the city’s commitment to classical music. By downsizing and reinvesting in 
community engagement, the orchestra can begin to rebuild its brand and prove its value 
to the city of Detroit. For many musicians, however, such a dramatic reorientation means 
a reduction in artistic prestige, emphasizing the potency of prevailing cultural norms. 
Similar labor-related conflicts have been played out recently in bankruptcy court. 
In April of 2011, the Philadelphia Orchestra filed to reorganize and renegotiate its 
existing contracts in an attempt to prevent future cash flow problems. According to the 
orchestra’s management, “operating funds are rapidly dwindling and will [soon] be 
exhausted, [and] while the Orchestra does not have any debt, we are operating at a 
significant loss with a structural deficit of $14.5 million.”129 This deficit—the difference 
between general operating costs and ticket sales—reflects a reality shaped both by 
geography and history. Like Detroit, Philadelphia is predominately African American, a 
demographic that has traditionally been underserved by orchestras and other high art 
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institutions. As fewer wealthy elites from the city’s Main Line neighborhood attend 
concerts, the orchestra has struggled to maintain community support, both through 
fundraising and ticket sales. 
 In the mid-2000s, the orchestra experienced unprecedented lacunae in 
administrative, board, and artistic leadership, struggling to fill vacancies for executive 
director, board chair, and music director. The uncertainty resulting from these openings 
was exacerbated by financially disadvantageous contracts with musicians, vendors, and 
partners such as the Kimmel Center and the Philadelphia Pops. For the orchestra, chapter 
11 bankruptcy represents an expedited means of renegotiating these contracts and 
jumpstarting the strategic change process. Nevertheless, musicians and patrons worry that 
the bankruptcy will impact the orchestra’s sterling reputation and the health of its brand, 
and rightly so. As the first major orchestra to file for bankruptcy in recent history, 
Philadelphia is entering uncharted territory. From the musicians’ point of view, the 
orchestra has more than enough assets to cover current costs, including a $120 million 
endowment from which to drawn on.
130
 From management’s perspective, however, 
accessing restricted endowment funds would only postpone the inevitable, as the 
structural deficit mentioned above continues to grow and threaten the orchestra’s future. 
 One might wonder why local foundations, donors, or the board itself has not 
stepped in to bailout the orchestra, but a relatively simple explanation exists: they have 
done it before, and it does little to solve the broader issue at hand. The Pew Charitable 
Trusts has provided the Philadelphia Orchestra with emergency funding several times 
since 2000, but these grants were predicated on an understanding that such “rescue aid” 
                                                 
130
 The size of the endowment could be considered as high as $140 million, if one includes the Academy of 
Music’s investment assets, which the orchestra oversees. 
  257 
would not become an annual crutch. Simply bailing out the orchestra is in essence 
prolonging a problem that will require further fixing down the road. An analogy to the 
2008 financial crisis is apt: without addressing the structural weaknesses causing the 
crisis, the system will remain broken and markets will remain unpredictable. In this 
sense, the Philadelphia Orchestra’s bankruptcy proceedings are less about immediate 
cash flow concerns and more about long-term stability. In October 2011, the musicians 
surprisingly accepted a new contract that included a fifteen percent pay cut and the loss 
of guaranteed pension funds, choosing to resolve the conflict instead of inciting a drawn-
out labor dispute. Although several musicians—including principal clarinetist Ricardo 
Morales—have decided to leave the orchestra, this decision sets an important precedent 
regarding how orchestras use bankruptcy to mediate contention and reinvent themselves. 
Whether these tactics solve the longstanding financial problems associated with 
orchestral performance remains to be seen, however. Several months before Philadelphia 
filed for bankruptcy, the Louisville Orchestra used a similar strategy to try and 
renegotiate its CBA, or collective bargaining agreement, with musicians. In December of 
2010, the orchestra’s board and CEO Robert Birman determined that the group was 
presenting too many concerts, and employing too many musicians, given the city’s 
limited demand for classical music. By shrinking the orchestra, they hoped to focus on 
building a culture of appreciation and investment that had thus far been missing from the 
community. Mayor Gregg Fischer stepped in to help with contract negotiations, noting 
that “the orchestra is very important to Louisville, and it’s part of our cultural footprint… 
[But] it seems that once a decade or so there’s always a crisis around the orchestra, and 
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we can’t continue to operate that way.”131 Despite successfully navigating bankruptcy, 
the orchestra has thus far been unable to meet musicians’ wage and work demands, 
prompting management to take the unprecedented step of auditioning non-union 
replacements.
132
 Any musicians that take the audition will likely be blacklisted from 
future union job opportunities. With the orchestra sitting atop the American Federation of 
Musicians’ “Unfair Employer” list, the entire industry is watching to see how things will 
unfold in Louisville. 
Given these and other developments, it seems safe to say that the strained 
relationship between orchestral musicians and management has reached its breaking 
point.
133
 The implicit goal of the musicians’ union—to advocate for higher wages, better 
work conditions, and more autonomy—conflicts with the needs of the institutions 
themselves. This tension reflects a broader issue concerning who orchestras exist to 
serve: musicians, wealthy patrons, or the broader community. The continued 
bureaucratization of orchestras has been understood as a necessary process, especially 
given ever-growing fundraising and administrative demands. Yet broader cultural trends 
suggest that these organizations have become over professionalized, growing increasingly 
dependent on complex administrative structures that no longer serve the music itself. 
Collective interest in orchestral music—and in the arts in general—has been 
declining for some time. Recent indices measuring the health of America’s arts sector 
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 In Denver, Colorado, two-thirds of the orchestra’s board of directors resigned after unsuccessful 
negotiations with musicians. They cited musicians’ unwillingness to compromise as their reason for 
stepping down (Kyle MacMillan, “20 Colorado Symphony Orchestra board members resign,” Denver Post, 
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suggest that artists and arts organizations struggle to compete with other forms of mass 
produced entertainment.
134
 Audiences for and investors in cultural events have shrunk 
considerably since 1982, with only 34.6% of the adult population attending a single 
museum or performance of jazz, opera, classical music, ballet, or theater in 2008.
135
  
Even with the advent of the internet and various digital technologies, it seems as though 
fewer people create and distribute art today than they did twenty years ago.
136
 Some 
researchers have argued that the reasons for this apparent decline are rooted in 
insufficient arts learning opportunities.
137
 Too little attention has been focused on 
stimulating interest in, and cultivating demand for, art and art making. When considering 
American orchestras specifically, paid concert attendance has declined by over 16% since 
2000, raising questions concerning the alignment of value, capacity, and support 
structures in twenty-first century orchestral life.
138
  
Past and Present Converge 
Before offering a framework to help scholars and practitioners think about ways 
in which orchestras might effectively tackle these challenges, I present some new data 
that captures the structural deficit embedded in the orchestra’s nonprofit operating model. 
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The four graphs that follow provide an updated look at the income gap phenomenon 
introduced in chapter one. Remember that this gap represents the difference between total 
expenses and earned income, measured here as the sum of performance income, 
recording royalties, and gains (or losses) on endowment and other investments. This 
difference has historically been filled by grants and donations from foundations, 
corporations, and wealthy individuals, whose contributions have become an essential but 
unpredictable part of modern-day orchestral economics.  
The last comprehensive calculation of the income gap in America’s “major” 
orchestras was conducted by McKinsey consultants John Macomber and John T. Wooster 
in 1972, and later republished and expanded by Philip Hart.
139
 To my knowledge, no one 
has extended these findings to the present day using an equivalent sample. Figures 5.1-
5.4 reflect financial data drawn from the League of American Orchestras’ annual 
statistical reports, which were accessed both through their physical archives in New York 
(1972–84) and digital files provided by the League’s Knowledge Center (1985–2009).140 
The average values for total expenses and earned income were calculated using a sample 
of approximately thirty U.S. orchestras. Although inconsistencies in the League’s data 
necessitated some slight modifications to which orchestras were included, these findings 
are roughly comparable to Macomber and Wooster’s 1972 analysis.141 Tables with 
detailed data for each year are reproduced in Figures 6.3–6.6 in the Appendix. 
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Each graph highlights a different phenomenon related to the much belabored income gap, 
which orchestras have been unable to curtail or prevent. Figure 5.1 reflects the “classic” 
income gap confronting America’s largest orchestras, and demonstrates how dependent 
America’s largest orchestras have become on their endowment funds. The massive drops 
in earned revenue reflect the dot-com bubble (2001) and the global financial crisis 
(2008), which negatively impacted the stock market and adversely affected orchestras 
with mega-endowments. The increased significance of endowment and other investment-
related income to orchestras’ operating budgets does not fully explain the growing gap 
between expenses and earned income, however. Figure 5.2 suggests that, while overall 
expenses have steadily continued to rise, performance income (or earned income without 
investment-related gains) has remained relatively stagnant since 1990. In that time, the 
average annual cost associated with producing orchestral concerts has more than doubled, 
while the percentage of total costs covered by ticket sales has steadily fallen from 50% to  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
York), and the orchestras of Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dallas, 
Denver, Detroit, Houston, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minnesota (Minneapolis-
St. Paul), National (Washington, D.C.), New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Rochester, San 
Antonio, Seattle, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Utah. The following modifications or substitutions were 
made in an attempt to mitigate inconsistencies and missing data: 1972-73—no data for the American 
Symphony Orchestra; 1974—New Jersey and Honolulu added; 1975—no modifications; 1976—no 
modifications; 1977—North Carolina and Syracuse added; 1978—no modifications; 1979—no 
modifications; 1980—Oregon, St. Paul, and San Diego added; Honolulu, North Carolina, and New Jersey 
no longer included; 1981—no modifications; 1982—no data for Kansas City; 1983—no modifications; 
1984—no modifications; 1985—no modifications; 1986—no modifications; 1987—San Diego no longer 
included; 1988—San Diego added, New Orleans and San Antonio no longer included; 1989—no 
modifications; 1990—New Jersey and Columbus added, Denver no longer included; 1991—San Antonio 
added, Syracuse no longer included; 1992—no modifications; 1993—Florida added, Rochester no longer 
included; 1994—Rochester added, St. Louis no longer included; 1995—Colorado added, San Diego no 
longer included; 1996—St. Louis added, Colorado no longer included; 1997—Colorado added; 1998—
Buffalo not included; 1999—Buffalo added, St. Louis not included (digital data incomplete, supplemented 
by archival data); 2000—St. Louis added; 2001—Fort Worth, Nashville, Pacific added; Columbus and 
Houston not included; 2002—Houston added; 2003—no modifications; 2004—Columbus added, San 
Antonio not included; 2005—Cleveland not included; 2006—no modifications; 2007—no modifications; 























Figure 5.1: Average Income Gap of America’s Thirty Largest Orchestras (1990-2009), w/o endowment income and adj. for inflation 
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40%.
142
 Even when adjusted for inflation, “Baumol’s Curse” continues to haunt the 
twenty-first century orchestra (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4). 
This data indicates that, from a financial perspective, orchestras have transformed 
from service to fundraising organizations, becoming increasingly reliant on private 
contributions and overinflated investments to subsidize ever-growing operating costs. 
The collective inability of orchestras to correct for shifts in the economic and cultural 
environments suggests a paradox. Despite enduring one crisis after another, orchestras 
persist, both organizationally and artistically. How have these institutions maintained 
themselves in such unfavorable conditions? It is well documented that organizational 
forms and practices ossify overtime, becoming legitimated and routinized despite 
efficiency concerns.
143
 The “myth and ceremony” that results from this process becomes 
self-fulfilling, creating value through repetition and familiarity. According to Douglas 
Dempster,  
The performing arts, like education and health care, have grown not 
through greater productivity, but through greater perceived value…. The 
key to understanding the economics of symphony orchestras and other 
performing arts is not in understanding the perils of productivity lag…. 
The key is to understand how these organizations control the perceived 
value of their service in order to keep pace with highly inflationary costs 




However orchestras seem unable to “keep pace” with changes in their environment, 
struggling to reconcile their artistic mission with the broader expectations of society. It 
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seems as if their plight is one of subsistence, surviving on wealthy donations to produce 
and maintain an art form that is revered by few and irrelevant for many. 
 Yet strong evidence exists, and reminds us, that orchestras have done more than 
simply survive in the twentieth century. As shown throughout this dissertation, American 
orchestras have created an enviable artistic legacy and developed an organizational 
framework that has helped classical musicians make a living. Despite the recent 
recession, at least eleven U.S. orchestras boast a base salary of over $100,000, with the 
Los Angeles Philharmonic leading the way.
145
 To understand these advancements, 
however, we must couch them within the broader historical narrative laid out in the 
preceding chapters. Thus, I have constructed a loose framework or typology to describe 
the kinds of challenges orchestras face, and categorize the ways in which these challenges 
are being addressed. The internal structure governing how orchestras organize plays an 
important role in this story, especially considering the contentious labor relation issues 
discussed earlier in this chapter. These tensions are exacerbated by a lack of resources 
that makes it difficult to cultivate healthy intra-organizational relationships. External 
structures shape how orchestras engage with diverse and sometimes conflicting local 
communities. The lack of consensus regarding what orchestras are, and for whom, makes 
it difficult to form substantive partnerships and reach new audiences. Figure 5.5 offers a 
summary of how arts organizations are beginning to address these structural constraints.  
 Orchestras also face great challenges—and opportunities—in the realms of artistic 
production and consumption. The industry has not yet decided how best to use twenty-
first century technologies to reach contemporary audiences, a challenge made particularly 
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acute by the orchestra’s historical aversion to such advancements. The artistic experience 
produced through live performance remains at the center of what orchestras do, and 
rightfully so, but it remains unclear if or how these conventions might be altered to meet 
today’s challenges. Orchestral institutions face significant barriers to change, but they 
also face exciting opportunities for innovation through the adaptation of new structures 
(both internal and external), technologies, and artistic practices. These facets of 
organizational life are not disparate, but are instead interconnected and historically 
contingent. As orchestras wrestle with an uncertain future, they must dislodge arbitrary 
industry standards and redefine what success means, and how it is achieved, in the 
twenty-first century. 
                                                 
146
 Originally published in Richard Evans, “Entering Upon Novelty: Policy and Funding Issues for a New 
Era in the Arts,” Grantmakers in the Arts Reader 21, no. 3 (Fall 2010). 
  269 
Models for the Future 
Perhaps now more than ever, serious discussion concerning the future of classical 
music and its place in contemporary society pervades public discourse surrounding the 
arts. One need only peruse a handful of industry blogs or articles to sense what seems to 
be a watershed moment in the history of classical music in America.
147
 This discussion is 
particularly rich in the context of symphony orchestras, whose massive resource needs 
and cultural import make them ideal targets for revisionist commentary. Although there 
may be no single answer to the questions facing orchestras today, several new models are 
being tested around the country. Some of these innovations represent a stark departure 
from accepted practice, while others have historical antecedents discussed earlier in this 
dissertation. Orchestras are beginning to fundamentally rethink how their mission should 
be reflected through their organizational structures, community relationships, 
technologies, and artistic practices. Each of these areas signifies unique but interrelated 
opportunities for substantive change and renewed success. 
The internal organization of orchestras has played a significant role in their 
collective successes and failures, but little if any work adequately explores this process. 
In chapter 2, I argued that the New York Philharmonic’s reorganization efforts carried 
important structural and artistic consequences that shaped its identity. These structural 
consequences include both the business model being employed by the organization in 
question, as well as the embedded and often contentious relationships between employees 
(musicians) and managers (administrative staff and board). The challenges associated 
with orchestral labor relations are not new, but reflect a steady process of 
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bureaucratization. Nearly fifty years ago, musician and union leader Lew Waldeck 
pointed out that “symphony musicians began to think about the causes for their unrest. 
They thought hard. They thought for a long time…. They thought, “We are not like any 
other union…. We are not only the workers, we are the means of production. We are the 
delivery system, We own the tools of production. We are the product.””148 This kind of 
rhetoric has ossified orchestral labor relations. Musicians blame management for most 
organizational failures, but have little recourse for recompense due to their detachment 
from the administrative process. Such limited involvement is structurally determined, 
reflecting a division of power between musicians and managers that is historically 
contingent.  
 The Atlanta Symphony Orchestra (ASO) has recently implemented a new forum 
encouraging musicians to contribute administratively and openly question managerial 
practices. Faced with financial challenges and widespread disaffection among 
constituents, the ASO has cultivated a collaborative organizational culture that eliminates 
conventional silos and increases synergy. The orchestra regularly holds meetings in what 
they affectionately call the “war room,” bringing together staff and ensemble members to 
participate in the strategy and decision making process.
149
 Leveraging musician insight 
and manpower to tackle larger organizational challenges evokes the “community of 
musicians” approach championed by Ernest Fleischmann, Pierre Boulez, and others. The 
corresponding cooperative model allows for greater flexibility but conflicts with the 
highly professionalized and hierarchical structures favored by most complex 
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organizations. The Saint Paul Chamber Orchestra is perhaps the best known musicians’ 
cooperative, vesting total organizational power and responsibility with its ensemble 
members, but others exist.
150
 Both the New York-based Knights orchestra and the 
Louisiana Philharmonic employ a self-governing scheme, but the artistic flexibility and 
freedom associated with cooperative organizations comes at a price. The community and 
financial resources necessary to support a large-scale symphony orchestra require 
intensive fundraising efforts. Without a full-time development staff and well-connected 
board members, six-figure musician salaries would surely become a thing of the past. 
These evolutions do not mean that the age of the corporate nonprofit orchestra is 
over, however, nor do they imply that nineteenth-century forms will replace current 
modes of organizing. Instead, orchestras are adapting innovations through a process of 
bricolage, reinventing the past to develop and expand their value for a new generation of 
listeners. One means of structural recombination that has become increasingly prevalent 
across the nonprofit sector is social enterprise. Simply defined as a nonprofit owned, 
revenue-generating entity that contributes to an organization’s mission, social enterprises 
represent a potentially more reliable income stream than charitable support, and can 
foster a culture of self-sufficiency. The concept has added significant value to a host of 
nonprofit industries, but the performing arts have yet to tap into its possibilities. Many 
organizations traditionally categorized as 501(c)3s have also begun to explore the 
regulatory and funding possibilities associated with for-profit and public sector 
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organizations. The recent development of the “L3C,” or Low-Profit Limited Liability 
Company, may offer a model for the future. L3Cs provide layered returns for a variety of 
investors—from foundations to social and even market investors. By freeing up capital 
and encouraging experimentation, this model attempts to strengthen social service 
organizations with financially sustainable practices. 
Several performing arts institutions have benefited from these blended or hybrid 
structures, but most come from outside the orchestra world. For example, the Royal 
Shakespeare Company (RSC) employed a hybrid commercial/subsidized model for a 
recent production of Matilda, engaging several philanthropists to serve as a safety net and 
mitigate the risk associated with most for-profit investments.
151
 Orchestras in Columbus, 
Ohio (Columbus Symphony) and Washington, D.C. (National Symphony) have partnered 
with other local arts centers to share administrative resources, diffusing financial liability 
and becoming more efficient and embedded in their artistic communities. Still other 
structural innovations address the reality that some organizations persist despite a lack of 
purpose. The Merce Cunningham Dance Company exercises an “epoch model” approach, 
which presumes a limited organizational lifecycle with a predetermined end-date.
152
 
When the Company’s artistic mission is sufficiently met, the organization will cease to 
exist. This frees up financial and human resources, benefiting artists’ creativity while 
increasing the fungibility of the arts sector as a whole. 
The external social structure in which orchestras operate also presents a series of 
opportunities for innovation and change. The story of El Sistema (Chapter 4) suggests 
that, to thrive, artists must form deep connections with each other and their communities. 
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As service organizations dedicated to performance, orchestras explicitly depend on their 
audiences for survival. This was as true in the nineteenth century as it is today. According 
to musicologist John Spitzer,  
Entrepreneur-conductors and enterprise orchestras thrived during the 
nineteenth century because they expressed and fit in with prevailing social 
values. They were the musical embodiment of the spirit of enterprise, 
initiative and commerce fostered by nineteenth-century capitalism…. 
Entrepreneur conductors and their orchestras also fit in with the new 
democratic values of the age and the broadening of public culture in which 
the middle classes gained access to cultural goods that had previously 




One could argue that orchestras no longer resonate with prevailing cultural practices and 
norms, but some ensembles are tackling this problem head on. The Memphis Symphony 
Orchestra responded to a despondent audience base by articulating a new mission of 
public citizenship, “building artistically engaging community partnerships that use 
musicians' artistic talents and leadership to serve community needs.”154 Invoking a 
system of “service exchange,” Memphis has redefined the role of the orchestral musician 
by providing compensation for activities outside of the concert hall (e.g., teaching, 
mentoring, producing a local radio show). This model can help orchestras balance their 
budgets and build community support, all while supplying musicians with additional paid 
work. It also addresses an oversupply of traditional concerts, foreshadowing a shift in the 
way orchestras identify themselves—from purveyors of elite art to public educational 
institutions. 
 Indeed, the simple notion that pops concerts represent the best (or easiest) way to 
reach one’s community is now viewed as outdated or even condescending. Orchestras are 
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instead beginning to take classical music “from the stage to the streets,” meeting 
audiences half way to engage them on their own turf. In Chicago, the CSO has teamed up 
with superstar cellist Yo Yo Ma to orchestrate a “citizen musician movement” in the 
city’s most underserved neighborhoods.155 Michael Tilson Thomas and the New World 
Symphony, an elite training orchestra based out of Miami, Florida, have begun curating a 
series of concurrent mini-concerts that encourages listeners to move freely and informally 
between performance spaces.
156
 And in Baltimore, Marin Alsop has implemented a 
“Rusty Musicians” program that invites amateur instrumentalists to sit and play with 
members of the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra. Thus while arts organizations have 
traditionally viewed audiences as passive consumers, these programs suggest a shift 
toward a more participatory framework, in which community members interact with both 
the music and the musicians.   
 The geographic location of these interactions is an important factor for orchestras 
to consider. After all, “community” is often situated in some physical or virtual meeting 
space, where people can come together and experience something collectively. The 
Brooklyn Philharmonic has recently been termed a “site-specific” orchestra, due to its 
interconnectedness with the Brooklyn community and various local artists (including 
rapper Mos Def and indie rock musician Sufjan Stevens).
157
 Such musical border-
crossing suggests a rethinking of traditional programming strategies, extending the 
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orchestra’s reach to a broader audience with diverse musical tastes and experiences.158 
Moreover, in an increasingly globalized world, locality need not be confined to a 
metropolitan area or neighborhood. Some of the country’s largest orchestras have taken 
considerable steps to redefine community and build an explicitly global brand. Since 
2005, the Cleveland Orchestra has invested heavily in extended residencies domestically 
(Florida) and abroad (Paris), while the New York Philharmonic’s recent tours to North 
Korea and Vietnam highlight its role as a cultural diplomat.
159
 
 Yet, with an art form that privileges the live concert experience, how can 
orchestras build meaningful relationships with global audiences, or reach a generation of 
young people who depend on and expect digital channels of entertainment and 
communication? Orchestras have until recently ignored many of the technological 
advancements attained during the digital age, fearing its potentially disruptive effects. 
Few would disagree that digital technologies represent a tremendous opportunity for arts 
organizations, both in terms of capturing and distributing content and reaching new 
audiences. But they also threaten at least two core values held by most orchestras: audio 
fidelity, and the sanctity of the live concert experience. Many feel that, with the advent of 
digital technology, the beauty and uniqueness of the live acoustic event is diluted or, 
worse yet, lost altogether. And, with an overabundance of freely available artistic content, 
few organizations have discovered how to effectively monetize the virtual experience. 
                                                 
158
 For more on musical border-crossing, see Charles Hiroshi Garrett, Struggling to Define a Nation: 
American Music and the Twentieth Century (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
2009). 
159
 For more on how musical institutions negotiate cultural diplomacy, see Emily Abrams Ansari, “A 
Serious and Delicate Mission: American Orchestras, American Composers, and Cold War Diplomacy in 
Europe,” in Carol Oja, Anne Schreffler, Felix Rathert, and Wolfgang Meyer (eds.), Crosscurrents: 
American and European Music in Interaction (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, forthcoming). 
  276 
 It should thus come as no surprise that most orchestras use technology in a 
relatively perfunctory manner. For them, technology is too expensive, too unfamiliar, and 
too destructive to provide real value.
160
 Nevertheless, some performing arts organizations 
are beginning to incorporate technology into their day-to-day operations and strategic 
planning, most often through the live broadcasting of concert events. Although I will not 
review fully how arts organizations have exploited technology to reach new audiences, 
two examples from outside the U.S. orchestra industry may prove instructive. Since its 
inception in December 2006, the Metropolitan Opera’s Met: Live in HD project has 
broadcasted more than fifty live productions in movie theaters and other venues across 
the world. Conceived as both an audience development tool and a revenue generator, the 
Emmy-award winning series has sold more than five million tickets in forty-six countries, 
and in 2010 the project posted its first profit. Yet it remains unclear what effect the 
project has had on other opera companies or the industry in general. Potential ticket 
buyers based in smaller rural markets may no longer attend live performances produced 
by regional opera companies, choosing instead to patronize the Met in HD programs. 
Alternatively, first-time opera goers may be inspired to attend or support future 
performances by their local company. 
The Berlin Philharmonic faces a similar paradox with its web-driven Digital 
Concert Hall (DCH). The DCH—a virtual concert venue that broadcasts live 
performances and archives concerts for future viewing—draws on cutting edge 
technologies to sell affordable online subscriptions to fans from around the world.
161
 The 
project is handsomely funded by Deutsche Bank, which provides research and 
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development support so that the orchestra can transform the DCH into a self-sustaining 
and revenue-generating audience development tool. Yet despite these obvious 
advantages, critics point out that the initiative’s success undermines the very essence of 
orchestral performance, enabling audience members to become complacent with the 
virtual concert experience and thus losing something ineffable along the way. Likewise, 
orchestras with inferior artistic and financial resources may be harmed by the project’s 
success, unable to compete with the Berlin Philharmonic’s sterling reputation. 
Nevertheless, the intrepid rise of technology directs our critical gaze toward the future, 
repositioning the orchestra as a powerful metaphor for cultural legitimacy.
162
 The broader 
implications of these technologies are contested and complex, but orchestras must learn 
to navigate them if they wish to compete with other entertainment and media outlets in 
the twenty-first century. 
 As argued throughout this dissertation, each of these structural and technological 
challenges carries important artistic consequences. Similarly, orchestras can use various 
programming and artistic strategies to combat the organizational challenges they face. 
Since the last decades of the nineteenth century, ensembles dedicated to “serious” 
symphonic music have experimented with more popular repertoire in an attempt to build 
demand. The pops tradition has since evolved to include mixed genre and cross-over 
concerts featuring popular artists, heavy metal bands, and movie or video-game music.
163
 
Alternatively, some orchestras have tried to differentiate themselves by focusing on a 
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historical or stylistic niche within the classical music tradition. In chapter 3, I explored 
how the Louisville Orchestra invested in an expansive new music project to gain 
international acclaim, and today a handful of ensembles support similar initiatives, albeit 
on a more modest scale. Still other orchestras have aligned themselves with the 
historically-informed performance movement, or integrated their concert programming 
with themed educational events produced in partnership with universities or other cultural 
institutions.
164
  Each of these strategies adds artistic value, but none has solved the 
organizational problems associated with symphony orchestras. 
 One recent attempt to bring together innovative programming and an alternative 
business model explicitly addresses some of these issues. Launched in 2011 and 
scheduled to run through at least 2014, New York’s “Spring for Music!” festival was 
conceived as a means of providing affordable and interesting performances by a set of 
forward-thinking orchestras.
165
 Each year, six or seven North American orchestras are 
chosen to perform at Carnegie Hall. The competitive application process is based 
primarily on the merit and inventiveness of the proposed programming philosophy, and 
thus orchestras of varying size and reputation are invited to perform.
166
 Tickets are priced 
at $15 and $25 each, and participating orchestras receives a share of the net proceeds for 
the entire festival, with a guaranteed share of at least $50,000. The simplicity of this 
model supports the festival’s mission: to foster artistic expression beyond the limitations 
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of the orchestra’s current financial model, and attract and excite new audiences for 
classical music through unique content and an accessible pricing structure. Bridging 
structural limitations with a compelling artistic message can help to isolate and perhaps 
even transcend the challenges facing orchestras today. 
Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
It is neither fair nor accurate to characterize orchestras simply as “permanently 
failing” organizations held together by a distinguished but increasingly irrelevant cultural 
past. Given the strains of evidence introduced above, it appears as though orchestras are 
working hard to reinvigorate themselves and tackle the challenges they face. The 
strategies being employed for this transformative work are diverse, but they are loosely 
connected through a common goal. To ensure survival, orchestras must contemplate their 
histories and examine the embedded structures they occupy. Indeed, organizational 
structure has been a defining influence in the context of musical performance and identity 
in the last century. However it has not been the only constraint facing orchestras, but one 
of many. In Chapter 2, I argued that the New York Philharmonic’s reorganization efforts 
were part of broader class warfare being waged inside cultural institutions across the city. 
The Louisville Orchestra’s New Music Project can be understood in part as a political 
statement, responding to Cold War rhetoric with evidence of home-grown cultural 
innovations. And, while El Sistema presents American orchestras with new opportunities 
to redefine themselves, its history reflects the interconnected and mutually contingent 
nature of music education, orchestral culture, and community in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.   
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 This dissertation provides a rich and varied perspective on the history of the 
American orchestra, but it does not offer a catch-all solution to the problems outlined in 
my introduction. Thus the question remains: are orchestras destined to grow increasingly 
ossified, marginalized, and irrelevant, or will changes to their organizational structure 
allow them the flexibility and resources necessary to become dynamic, self-sustaining 
institutions? As discussed throughout the dissertation, the rift between popular and urban 
elite culture is central to the very formation of the American orchestra, and has plagued 
its viability ever since. Orchestral historian Philip Hart goes so far as to argue that great 
art is inherently aristocratic, suggesting that self-induced elitism may represent the 
orchestra’s surest chance for survival.167 I disagree. While the hierarchies embedded in 
the orchestra’s ensemble, administrative, and patron structures make organizational 
change all the more complex, it is inevitable. In the face of declining demand and rising 
costs, orchestras are experimenting with their marketing and programming tactics to 
attract and engage new audiences without repelling their traditional patrons. Yet 
significant changes are necessary if orchestras wish to break through the structural 
shackles that currently constrain them. 
Recent research from within the arts sector has proposed how arts nonprofits can 
facilitate new engagement strategies to alter their fate. Many of these insights come from 
consultants, whose interest in applied research resonates with the practical dilemmas 
facing orchestras today. In a 2010 study commissioned by the Met Life Foundation and 
published by the League of American Orchestras, Lela Tepavac found that orchestras 
with committed and unified leadership, an open artistic decision-making model, and a 
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propensity for collaboration were more likely to succeed in difficult economic 
environments.
168
 Other work exploring civic engagement in the arts has called for the 
development of “learning institutions” based on the principles of participatory evaluation 
and collaborative inquiry.
169
 From this perspective, arts organizations need to rely on data 
that is collected and valued by multiple constituent groups, minimizing power dynamics 
within and between institutions to construct an inclusive theory of change.   
A second study commissioned by the League of American Orchestras posits an 
integrated approach to audience engagement, defining it not as a distinct strategy but a 
fundamental characteristic shared by successful arts organizations.
170
 The authors 
conclude that orchestras can engage audiences better by exploring non-traditional 
performance spaces, soliciting substantive feedback, and encouraging listeners to 
participate actively in the design and interpretation of their own experiences. Another 
recent research report published by the Wallace Foundation reached similar 
conclusions.
171
 They argue that the challenges arts organizations face stem not only from 
the recent economic downturn, but from longer-term seismic shifts. Technological 
innovations have made it possible to gather and interact more spontaneously, without the 
assistance or authority of traditional institutions. Moreover, a vast array of entertainment 
alternatives exists, empowering discerning consumers to pick and choose how they spend 
their leisure dollars. Yet the participatory process is not a zero-sum game; it is dynamic 
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and always evolving. Providing and maintaining access to artists and their performances 
is critical for twenty-first century arts institutions, who must reconcile accessibility with a 
decidedly exclusive past. 
 These engagement techniques represent opportunities for change that resonate 
not just with orchestras, but with other nonprofits as well. Indeed, the lessons learned 
throughout this dissertation can be extended to a number of organizational contexts, 
including those in the performing arts (e.g. opera and theater companies) and other 
nonprofits (e,g. museums and universities). These organizations rely on similar structures 
and strategies, and face similar challenges, as the symphony orchestra, and thus the 
analytical framework proposed above might yield new insights that expand or nuance my 
findings. More work also needs to be done to trace how orchestras and their audiences 
have variably defined “success” and “excellence” since the adoption of the corporate 
operating model. Understanding how people measure and perceive value is a crucial step 
in determining what conditions breed success. Other directions for future research include 
a more comprehensive analysis of how organizational structure impacts musical 
composition processes. It seems plausible that the stylistic and technical attributes made 
available to composers during a certain period are contingent on the broader 
organizational framework. The limited scope of this dissertation also invites future 
comparative study of how these issues play out in various European countries, where 
orchestras face similar structural challenges in an altogether different context.  
It is clear that change is an inevitable and continuous process that has impacted 
orchestras from the very beginning. While much of my dissertation details the industry’s 
failure to change in concert with its environment, the story of the symphony orchestra in 
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America is not simply one of economic turmoil and cultural irrelevance. Orchestras are 
playing more music at a higher level than ever before, and have the potential to reach 
new audiences through technological and programming innovations. With thousands of 
conservatory graduates looking for work each year, the artistic quality of small regional 
ensembles has soared, and in 2007 there were at least 2000 orchestras operating around 
the country, encompassing 3,500 conductors, 8,000 staff members, 75,000 board 
members, and over 400,000 volunteers.
172
 Although significant structural alterations may 
be necessary for some orchestras to survive, this does not mean that the current nonprofit 
model will disappear. By looking beyond their collective past and exploiting 
opportunities for change and innovation, orchestras might avoid continued crisis and 
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Figure 6.2: First Edition Recordings by the Louisville Orchestra, 1954–87 
 
 
Record No. Composer First Name Last Name Title 
L5452 Henry Cowell Symphony No. 11 
L5452 Alexander  Tcherepnin Suite, Op. 87 
L5452 Bernard Wagenaar A Concert Overture 
L5454 Alan Hovhaness Concerto No. 7 for Orchestra 
L5454 Mario Castelnuovo-Tedesco Overture to "Much Ado About Nothing" 
L5454 Carlos Surinach Sinfonietta Flamenca 
L5455 Jacques Ibert Louisville Concerto 
L5455 Gardner Read Toccata Giocoso 
L5455 Otto Luening-Vladimir Ussachevsky Rhapsodic Variations for Tape and Orchestra 
L5459 Gottfried Von Einem Meditations 
L5459 Karol Rathaus Prelude for Orchestra, Opus 71 
L5459 George Perle Rhapsody for Orchestra 
L565 Juan Orrego-Salas  Serenata Concertante, Op. 42 
L565 Harold Shapero Credo for Orchestra 
L565 Robert Muczynski Concerto No. 1 for Piano and Orchestra 
L566 Henk Badings The Louisville Symphony 
L566 Ben  Weber Prelude and Passacaglia 
L566 Leo  Sowerby All on a Summers Day 
L571 Paul Nordoff Winter Symphony 
L571 Paul Muller-Zurich Concerto for Cello and Orchestra, Op. 55 
L572 Andre Jolivet Suite Transoceane 
L572 John Vincent Symphony in D 
L582 Lou Harrison "Four Strict Songs" for Eight Baritones and Orchestra 
L582 Peter Jona Korn Variations on a Tune from "The Beggar's Opera" 
L583 Elliott Carter Variations for Orchestra 
L583 Everett Helm Second Piano Concerto 
L585 Roger Goeb Concertino for Orchestra ll. 
L585 Gail Kubik Symphony No. 2 in F. 
L586 Walter  Piston Serenata 





L586 Niels Viggo Bentzon Pezzi Sinfonici, Opus 109 
L591 Aaron Copland Orchestral Variations  
L591 Alfonso Letelier Aculeo, Suite for Orchestra 
L592 Sir Arthur Bliss Discourse for Orchestra 
L592 Colin McPhee Symphony No. 2, Pastoral 
L593 Herbert Elwell Concert Suite for Violin and Orchestra 
L593 Halsey Stevens Sinfonia Breve 
L595 Henry Cowell Ongaku for Orchestra 
L595 Benjamin Lees Symphony No. 2 
L596 Bohuslav Martinu Estampes 
L596 Nikolai Lopatnikoff Music for Orchestra, Op. 39 
L601 Paul Ben-Haim "To the Chief Musician" 
L601 Wallingford Riegger Variation for Violin-Orchestra 
L605 Paul Hindemith Sinfonietta in E 
L605 Claude Almand John Gilbert: A Steamboat Overture 
L605 David Diamond Overture: "Timon of Athens" 
L606 Bernard Rogers Dance Scenes 
L606 Joaquin Rodrigo Cuatro Madrigales Amatorios: for Soprano and Orchestra 
L606 Vincent Persichetti Serenade No. 5 
L612 Ernst Toch Peter Pan 
L612 Roberto Garcia-Morillo Variaciones Olimpicas, Opus 24 
L613 Peter   Mennin Symphony No. 5 
L613 Joaquin Rodrigo Concerto Galante for Violincello and Orchestra 
L615 Alexander  Tcherepnin Piano Concerto No. 2 
L615 Arthur Honegger Suite Archaique 
L616 Robert Kurka Symphony No. 2 
L616 Robert Whitney Concertino     
L621 Charles  Ives Decoration Day 
L621 Lou Harrison Suite for Symphonic Strings 
L622 Henry Cowell Thesis (Symphony No. 15) 
L622` Rodolfo Halffter Ballet Suite, "La Madrugada Del Panadero" (Early Awaking of the Baker) 
L623 Harald Saeverud Peer Gynt Suite No. 1, Op. 28 
L623 George Rochberg Night Music 





L624 Andrzej Panufnik Sinfonia Elegiaca 
L625 Ross Lee Finney Symphony No. 2 
L625 Iain Hamilton Scottish Dances, Op. 32 
L626 Benjamin Britten Violin Concerto No. 1, Op. 15 
L626 Paul Ben-Haim Pastorale Variee for Clarinet, Harp and Strings, Op. 31 
L631 Zoltan Kodaly Symphony (1961) 
L631 Nelson Keyes Suite, "Music for Monday Evenings" 
L632 Hale Smith Contours for Orchestra 
L632 Garner Read Night Flight, Op. 44 
L632 Robert Kurka Serenade for Small Orchestra, Op. 25 
L633 Walter  Piston Concerto for Viola and Orchestra 
L633` Hall Overton Symphony No. 2 in One Movement 
L634 George Rochberg Symphony No. 1  
L634 Ray  Luke Symphony No. 2 
LS636 Frank Martin  Concerto for Violin and Orchestra 
LS636 Ernest Bloch Proclamation for Trumpet and Orchestra 
LS636 Toshiro Mayuzumi Pieces for Prepared Piano and Strings 
L641 Chou Wen-Chung Soliloquy of a Bhiksuni 
L641 Luigi Dallapiccola Due Pezzi 
L641 Jose Serebrier Partita 
L642 Quincy Porter Symphony No. 2 
L642 Vittorio Giannini Divertimento No. 2 
L644 Ned Rorem Eleven Studies for Eleven Players 
L644 William Sydeman Orchestral Abstractions 
LS645 Alexander  Tcherepnin Symphony No. 2 
LS645 Richard Mohaupt Town Piper Music 
L646 Wallingford Riegger Symphony No. 4 
L646 Roberto Gerhard Alegrias, Ballet Suite 
L651 Alvin Etler Concerto for Wind Quintet and Orchestra 
L651 Ives Schuman Variations on "America" 
L651 Ulysses Kay Umbrian Scene 
L652 Ross Lee Finney Symphony No. 1 (Communique 1943 
L652 Daniel Pinkham Symphony No. 2 





LS653 William Kraft Concerto Grosso 
LS654 Nikolai Lopatnikoff Variazioni Concertani 
LS654 Andrzej Panufnik Nocturne 
L655 Roy Harris   Symphony No. 5 
L655 Paul Creston Corinthians Xlll 
LS656 Robert Kurka Suite from "The Good Soldier Schweik" 
LS656 Carlos Surinach Symphonic Variations 
LS661 Ernst Toch Jephta. Rhapsodic Poem (Symphony No. 5) 
LS661 Harry Somers Passacaglia and Fugue 
LS661 Francois Morel Antiphonie 
L662 Alan Hovhaness The Silver Pilgrimage (Symphony No. 15) 
L662 Lennox Berkeley Four Rosard Sonnets for Tenor and Orchestra 
LS663 Bohuslav Martinu Symphony No. 5 
LS663 Virgil Thomson Concerto for Flute  
L664 G. F. Malipiero Notturno di Canti e Balli 
L664 Irwin Baselon Short Symphony (Testament to a Big City) 
L665 Benjamin Lees Concerto for Orchestra 
L665 Ronald Herder Movements for Orchestra 
L665 Luigi Nono Due Expressioni (Part 1) 
L666 Roy Harris Epilogue to "Profiles in Courage" -J.F.K. 
L666 Gunther Schuller Dramatic Overture 
L666 Toshiro Mayuzumi Samsara. Symphonic Poem 
LS671 Boris Blacher Orcherstal Fantasy 
LS671 Andrzej Panufnik Rapsody for Orchestra 
L672 Ross Lee Finney Symphony No. 3 
L672 Silvestre Revueltas Ventanas 
L672 Lothar Klein Musique A Go-Go 
LS673 Daniel Pinkham Signs of the Zodiac 
LS673 Robert Rohe Mainescape 
LS674 Alvin Etler Triptych 
LS674 Harold Shapero Partita in C for Piano and Small Orchestra 
LS675 Peter Racine Fricker Symphony No. 1 
LS676 Goffredo Petrassi Concerto No. 5 for Orchestra 





LS676 Irwin Fischer Overture on an Exuberant Tone Row 
L681 Henry Cowell Sinfonietta 
L681 Carlos Surinach Melorhythmic Dramas 
L682 Robert Starer Mutabili 
L682 Charles  Koechlin  Cinq Chorals dans Les Modes du Moyen-Age 
L682 Henry Cowell Ballad Hymns and Fuguing Tunes Nos. 2 and 3 
L683 Dmitri Shostakovich Suite from "Hamlet," Op. 32 
L683 Leon Kirchner Toccata for Strings, Solo Winds, and Percussion 
LS684 Paul Hindemith  Kammermusik No. 2, Op. 36, No. 1 
LS684 Goffredo Petrassi "Noche Oscura," Cantata for Mixed Chorus and Orchestra 
LS685 Boris Blacher Orchestra Ornament 
LS685 Francis Poulenc Deux Marches et un Intermede 
LS685 Darius Milhaud Cortege Funebre 
L686 Leonardo Balada Guernica 
L686 Gunther Schuller Five Bagatelles for Orchestra 
L686 Luigi Dallapiccola Piccola Musica Notturna 
LS691 Peter Schickele Three Views from "The Open Window." 
LS691 Robert Dennis Three Views from "The Open Window." 
LS691 Stanley Walden Three Views from "The Open Window." 
L692 William Schuman Symphony No. 4 
L692 Robert Bernat In Memoriam: John F. Kennedy 
L693 Peter Mennin Concerto for Cello and Orchestra   
L693 Arthur Honegger  Prelude to "Aglavaine et Selysette." 
L694 Paul Hindemith Concert Music for Solo Viola and Large Chamber Orchestra, Op. 48 
L694 Easley Blackwood Concerto for Violin and Orchestra, Op. 21 
L695 Heitor Villa-Lobos Danses Africaines 
L695 John Addison Concerto for Trumpet, Strings and Percussion 
L696 Silvestre  Revueltas "Redes" (complete) 
L696 Alberto Ginastera "Ollantay" A Symphonic Triptych 
LS701 Antonio Tauriello "Illinx," for Clarinet Solo and Orchestra 
LS701 Marcel Grandjany Aria in Classic Style for Harp and Strings 
LS701 Matyas Seiber Concertino for Clarinet and Strings 
LS702 Hector Tosar Toccata 





LS702 Jacques Ibert Bacchanale 
LS702 Yoav Talmi Overture on Mexican Themes 
LS702 Camargo Guarnieri Three Dances for Orchestra 
LS703 Julius Reitz Concert Overture, Op. 7 
LS703 Max Bruch Symphony No. 2 in F Minor, Op. 36 
LS704 Richard Strauss Six Songs, Op. 68 "Brentano" 
LS704 Phillip Rhodes "The Lament of Michal," for Soprano and Orchestra 
LS705 Joseph Joachim Concerto for Violin and Orchestra in D minor (“Hungarian Concerto”) 
LS706 Vincent Persichetti Symphony No. 8 
LS706 Wallingford Riegger Study in Sonority 
LS711 George Crumb "Echoes of Time and the River" (Echoes ll) 
LS711 Merrill Ellis "Kaleidoscope," for Orchestra, Synthesizer, and Soprano 
LS712 Ezra Laderman "Magic Prison" 
LS712 Archibald MacLeish "Magic Prison" 
LS712 Nelson Keyes "Abysses, Bridges, Chasms" for Ten Rock-Jazz Soloists and Orchestra 
LS713 Carlos Chavez Suite from "Horsepower" 
LS713 Enrique Granados "Dante," Symphonic Poem, Op. 21 
LS714 Gustavo Becerra Symphony No. 1 
LS714 Jesus Pinzon Study for Orchestra 
LS714 Gerardo Gandini Fantasie-Impromptu for Piano and Orchestra 
LS714 Hector Quintanar Sideral ll 
LS715 Gyorgy Rayki Elegiac Variations and Lamentation for Orchestra 
LS715 Wallingford Riegger Dichotomy 
LS716 Morton Gould "Soundings" and "Columbia" 
LS716 Carlisle Floyd In Celebration: An Overture for Orchestra 
LS721 John Becker "Symphonia Brevis" (Symphony No. 3) 
LS721 William Schuman Prayer in Time of War 
LS721 Felix Labunski Canto di Aspirazione 
LS722 Krzysztof Penderecki De Natura Sonoris No. 2 
LS722 Gene Gutche Genghis Khan, Op. 37 
LS722 Karel Husa Music for Prague 1968 
LS723-4 Phillip Rhodes From "Paradise Lost".  An Opera-Oratorio in Three Acts 
LS725 Karl  Husa Two Sonnets from Michaelangelo 





LS726 Leonardo Balada "Maria Sabina", Symphonic Tragedy for Narrators, Chorus and Orchestra 
LS731 Frank Martin Concerto for Cello and Orchestra 
LS731 Malcolm Arnold Concerto for Two Violins and String Orchestra 
LS732 Rod  McKuen "The City" and "I Hear America Singing" 
LS733 Ned Rorem Piano Concerto in Six Movements 
LS733 Thomas Briccetti Overture: The Fountain of Youth 
LS733 Paul Turok "Lyric Variations" for Oboe and Strings 
LS734 Max Reger A Comedy Overture, Op. 120 
LS734 Georges Bizet Chromatic Variations (orch. Felix Weingartner) 
LS734 Moritz Moszkowski Suite No. 3, Op. 79 
LS734 Edward Napravnik Festive March 
LS735 Lawrence Widdoes Morning Music 
LS735 Peter Schulthorpe Sun Music lll 
LS735 Alan Hovhaness "Avak, The Healer" for Soprano, Trumpet and Strings 
LS736 Jaques Ibert "Ballad of Reading Gaol" 
LS736 Charles  Koechlin Partita for Chamber Orchestra 
LS741 Matthias Bamert "Mantrajana" 
LS741 Gordon Crosse Some Marches on a Ground 
LS741 Phillip Rhodes "Museum Pieces" for String Quartet and Clarinet 
LS742 Norman Dello Joio Homage to Haydn 
LS742 Dan Welcher Concerto for Flute and Orchestra 
LS743 Ernest Guiraud The Fantastic Hunt 
LS743 Moritz Moskowski Violin Concerto, C Major, Op. 30 
LS744 Darius Milhaud Symphony No. 6 
LS744 Darius Milhaud Chansons de Ronsard 
LS745 Samuel  Barber Die Natali 
LS745 Claus Adam Concerto for Cello and Orchestra 
LS746 Walter  Piston Symphony No. 7 
LS746 Walter  Piston Symphony No. 8 
LS751 David Baker Le Chat Qui Peche, for Soprano, Jazz Quartet and Orchestra 
LS751 Morton Gould Symphonette No. 2 
LS752 Benjamin Lees Symphony No. 3 
LS752 Joaquin Turina Danzas Gitanas 





LS753 George Chadwick Overture "Euterpe." 
LS754 Arthur Foote Francessca da Rimini 
LS754 Arthur Bird Carnival Scene 
LS754 Leo Ornstein Nocturne and Dance 
LS755 Walter  Piston Incredible Flutist 
LS755 Dudley Buck Festival Overture 
LS756 Ernst Krenek Kleine Blasmusik.  Three Merry Marches 
LS756 Peter Maxwell Davies Saint Michael Sonata 
LS757 Stephen Douglas Burton Songs of the Tulpehocken 
LS758 Edward Harper Bartok Games 
LS758 Alun Hoddinott Investiture Dances 
LS758 Anthony Strilko The Mediation of Hermes Trismegistis 
LS759 Antal Dorati Concerto for Violoncello and Orchestra 
LS759 Gyorgy Ranki Suite from "King Pamade's New Clothes" 
LS760 Eric Stokes The Continental Harp and Band Report 
LS761 Joaquin Nin Diferencias 
LS761 Blas Galindo Symphony No. 2 
LS762 Heitor Villa-Lobos Bachianas Brasileiras No. 4 
LS762 Priscilla  McLean Variations and Mozaics on a Theme of Stravinsky 
LS763 Samuel  Barber Prayers of Kierkegaard, Op. 30, for Mixed Chorus and Orchestra 
LS763 Dan E. Welcher Dervishes: Ritual DanceScene for Full Orchestra 
LS763 Hunter Johnson Past the Evening Sun 
LS764 Jacob Druckman Lamia 
LS764 Dominick Argento Royal Invitation: Homage to the Queen of Tonga 
LS765 Roque Cordero Symphony No. 2 in One Movement 
LS765 Leonardo Balada Homage to Sarasate 
LS765 Henry Brant On The Nature of Things, after Lucretius 
LS766 Roy Harris When Johnny Comes Marching Home, An American Overture 
LS766 John Weinzweig Symphonic Ode 
LS766 Walter  Piston Symphony No. 1 
LS767 Gian-Carlo Menotti The Telephone 
LS767 Ivana Themmen Shelter This Candle From The Wind 
LS768 Peter Schickele Pentangle, Five Songs for French Horn and Orchestra 





LS768 Joyce Mekeel Vigil 
LS769 Jacques Hetu Concerto for Piano and Orchestra, Op. 15 
LS769 Dereck Healey Arctic Images 
LS770 Peter Maxwell Davies St. Thomas Wake, Fox Trot for Orchestra 
LS770 George Antheil Symphony No. 5 
LS771 John Corigliano Elegy   
LS771 John Corigliano Tournaments 
LS771 Bohuslav Martinu Oboe Concerto 
LS772 Donald Erb Autumnmusic; Christmasmusic; Concerto for Trombone and Orchestra 
LS773 Daniel Bortz In Memoria Di 
LS773 Gunnar  De Frumerie Symphonic Varistions 
LS773 Lars Erik Larsson  Divertimento 
LS774 George Crumb Variazioni    
LS774 Sidney Hodkinson Fresco 
LS775 Karel Husa The Trogan Women 
LS776 Roger Sessions Symphony No. 7; Divertimento 
LS777 Toshiro Mayuzumi Essay for String Orchestra 
LS777 Duke Ellington Suite from "The River" 
LS778 Thomas Ludwig Symphony No. 1 
LS778 Stanislaw Skrowaczewski Music at Night 
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1971-72 $2,515,635  $1,299,620  0.516617032 
1972–73 $2,800,900  $1,561,565  0.55752261 
1973–74 $2,950,783  $1,663,911  0.563888059 
1974–75 $3,292,355  $1,995,609  0.606134338 
1975–76 $3,638,362  $2,212,131  0.608001896 
1976–77 $3,918,939  $2,319,821  0.591951274 
1977–78 $4,451,084  $2,675,593  0.601110313 
1978–79 $5,196,218  $3,131,729  0.602693857 
1979–80 $5,856,123  $3,527,006  0.602276746 
1980–81 $6,726,092  $4,050,783  0.602249095 
1981–82 $7,685,748  $4,664,884  0.606952581 
1982–83 $8,293,110  $4,919,285  0.593177383 
1983–84 $9,281,620  $5,370,453  0.578611636 
1984–85 $10,441,960  $5,404,348  0.517560692 
1985–86 $11,563,303  $6,200,434  0.536216498 
1986–87 $12,376,253  $7,637,960  0.617146418 
1987–88 $13,598,788  $8,707,971  0.640349066 
1988–89 $14,551,573  $9,117,857  0.626589091 
1989–90 $15,293,875  $9,536,637  0.623559238 
1990–91 $16,029,458  $9,656,497  0.602421901 
1991–92 $16,602,794  $10,357,780  0.62385766 
1992–93 $17,139,567  $11,029,589  0.64351618 
1993–94 $17,085,363  $10,797,529  0.631975362 
1994–95 $17,939,706  $11,389,247  0.634862523 
1995–96 $19,422,994  $12,293,299  0.632924994 
1996–97 $20,420,962  $12,270,001  0.600853224 
1997–98 $21,824,874  $13,613,417  0.623756981 
1998–99 $22,815,510  $14,280,466  0.625910414 
1999–2000 $24,347,530  $15,104,037  0.62035192 
2000–01 $25,115,461  $16,742,365  0.666615848 
2001–02 $26,005,721  $11,730,365  0.451068641 
2002–03 $26,203,598  $16,880,350  0.644199708 
2003–04 $28,226,475  $19,392,635  0.687037105 
2004–05 $28,497,693  $20,687,669  0.725941897 
2005–06 $30,148,108  $20,417,428  0.677237449 
2006–07 $31,272,213  $25,323,353  0.809771688 
2007–08 $33,371,346  $12,123,277  0.363284017 
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Figure 6.3 Income Gap Data (1990–2009), without endowment income 
Year Avg. Expenses 
Earned Revenue, less 
endowment income Proportion Covered 
1990–91 $16,029,458  $7,965,528  0.496930578 
1991–92 $16,602,794  $8,527,083  0.513593279 
1992–93 $17,139,567  $9,038,996  0.527376009 
1993–94 $17,085,363  $9,008,576  0.527268652 
1994–95 $17,939,706  $9,400,855  0.524025012 
1995–96 $19,422,994  $10,032,922  0.516548674 
1996–97 $20,420,962  $9,910,287  0.485299725 
1997–98 $21,824,874  $11,002,845  0.504142423 
1998–99 $22,815,510  $11,274,507  0.494159758 
1999–2000 $24,347,530  $11,923,147  0.489706622 
2000–01 $25,115,461  $11,753,023  0.46795966 
2001–02 $26,005,721  $11,653,793  0.448124198 
2002–03 $26,203,598  $11,704,446  0.446673239 
2003–04 $28,226,475  $12,207,246  0.43247506 
2004–05 $28,497,693  $12,260,563  0.43023003 
2005–06 $30,148,108  $13,105,702  0.434710588 
2006–07 $31,272,213  $13,411,225  0.42885437 
2007–08 $33,371,346  $13,015,258  0.39001299 
2008–09 $34,576,709  $14,345,617  0.414892498 
 








1971-72 $2,515,635  $1,299,620  0.516617032 
1972–73 2637382 1470400 0.557522574 
1973–74 2503167 1411506 0.563888067 
1974–75 2559967 1551689 0.606136329 
1975–76 2673917 1625747 0.608002043 
1976–77 2704338 1600836 0.591951154 
1977–78 2854605 1715933 0.601110486 
1978–79 2988771 1801314 0.602693883 
1979–80 2967698 1787375 0.602276579 
1980–81 3090272 1861114 0.602249252 
1981–82 3325030 2018135 0.606952418 
1982–83 3476540 2062204 0.593177124 
1983–84 3730519 2158521 0.578611448 
1984–85 4051051 2096665 0.517560752 
1985–86 4402440 2360661 0.536216507 
1986–87 4548214 2806914 0.617146423 
1987–88 4800663 3074100 0.640349052 
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1988–89 4901733 3071373 0.626589208 
1989–90 4887836 3047856 0.623559383 
1990–91 4916434 2961768 0.602421999 
1991–92 4943965 3084330 0.623857572 
1992–93 4955150 3188719 0.64351614 
1993–94 4814307 3042524 0.631975485 
1994–95 4931750 3130983 0.634862473 
1995–96 5183996 3281081 0.632925064 
1996–97 5359247 3220121 0.600853254 
1997–98 5637487 3516422 0.623757004 
1998–99 5738437 3591747 0.625910331 
1999–2000 5922400 3673973 0.620352053 
2000–01 6012988 4008353 0.666615832 
2001–02 6080203 2742589 0.451068657 
2002–03 6012235 3873080 0.644199703 
2003–04 6269477 4307363 0.687037053 
2004–05 6121585 4443915 0.725941893 
2005–06 6318156 4278892 0.677237472 
2006–07 6375229 5162480 0.809771696 
2007–08 6554107 2381002 0.363283968 
2008–09 6818112 812892 0.119225381 
 
Figure 6.5 Income Gap Data (1990–2009), w/o endowment income & adjusted for 
inflation 
 
Year Avg. Expenses 
Avg. Earned Revenue, 
less endowment income 
Proportion 
Covered 
1990–91 4916434 2443127 0.496930702 
1991–92 4943965 2539187 0.513593239 
1992–93 4955150 2613227 0.527375962 
1993–94 4814307 2538433 0.527268618 
1994–95 4931750 2584360 0.52402494 
1995–96 5183996 2677786 0.516548624 
1996–97 5359247 2600841 0.485299707 
1997–98 5637487 2842097 0.504142537 
1998–99 5738437 2835704 0.494159647 
1999–2000 5922400 2900239 0.489706707 
2000–01 6012988 2813836 0.46795969 
2001–02 6080203 2724686 0.448124183 
2002–03 6012235 2685504 0.446673159 
2003–04 6269477 2711392 0.43247499 
2004–05 6121585 2633689 0.430229916 
2005–06 6318156 2746569 0.434710539 
2006–07 6375229 2734045 0.428854399 
2007–08 6554107 2556187 0.39001301 
2008–09 6818112 2828784 0.414892568 
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